WOMAN: Mr Rouhani I wonder if we could start by my asking you what were the main grievances which Iranians had about Anglo Iraian oil companies operations?

MAN: Well the grievances against the Anglo Iranian can be divided into two periods, before the war and after the war. During the two decades, the 1920's and the 1030's grievances began to become more and more important, in late 1920's, a few Iranians were engaged by the Anglo Iranian on contracts more or less similar to the contract of the British employees, one of these erm was a person who was posted to Abadan, he stayed only a short time and then resigned, when he resigned he gave the reason writing to the general manager, he gave the reasons for his resignatin which was that there was discrimination against the Iranians in every respect, in transport in salaries the wage scale at that time was er 4 reals a day for unskilled labour which is the equivalent of 1 shilling and six pence, and er the .... facilities excluded Iranians, the stores you know for provision stores were different, the provisions which Iranians could deal were different of those of the Europeans, er could deal in and in everyway there was discrimination it looked as if the principle which governed the decisions of the policy makers in London was that British superiority must be preserved at any cost. So this friend of mine after a few months he resigned and he wrote to the general manager and he received the reply which said er Rome was not built in a day. when he came back to TEhran he told me that he was absolutely struck by the feeling of discontent, this is the late 1920's about 1930, and he said that that when he arrived
discontent er which was er represented by a number of incidents by a number of ....none of which he was very much amused with and it was that a director from London had arrived in the fields areas and had addressed the workman at the drilling site, and he said you know you ought to be very thankful to us for getting the oil out of the ground, because that will provide work for you, and then this....workman, you know .....is very well reputed for their humour, he said we know exactly the reason for which you get the oil out of the ground, you know where you will go in the next world, and gods fuel at that place is oil, so you want to get as much of it out of the ground as you can. That shows the spirit of the workman of already were feeling that the discrimination against Iranians was unfair, the extreme in every way not only as far as the wage scale was concerned, transport housing medicale facilities in every way. That was the position in the 1920's. In the 1930's.....

Could I ask you to go straight to the 1950's now, the late 1940's and what was the grievances then?

Then er after the war there was a new series of grievances which were based on the fact that er Iran suddenly realised that the existance of a foreign company dealing with such an important source of energy as petroleum was against the sovereignty and against the higher interests of the state. It was in particular after the occupation of ....in 1941, after the occupation there were a number of stories about the way the Anglo Iranian had erm shown it's loyalty more to they British than to the Iranians, there was a feeling that the had helped the British forces when they arrived in Abadan. And er also there were other causes of grievances which were which came after after the war, and one of these was that
Anglo Iranian were the figures and facts which Iran's participation and share in the oil company had to be determined, and the Anglo Iranian would not allow that at all, and also in some of the negotiations they went out of their way to create suspicion on the part of Iran, at one meeting which I remember distinctly because I was present at the meeting, this was in 19, in er late 1949, the Prime Minister was Mr Sahed, the British Ambassador was present and the minister of justice was present and when the Iranian prime minister asked what as the Anglo Iranian offered in the way of improving on the terms of the concession, er Fraser was then the chairman who was present together with ....Fraser said er we have given you this, then repeated the same thing under with a different er under different form of explanation, and then went on...third way of explaining the same thing. And the minister of justice then said may I tell a story....

Mr Rouhani I'll have to interrupt you, I think we haven't got time for that story now. Now can I ask you whether you know of any occasion in which Anglo Iranian was warned about the discontent, I understand that you have a story to tell about that.

Wel er yes, a number of Iranian employees of the company of the higher category of employees knew that er conditions were becoming more and more I mean unfavourable, and they er including myself wrote er notes explaining what the situation was and these notes were sent on to London, and afterwards we were told unofficially we never received a formal reply but we were told unofficially that there was an impression in London
that those who prepared these notes were under the communist influence political influence which was against the Anglo Iranian, so they would not believe that the situation was really as unfavourable to them as it was.

WOMAN: Were you under communist influence?

MAN: Oh no, well I think none of us was, none of us was had anything to do with the communist propaganda which was being made against the Anglo Iranian there is no doubt, but none of us was under that influence, just seeing how discontent was growing.

WOMAN: Did Iranian's in your position feel that you were being discriminated against?

MAN: Oh yes, yes certainly there were...there were two really two weights and two measures, one for the British and the select few Iranian's, there is no doubt a number of Iranians how were treated more or less in the same way as the European members of the staff, but the vast majority the vast majority was treated entirely different on another basis and that created a very natural state of dissatisfaction.

WOMAN: Thank you. Now coming to now about after the nationalisation took place, what was Mossadegh's main objectives as he told Jackson when Jackson came to see him, I understand that you were there too.

MAN: Yes, I waser Mossadegh asked me to interpret and er there was only Jackson Mossadegh and myself, and er Jackson explained that he had come to find a way by which the Anglo Iranian would continue because the Anglo Iranian had created the industry and it was a pity that it should not continue with whatever arrangements were made under nationalisation. And so Mosadegh said well you know what we want, we want to manage our own industry, and but er we are perfectly willing to employ, to keep your employees, they are perfectly willing
to have an arrangement with you by which you will have all
the oil that you need, but er we cannot have you as a
 .....we, if we have you as a....how are we going to reject
 $ er the request for a concession made by the by the Russians
which er there had been made, and he said in our overall
political situation we are not in a position to offer a
concessino to the Russian, but as long as you have a concession
how can we turn down their request for one, so give up your
concessions, we will assure to you, we will ensure that everything
that you want, all you want is to be able to export to have your
oil requirements met, and I guarantee to you that you will have
all the oil that you will need. Then Jackson said er yes
buter we want to remain, that Anglo Iranian wants to remain
in the form of a company co-operating with your national
company, and Mossadegh said well we don't want that co-operation
er except co-operation with your employees we will certainly have
by engaging them ourselves, and we will give them exactly the
same privilages. Then er Jackson said er we will recognise
a kind natinoalisatin, and Mossadegh said well there is no
kind of nationaliation which we will xxxxxx be acceptable to
us accept the real kind. And so on that the er negotiation
I mean er was failed completely

But do you in fact believe that the British did accept
Irans right to nationalise, could you explain what their
attitudes was?

No their attitude was that er the er anglo Iranian or a
substitute of the Anglo Iranian should remain whatever the
nationalisation picture was, that that organisation should
remain and that of course was unacceptable to Iran, because
all Iran wanted was what it has now, is to be able to run
its own industry with employees whether Iranian or foreign
or on any arrangements but they wanted to er run the industry, ....

WOMAN Thank you very much......

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WOMAN Mr Rouhani can I ask you about your impression of Mossadegh as a person?

MAN I knew Mossadegh very well as a person, he was er a representative of the true representative of the old aristocracy of Iran, it was culture, er refined, broad minded, human and absolutely erm free from any....or religious fanaticism. And so I think he was eminantly suited to er the improve relations between the east and the west, between and in the particular circumstances of Iran and Great Britain, but also in the wider level between the west, east and the west, because there was a situation of crisis in the beginning of 1950's, there was a situation of crisis not only in Iran but in the whole of the Middle East. And he was eminantly fitted to deal with that situation and to bring about a new, a re-adjustment of relations between the east and the west. Er, he was perfectly sane, the stories about hs having been mad or threatrical or ....those histories are totally unfounded, I will tell you one instance which shows to what extent they were unfounded, there was a story in Tehran at that time, I think I heard it repeated afterwards that on one occasion, he fainted he collapsed, his son in parliament his son rushed to see what was wrong with him and he bent down to feel his pulse where upon he whispered to him, mind nobody picks my pocket. And er that is totally, when I repeated that story to his son, because I wanted to find out all the facts connected with Mossadegh, he was so outraged, that I thought he might have attacked me, he said it was totally unfounded, there were a number of stories
Opponents, he was perfectly sane, he knew exactly what he wanted, what he wanted was very simple, as I said er a minute ago, he said we have an industry, we want to run it ourselves, we have the means of running it, and er because the British and Americans at that time did not want an independent oil company in Iran, they er made all kinds of remarks stories ... allegations of communistic influence and things like that which in my opinion were totally false, I saw Mossadegh at least once or twice every week and I knew him perfectly, and I don't think that he was in any way artificial in his approach to this oil question he was perfectly sincere.

Thank you. It is of course illeged that he didn't really know enough about the oil industry, he didn't understand the complexities, could you deal with these allegations.

Well to know all about the oil industry is not such an important matter, the chairman of the oil companies who have come after him I was deputy chairman myself for many years, it was not at all necessary to know all the details, when I was er deputy chairman of six years, and there is a great deal in the industry, of which I knew nothing, its not important, the importance is to be able to have the right assistance the right advicers, the correct overall policy, and Mossadeghs overall policy was perfectly just, he said we want to run our industry we have the men to run the industry, and er as it turned out the er the Iranian employees of the...Iranians exports without any assistance from any experts any foreign experts were able to maintain the installations during the whole of the period of er nationalisation and to produce as much oil and refine as
much oil as was needed for internal consumption and limited
exports.

Now can you tell us Mr Rouhani what was actually new about
the Harriman and Stokes Mission which came to Iran in 1951,
and what happened?

Well their proposals were substantially the same as the
proposals made by Jackson, different forms and different
organs but the essence of the proposals were exactly the
same as proposed by Jackson and as repeated afterwards by
the world banks, all these proposals were the same thing,
that internal distribution should be in the hands of the
national company, but all arrangements about producing,
refining exporting must be in the hands of another
organisation in which of course Iran could be represented
by having directors or er advicers, but the whole essence
of all those proposals was the same, that a foreign organisation
ought to run the industry both production and refining and that
was unacceptable to Mossadegh.

Was Mossadegh in fact disappointed at the response of the
Americans to what he'd done?

Er, very much so, but still he kept on hoping that some how
America would come .... until er late in 1953, on the 6th
July 1953, Eisenhower sent a major statement which made
it perfectly clear that America would no longer support
Mossadegh.

So when Mossadegh embarked on nationalisation, what was he
expecting the Americans to do?

He was expecting the Americans to help Iran by giving Iran
necessary equipment, experts and allow Iran to export its oil
including to American or American purchasers and he thought
that America would come to Iran's help because as you know
Americans had expressed sympathy on several occasions with nationalist movements in Iran, and also Henry Grady who was the Ambassador, the American Ambassador in Tehran had helped Mossadegh personally and officially a great deal, and a number of Americans connected with the oil industry had said that American would support Iran and there was a wide spread feeling which perhaps was justified, there was a wide spread feeling that American oil companies were only waiting for the occasion on which they could penetrate the Iranian scene, which up to then had been a British preserve. So all those considerations made Mossadegh hope that America would help in.

now in the summer of 1951, an Iranian commission went down to Abadan to take over, the refinery, what was the reception they got?

I wasn't present on that occasion but I had a report which came back to Mossadegh and it said that the reception was extraordinary, because there was a feeling that er now all the defects of the oil regime which were in a word discriminat against Iranians although defects would be removed because all the administrations of the industry would be in the hands of the Iranians, and they had awonderful reception on arrival.

Mossadegh finally ended up in asking the British technicians to leave Iran, could you tell us about why this came about?

Right up to the last moment, Mossadegh did not want the British employees to leave, and he did everything in his power to keep them by assuring to them that they would receive the same treatment if not better as far as salaries were concerned, accommodation was concerned, all the conditions
of employment, he wanted to keep them quite sincerely and
he kept on saying to the British, let us keep your employees
as our employees they said no, if they stay they must stay
as employees of anglo iranian or another organisation, which
will take the place of the anglo iranian, and when Harriman
and Stokes left Iran, Mossadegh tried once again to er by
writing to Harriman I believe, to writing to him and getting
in touch somehow with the British government, he said let
me keep the British employees in the service of the national
oil company, the answer was no, that they could not remain
as employees of the national company, so Mossadegh had no
alternative but to erm expel them which happened I think in
October of 1951, but right up to the last moment, he did
not want them to leave.

WOMAN Why did Mossadegh go to America about that time, what was his
purpose?

MAN He went to attend a meeting of the security council that was
in October, that was in October of 19... he went to the security
council, because after the er proposals made on the British
side had been rejected by Iran, the British government er
appealed to the security council on the grounds that a Iran
was about to use force, by expeling the British employees,
and the situation was one of force, and therefore there
was a danger to world peace, which was a very flimsy I think
excuse, but they did go to the security council, Mossadegh
decided to go in person, to attend the security council and
explain Irans case. Well to explain what he said at the
security council would take a great deal of time, but the
essence of it was just what I have said before, that we
want after all, we want to run our industry and whatever
the Anglo Iranian expects which is to receive oil, we will assure we will guarantee that they will have so er why do they persist in remaining in Iran as a company which is unpopular, because, and er of course the result as you know the result on the acting on a proposal by the French delegate the security council decided to postpone the subject until the Hague court gave its ruling on the question of jurisdiction.

WOMAN did Mossadegh feel that it had been a successful mission.

MAN Yes, yes indeed when he came back from that visit to America, I think his whole position became much stronger with the public. And of course it became still stronger after the Hague court

WOMAN Thank you.

TALKING BACKGROUND
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INT Mr Rouhani can I ask you about what the British did to try and stop Iranian oil being sold and whether you felt that this was justified?

ROUHANI Er it certainly was not justified, because Iran was acting in its rights, er, and er, the the Iranian government had suggested several times that the difference over the question of compensation could could be settled, but the british company was not er in favour of coming to an arrangement because as I said a minute ago, they wanted the Anglo Iranian to remain, that was the real difficulty. As soon as the er, national oil company was er, established, and that part I was personally involved in, er, counting on its ability to er produce up to about 7 or 8 million tons a year, without any help from er, foreign experts, er the er, national companies started looking around for er, customers. And er we sent er notices to all countries, all over the world saying that we are in a position to to er, sell oil, and er, we are ready to receive offers and we received during 1951 ans 1952 we received as many as 260 offers From would be purchasers. Er, all of these er were turned down. By the Iranian government. A large number of them because they came from er, persons er who were not very well known, and er Iran had no confidence in there being able in turning out to be really good purchasers. Some of them were turned down because they came on on proposals of barter arrangement from the countries in in East Europe. And at that time Iran did not want to make a deal with the communist countries. And er, others which seemed er quite
ROUHANI(CONT) er, sound proposals were taken up and followed and as a result of those offers we were able to to break through in early 1953 we were altogether we were able to sell and deliver to Japan and Italy about 120 thousand er tons. But we were not able to er export any more because the british company er, on every occasion the British company brought a case against the er, er buyer, in the courts of the countries concerned. One, in one case they succeeded, which was in er Aden over a consignment of only 600 tons. Er, but in all the other cases which were bought in Japan and in Italy and I was concerned with all of those cases because I attended the courts as er advisor to Dr Mossadegh the ruling was given in favour of the of the purchaser. But those even the purchasers themselves were frightened, and er, they had promised to buy er, more from us and er, they had er, already er, ear marked tankers to come to Iran and er take more consignments but the last moment they decided to er, stop their transactions because the whole time the british government on behalf of the Anglo Iranian was threatening these er, er, countries with some sort of prosecution. So they, that embargo did have the effect of preventing the er national company from er, finding the customers what, it certainly would have been able to find and certainly would have been able to to supply er, quite satisfactorily er thus developing its own situation as an independent company.

INT. Were you not in fact selling stolen oil as the British suggested?
ROUHANI Well that was their er, that was er, (LAUGHS) the way that they put it but it was entirely unfair to call it that because once Iran had nationalised the oil industry according to international law. At that moment Iran became the owner of its oil and to call Iran a thief and having stolen other people's property was absolutely unfair. Because, at that moment the only case of the Anglo Iranian company was for compensation. But the ownership of the oil er, became entirely Iranian as a result of nationalisation which is recognised by international law.

INT. What happened at the Hague in 1952, and do you feel that the British were justified in continuing the embargo after that ruling?

ROUHANI Er well, you know what the court er, ruled was that they did not have jurisdiction and because of that ruling there was a great deal of admiration for the Hague court and in particular for the British judge Sir Arnold McNare? who ruled in favour, was voted in favour of Iran. But the essence of that ruling was not who was wrong and who was right. The essence that the court did not have jurisdiction. So on that basis the British government lost no time in announcing after the ruling that that does not alter the picture at all. The er, rights are all on the side of the Anglo Iranian and the Anglo Iranian is entitled to take any action that it feels it should in er, preserving its interests.

INT. Of course Mossadegh was often accused of being intransigent and not actually wanting to settle. What is your feeling about what Mossadegh really felt?

ROUHANI Oh that's totally untrue, and that also I know personally because on every occasion when I met him he said er, let us do all we can to settle this er question and er, a very well known case
ROUHANI (CONT) of the last approach he made to er, er, settle this question was when he sent me on a mission to talk to er, K B Ross, you know who was one of the er, mangers of the refinery, of the Abudan refinery for some time and who had been particularly very popular in Abudan among Iranians, and K B Ross wrote to Mossadegh and said I have some ideas that we can come to a to a settlement, I can help the settlement, will you er, I'm going, he said I'm going to Baghdad, will you send your ambassador there to er, talk with me, and Mossadegh asked me to to meet him. At that time which was in June of 1953 and Mossaedgh was very keen that this approach should er, come to er, I mean fianality, and I saw Ross and for some reason Ross said that he was very much interested by Mossadegh's message. He took it to London and he said I will send you a message to come and meet me in Geneva which he did and I went to meet him in Geneva, we were to meet on the 8th of July 1953 on the 6th of July I received a telegram from him saying I'm very sorry that other loyalties prevent me from coming to meet you. What those other loyalties were I never discovered. Nor did I discover er why he took that initiative did he have any contacts in the foreign office, in the oil company, and he didn't explain the background of his mission. But obviously he had some contacts. It was after each time that we talked, I talked to him, during four days after, each time he'd got in touch with London. But why it ended like that of course Mossadegh when I came back Mossadegh said I knew that that would be the result because the Americans have decided to stop supporting us.

INT. Was Mossadegh experiencing difficulties internally in Iran in 1953?
ROUHANI With a large number of people who were er, opposed to him some on political grounds, I cannot enter on the political situation, because er, er, he probably made mistakes.

INT. Could we stop and start again.

ROUHANI Yes.

NOISE IN BACKGROUND.

TALKING IN BACKGROUND.

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INT. Mr Rouhani was Mossadegh experiencing difficulties internally in Iran in 1953?

ROUHANI Mossadegh had a number of opponents in Iran. Some of them on political grounds. Which I cannot express any opinion about because the er political opposition to him was that he was trying to overthrow the Shah. I don't think it was a fair you know supposition. I don't think he was. But anyway that was the opinion of a large number of people who were against him on that ground. A certain number of people thought that he was becoming, he was leading Iran towards communism. That was you know the communist bogey which was represented to the United States and was the cause of the United States action in removing Mossadegh. I think that also was totally wrong. Mossadegh was not going towards communism, er, I had er dinner with the er Minister of Labour, two days before a coup d'etat and I told him that there had been demonstrations in Tehran. Demonstrations by the Tudeh there were demonstrations
ROUHANI (CONT) members I brought to the notice of the Minister of Labour he just laughed and he said we are totally in control of the situation. And er, there was no truth in the fact that Iran was becoming communist. And Mossadegh did have these opponents on various grounds, he was perfectly aware of them and he said that a number of them including members of Parliament were opposed to him because they were in the pay of er british embassy. That was his his opinion. And in the end er of course the opposition against him er became very important but er not so important that internally ther would have been a coup d'etat. The coup d'etat was engineered entirely from outside.

INT. Was he, did he continue to be popular at that time?

ROUHANI With a large number of people yes. And all the ...

INTERRUPTED..

INT. Could you say that, sorry..... we've finished the film again.

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INT. In what sense did Mossadegh continue to be a popular man in 1953?.

ROUHANI He was a nationalist figure in whom a great proportion of the peop of the country had confidence. And er, he continued to be popular inspite of all the er the dissatisfaction that the er, er foreign countries particularly er in the United States and in England began to develop with his, with the way he was running the country. But within Iran he continued to be extremely popular with a very influential part of the populatin, who was I said believed that he was serving the true interests of the country. Wanted to preserves Iran's sovereignty.
INT. I believe a letter was written to President Eisenhower, in the summer of '53 could you tell us about that letter?

ROUHANI Well that letter in essence was a request for financial assistance Because Mossadegh had relied on two possibilities for being able to run the country financially. Er, one was on the proceeds of the oil industry because he had been er, led to believe particularly by some Americans er, who were involved in the oil industry that he would be able to sell oil and he had even suggested that he would be prepared to to er, sell oil at fifty percent er, er reduction of the prices and he thought on that basis he would be able to have sufficient funds to run the country. Since that failed, he thought some of his advisors recommended a non-oil policy. But that was an impossibility. And, at that particular time it was an impossibility. Therefore the only er, means that he could think of, for providin himself with funds, was toer request assistance from American which had come to Iran's help since the war on many occasions, financially. Er the response from Eisenhower as you know was er, was totally negative he said we cannot the American tax payer can't be expected to er to pay when your country can provide er, funds for itself by er selling its oil. By selling its oil on the basis that the Anglo Iranian and the americans er wanted it to sell oil, that is not independently but to an international organisation.

INT. To what extent were the international of the seven sisters, the international oil companies to blame for the economic difficulties that Mossaeddgh was incurring? Could you mention these in your response.
ROUHANI Well the five American companies the American majors had
the same interests, I mean they had common interests
with the Anglo Iranian, that is they wanted to be in complete
control and mastery of the international oil market. Therefore
they would not they were not ready to do anything to help Mossadgh
which would be against the interests of the Anglo Iranian.
So to that extent the majors were er, er, opposed to the progress
of nationalisation in Iran.

INT. Now of course in the summer of '53 Iran had managed to sell
as you mentioned from er oil er ships that had left Iran and reached
their destinations. Do you feel there was any connection between
that and the timing of the coup d'état?

ROUHANI It is quite possible that the er, Anglo Iranian and the American
companies felt that now Iran is is breaking through. And if it
manages to break through it will be a great threat to the er
mastery to the control of the international market by the major
companies. It may well have played a role in bringing about the final
er act of the coup d'état.

INT. Do you have any personal experiences of the coup d'état yourself?

ROUHNAI None at all, no no I had, it was a great surprise to, as I said,
only the, two days before the coup d'état the minister of , Mossadegh
himself and the and the minister of Labour had no idea that er that
that would happen. So it it came as a surprise too...
INT. Was there no means of resisting this coup d'état, available?

ROUHANI Well er, it was such a surprise that I don't think it took even the er, er, the army, took the army completely by surprise, I don't think that there was already any preparation within the army not to respond. But it came as such a surprise that there was no time to er, er, put up a defence.

INT. Did you feel that the change of government in Iran affected the final outcome of the consortium negotiations, and how did, I mean what did you feel about the final settlement in '57?

ROUHANI Well it depended on what one expected. If one expected the conditions, the general conditions in the country to run normal again, the oil to begin to run again, money begin to flow in to the treasury, if one wanted that to happen of course it was a good thing because it opened the way for the negotiations which ended in the consortium agreement. But if one wanted er a situation in which the er, er, Iranian national company would develop and become what it wanted to become then it was it was defrimental. Because it it had a retarding effect, it had a very definite retarding affect, during the consortium talks which took about six months, and I was involved in them, during talks several times on the Iranian side it was said to the members of the consortium but you offered such and such a thing... before and they said We are not concerned with what happened in the past. They were themselves quite aware that they were being retrogressive...

INT. Did you feel that Iran was being blackmailed at that stage?
ROUHANI Well it depends on what you mean by blackmail, as a criminal act because I think blackmailing is a criminal act. I wouldn't say that there was a criminal intention, but er, undoubtedly the er, er, Anglo Iranian and the other major companies knew that they were in a position of strength and its quite natural whoever is in a position of strength they will try to make the most of it.

INT. And you would like to say something about the results of the coup d'etat?

ROUHANI Well my own er opinion about the coup d'etat was that it served interest, the real interests of the Anglo Iranian. And the supposed interests of the United States because their interest was to prevent the progress of Iran towards communism that was completely a bogey. So it preserved, if it helped America it helped American in an illusion. But its overall effects those were the immediate effects. But its er, er, eventual effects were against er, not only Iran but against the general situation in the Middle East because it helped the crisis which is today occurring in the er, Middle East, because Mossadegh was prevented as a result of that coup d'etat Mossadeh was prevented from developing his idea of secular nationalist democratic movement which if it, if it, he had had a chance to develop that er, that regime, er the events in the Iran would not have happened. And the whole situation in the Middle East would have been very much helped because Mossadeh as I said was absolutely free from xenophobia And today as you know the situation in the Middle East is very much influenced by xenophobia very much influenced by religious fanaticism which Mossaeddgh absolutely was without.
Finally can I ask you if Mossadegh was all these things how come he remained how come he was so terribly misunderstood by the west, at the time?

ROUHANI The west wanted to misunderstand him. I have discussed Mossadegh with so many of my british friends and ex-colleagues and I have found to my great surprise that none of them is interested in Mossadegh as a person. They are all interested in him as the person who er, er, cancelled the oil concession. They did not want to understand him. Even the obituary notice which was published in the Times of London, said er, Mossadegh was unsound, he was unstable, he was er, histrionic, and so on. No one really wanted to understand him. If they had wanted to understand him I think a great deal could have been made for the future. As I said, the present situation in the middle east might not have happened.

INT. Thank you very much.

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