examined seriously by members of the culture to whom it is directed. Very often the innovator is not in a position of influence or does not have the personality best suited to the propagandizing of his invention or idea. Although both theorists allow this necessary adjunctive role considerable treatment within their works, I will not. This is where my theory begins to overtake LaPiere's and consequently where I will diverge from Social Change. Along with the advocate however - who finally is a more rough and tumble PR-type than the innovator - is the adopter (59), the final actor of LaPiere's theory. LaPiere is quick to point out that neither of the three roles pushing for institutionalization of the innovation, that of innovator, advocate or adopter, is any more or less easy than the others. Each is fraught with a multitude of complex difficulties, but naturally of different types. Innovation is problematic mostly concerning an alteration of consciousness; the advocate must be sufficiently persuasive and in tune with the culture that others will listen to him and not disparage his defence of a suspect addition to the culture; and the adopter is instantly ridiculed by his contemporaries, or worse, forced to fail in his use of the innovation by way of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

But again, for my purposes, the innovator takes center stage in what follows, due for the most part to the specific type of innovation central to this thesis. The role of advocate and adopter is implied, but a discussion of them is not of key significance.
CHAPTER II
A REVISED THEORY

Ever since the great democratic revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries, social scientists have made the mistake of assuming that political revolution, with its self-righteous, humanistic splendor, would be the "going thing" as far as rapid social change was concerned, for some time at least. Even those who saw the limitations, historically, of this mistaken perception allowed themselves to fall into another equally fallacious theoretical rut by viewing social movements as the most important motor of change. Luckily, there have been of late some theorists and historians who recognize the inconsistency between these views and the empirical data emanating from the most advanced cultures. Building on the sound understanding of revolution and social movements offered by writers like Barrington Moore, Crane Brinton, Hadley Cantril, among many - theorists who avoid the above pitfalls - I have constructed a theory of future change in post-modern culture, which owes much to the suggestion of Marion Vanfossen.

Basically, this is a theory which considers the effects of the sophisticated, relativistic attitude or "enlightenment" on a populace, plus an appreciation for historical context such as the dissolution of feudalism.
and at the other end of the spectrum, the advent of "post-ascetic" culture. Very briefly: the breakdown of feudal social structure in terms of obligations and duties between classes brought with it the popular revolutions of France, America, Russia and China — to name only the most successful — when the aristocracy and royalty refused to revise its position in the society in favor of the "enlightened" bourgeoisie and an infuriated populace. After the particular cultures each evolved into an industrial setting, the need for political revolution was in large measure over, as was the easy possibility of it. Put bluntly, the forces of coercion — in most instances an uneasy reactionary coalition between the remnants of the aristocracy, lingering ruling houses, and the more affluent bourgeoisie — had taken their lesson of 1789 seriously, and were growing ever more skilled in the arts of oppression. However, as there were still tremendous forces extant in the interest of major social change, the social movement developed in the late 19th century as a suitable tool. It combined the large-scale impressiveness of political revolution with wisely conceived gradualistic tactics (e.g. the Fabians and reform groups), thereby avoiding holocaust and annihilation at the hands of counter-revolutionary forces. Thus far in the description, few historians and political analysts would quibble, except over details, or the sticky question of causality.

However, this is where a revised perception begins to come to the aid of scholars who, for example, look sadly
upon the memory of the liberalizing 1960's and proclaim (with the approval of their like-thinking peers), "Alas, there was no revolution, only mild changes of fashion in some elite groups; no redistribution of income, no alteration of power, no change in relations of production". I would respond: "Quite wrong - the cultural revolution of the 60's was just that. It had and will continue to have far-reaching effects in a liberating direction, not only in elite, collegiate groups, but across a wide range and diversity of personalities throughout post-modern culture". At this point LaFiere's thoughts might be phrased in this manner: "Yes, I see that my innovator theory has been latched onto and that the user of it recognizes that especially now in an era of mounting, menacing social control agencies and mechanisms, surely the only practicable means of social change is through the innovator out-thinking, out-maneuvering, out-innovating the repressive features of the status quo".* Offered here in dramatic form, and greatly simplified, is the outline of what will follow.

Individual innovators in the persons of traders, merchants and bankers, sowed the early seeds in the late medieval which erupted into revolutionary action late in the 18th century. In that four or five century span many changes

*Very recently a financial analyst, Harry Browne, produced a popular manual, How I Found Freedom in an UnFree World (N.Y.: Avon Books, 1974) which in crass and atheoretical terms sets out one possible course of action for potential innovators, at least regarding certain aspects of modern social life. While his views are not completely coincident with mine, it is the best (only?) of its kind, and has been warmly received.
enveloped European society. The plagues decimated the feudal workforce; the Renaissance and Reformation substituted for unthinking servility necessary to the operation of the feudal social arrangement, a youthful, naive rationalism and individualism. Technological developments were rife: of extreme importance for modernization and my theory was Gutenberg's contribution. The rural, homogeneous, incestuous country folk escaped with but little reluctance to the city, where social mobility was possible and where the concomitant ideas of personal freedom and endeavor were the house ideology. The absolutistic "thought" (or lack thereof) so necessary to lord-vassal allegiances and a social structure viewed as God-given, began early to fall to the "modern", more relativistic, understanding of social relations as man-created and therefore man-dissoluble. As mentioned much earlier, the perception of the possibility of change was and is of central importance to the success of all those who seek an alteration of social reality, whether it be the innovator or the mass movement leader, or for that matter he who seeks to develop "a better mousetrap". With the discovery of the American continents, the mandate for geographical and mental exploration was accentuated, and men like Luther and Calvin, Columbus and Cromwell straight through Voltaire and Rousseau - among the peculiar, outlandish and unappealingly innovational of their times - pursued the light of reason into the darkest contradictions of medieval life.
But the Age of Reason brought nearly as many problems as it solved, for with the displacement of God, Country or King as supreme being, Europe and the colonies in America fell under the merciless rule of Progress. It can fairly be said that only in the last generation or two have the millions of genuinely exploited laborers of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries been vindicated in some small way for their mutilated lives. They left their rural hamlets - in which Christopher Hill tells us they labored perhaps 15 weeks per year (60) - and migrated often by necessity to the mills, mines and factories, where around the clock til death was the schedule. But with their broken backs they produced what now is termed post-industrial, post-modern or post-ascetic culture. Certainly they are not alone responsible, but "were it not" for their slavish efforts, affluence as we know it could not have been created.

But being human animals, the urban proletariat could not tolerate indefinitely the abuses to which they were constantly subjected. Some of the liberated bourgeoisie (LaSalle, Marx, Proudhon, Blanqui, Kropotkin, etc.) came to their aid, and those strong workers who could not be intimidated by their employers and whose strength was not utterly exhausted at the factory, slowly but loudly began the labor agitations of the early 19th century. And as in almost any historical period, those who revolt even mildly feel the immediate blow of reaction. Even the famous Paris Commune of 1871 ended with the terrible deaths of 17,000 "revolu-
tionaries", many of whom were infants. Thus it began to
dawn upon social theorists of change that violence brought
the same, and more of it; the famous British gradualist
tactic, although less dramatic and requiring more patience,
proved finally to be the most feasible approach. As already
noted, reform movements met with amazing success, much more
so than the violent expressions for change which preceded
them.

What type of person joins a movement, gives his
all, relates to its activities thoroughly and allows himself
to be caught in a "religious" dedication to the cause? As
will be detailed later, these participants are distinctly
"neo-modern" or "industrial" citizens: not well educated,
not yet estranged sufficiently from former, rural absolu-
tistic thoughts about goods and evils, not mobile, not well
traveled: not, then, affluent participants of post-modern
culture. Even if social movements could operate efficiently
in the current historical matrix, organizers would be hard-
pressed to fill their rosters, to organize viable cells, to
impress upon their members the ultimate goodness of their
goal and the ultimate evil of their opponents, to have their
participants carry cards and swallow whole a moralistic,
hyperoptimistic ideology.

Put idiomatically, the world has grown too wise,
the people have grown too sophisticated - that is, in the
most advanced sectors of the most advanced nations. More-
over, it will not do, in criticizing this position, to note
that there have always been folk who would not accept absolutes. That Nietzsche would have been a poor follower does not impune the theory; for today there are millions of Nietzsches, but more worldly even than he. Certainly one of the shining triumphs of the modern cultures is the number of minds whose orientation is becoming more and more cosmopolitan, non-nationalistic but international, nonlocal, nonsectarian, nonabsolutistic. These millions of minds seek - to steal from Mills - as much freedom as their reason can handle. And to date it seems that very few innovators in the realm of cultural change have exhausted either themselves or the possibilities in their search and experimentation for the rational life. Habermas' recent book, Towards a Rational Society (although from the Frankfurt metaphysical tradition), capsulizes the aspirations of those with minds, money and time. There has never before been in human history such an opportunity for individual growth through experimentation across a wide range and diversity of lifestyles and cultures as now exists for some people in our culture.

Ogburn's useful concept of social lag immediately comes to mind as we witness those who in every way are capable of relatively limitless experimentation, yet are entirely unwilling to forego their acquired cultural baggage, in the form of outdated beliefs and properties, which prevent them from making the most of the culture. I stress the historical element of the argument (i.e. the possibilities affluence brings to the social innovator) for there is throughout the
culture a peculiar combination of sentiments: first, an awareness of dizzying flux and change (adequately documented by Toffler) and second, the competing, contradictory idea that things never really change much finally, and that what was good enough for father... The resolution of this contradiction is something beyond the capabilities of many societal members.

The statement of Bendix and Berger (referred to above, p. 23) comes now into clearer focus as to its relevance to my theory. Very obviously, if one is to inhabit what can be termed a "multiplicity of selves", thereby maximizing the opportunity for involvement with others in a cross-section of situations, the whole concept of "boundary-maintenance" becomes relatively useless as compared to its opposite, "boundary-expansion". Closely connected with the first mentioned concept is one of the most potentially reactionary ideas ever to have been propounded by psychologists: the Gestalt. The idea that the social actor could ever be, or rather, ought to be, a consistent, monolithic, thereby morally predictable Oneness throughout situational variation is straight from the Bible: the soul. It is easy to picture the utility of defining people in this way, when the locus of one's entire life is a small, homogeneous, herds-driving tribe in the Middle East two millennia ago. It was functional to some degree for a man to be known as "good" or "bad" to his kinsmen and to occasional intruders into the culture. The idiocy of trying to employ such standards in the post-
modern situation is immediately obvious. The media do their best to make high tragedy out of modern life by using these anachronistic conceptions of behavior and the protagonists involved in that behavior. The favorite example in the late 60's was to show "dispassionately" the photograph of the phi beta kappa, good, down-home community boy sitting in a federal prison for resisting the draft or selling marijuana. Somehow that was to suggest the "inevitable" irony and confusion, the "alienation" if you will, "necessarily" inherent in the modern situation. This is a mistake in perception and understanding. Clearly, the "violator" was innovating, but he ran afoul of social control agencies - something proficient innovators learn not to do - and the powers that were, in very clear-eyed fashion, incarcerated him for his "bad" actions. There is no ambiguity here: the innovator knew just what he was about, and the repressive agencies knew as well. There is no high tragedy: there is only the historically usual condition of the innovator being penalized through the normatively coercive power wielded by the state. The innovator threatened - altogether too loudly of course - to overthrow in some relatively minor way the status quo, in favor of a more rational, personally meaningful world. His reward is the usual fare for people of such aspirations.

Hand in hand with the necessity for situational ethics (an unfortunate term), a resilient definition of "selves", and the desire to expand boundaries through multi-
faceted interpersonal experiences, is the relinquishing of many other key values of the acquisitive culture. The innovator in this sense does not care for property except that property which immediately promotes his capability for innovating, interpersonally and otherwise. He does not care for nor is he fascinated by power over people or things; his interest is perennially focused on the "using up" of himself and his resources in the direction of people, whom he defines as able to properly "use him". This is not philanthropic, or centrally so; what must operate however in the arena of multiplicative selves is a high level of reciprocity, inasmuch as people are capable of responding fairly for "goods" (used very broadly) they receive. This is not to be construed as "game theory" or a rehash of the popular economic models used in small groups theory. Even a touch of mechanistic thinking in an area so sensitive as this is a touch overdone. If there is a theory which approximately conveys the untended meaning here, it would be one of the 18th century models of human behavior, understood to be constituted of well-thought out, calculated and rational action, but now based on the desire to experience things and people under mutually satisfying conditions.* Parenthetically,

*There resides in the use of rationalist psychologies (known also as "naive positivism" or "Pollyanna" interpretation of behavior) a paradox which I would do well to dispose of immediately. Because there are evidenced in human behavior any number of irrational or nonlogical acts (exhaustively analyzed by Pareto among others), the theorist who therefore avoids the enlightenment understanding penalizes himself on poor grounds. Voltaire, Kant and similar thinkers were aware,
the age old debate (e.g., Hobbes vs. Rousseau; Marx vs. Smith) about whether man is "basically" good, cooperative and well-meaning or bad, aggressively antagonistic and an evil-doer, if it has any relevance here, probably finds me on the side of those who support the kinder appraisal of man. But instead of man being this way or that "by nature" of his manness, I would insist (in the standard sociological posture) that given an appropriate social structure, post-modern men would for the most part treat each other well, well enough at any rate to facilitate and encourage innovational behavior among one another, as opposed to the treatment historically

I am sure, that wide-eyed rationalism, most memorably represented in the social contract theory, did not offer a comprehensive definition or analysis of human behavior. What it did do with fabulous success was posit a normative vision of man, as agreeable and reasonable, in pseudo-scientific terms which typified 18th century polemics. This argumentative, hyperbolic style should not obscure the usefulness for theorists of change of the positivist legacy.

There is no debate that men manifest socially both rational and nonrational actions. In addition it is agreed that life is continuously ambiguous and difficult to exhaustively investigate. The marginal success of small groups research better than other sociological subfield testifies to the problematic nature of "mind-watching". But after that is said, what remains is the unsavory option: either we admit to the lure of apotheosizing the irrational as the central feature of life (Jung), or we largely ignore it and its unpredictable quality, and focus instead on rational activities, and most important, the possibilities for rational improvement of life when and if individuals care to attempt same. The question for sociologists should be, IF a person chooses to be as rational as he sometimes can be, THEN how does the social structure appear to handle his attempt, warmly, coolly, or indifferently? That a person may continuously live a life of thoroughly nonrational action is admitted; that many people actually do is unlikely. Therefore the entire theory presented here is suitable for application only to those who make the effort at rational existence.
given the unorthodox. They would behave amicably simply because of the benefits derived from interaction and the concomitant lessening of social controls surrounding it.

Also essential in understanding the post-modern innovator is the realization that his definition of "self" differs radically from the psychiatrically approved recipes for "healthy" self-conception often promulgated in advanced societies. Along with the pleas for self-scrutiny, self-acceptance, self-forgiveness, self-expansion through meditation, etc. is the implication that one's unbalanced self-view is more a function of alterable internal tensions and neuroses than of an ill-constructed social order. Being aware that this line of argument is, among other things, one of the oldest of conservative ideologies, the innovator strives continuously to expand "self" by ignoring it: self is static, predictable, plugged into a status quo of an essentially unchanging collection of closely inter-related situations and personalities. The "multiplicity of selves" the innovator prefers, indeed finds necessary to his actions, is a construct of situations, not of continuity (habit) or property (home). The innovator's self is the product of his accumulated knowledges and experiences, his aim being to increase incrementally both components to the betterment of his ability to handle various, nonintegrated behaviors.

The unending demand among popular psychiatry, that people ought to become neatly, wholesomely contained entities, free of tension and distress, holds no more appeal for the innova-
tor than the multiplicity of selves idea would hold for a Southern plantation owner of the previous century. The old Southern gentleman is precluded from making personal enlightenment and experience a goal, for his position as patriarch demands that he display for the land and his chattels (which includes the family) an unreasonably, inhumanly narrow, righteous and unbending "self" which strives only to "preserve and protect". There is no more antithetical a position conceivable to this feudal mind than that of the innovator, whose being is not in having and making, but strictly in knowing and doing. The latter is in no need of "roots", family, home, "place in society", not to mention religion, community and for the most part, government, as it would have been understood by the planter. Inasmuch as there still remain in advanced cultures persons with a feudal orientation, the possibility of large-scale innovation as described here is lessened. But with the advent of post-industrialization and its continued growth, the provincial is forced into a quasi-schizophrenic condition of watching the world about him, emphasized through the media and popular culture, speeding towards the dissolution of almost everything he holds sacred - literally - while he sits on the veranda fighting with all his resources merely to hold ground. That his position is finally untenable is obvious to no-one more than to himself.

If the above plantation patriarch is thought of as an ideal-type (on the "right"), then other members of the post-modern culture may be compared with his arch-conservatism
on a continuum. For instance, the businessman who lives and works in the urban sprawl may have dispensed with religion and a love for community. He may in the interests of furthering his career, engage in random, minor innovations in circumventing distasteful restrictions imposed upon him by the government. Also he may rationalize (in Weber's sense) other types of behavior to more comfortably fit his personality and various needs, such as the exploitation of a competitor's secretary more for intelligence than sexual reasons. But, more towards the right end of the continuum, he may demand from his suburban wife and children and his professional subordinates, behavior suitable to the obsequious chattel. So, while for him life may make a great deal of sense and be in comfortable accord with the dictates and limitations of the culture, for those subject to his possible oppression, his "will to power" may constitute the single greatest irrationality of their existence. For the innovator, the possibility of being put in such a situation—that is, in the hands of a person(s) who can demand of him irrational and unnecessary acts of fealty, or put differently, one who would seek to restrain his ongoing search for new stimuli—is the ultimately detestable condition.

This has tremendous and far-reaching ramifications for our current societal arrangements. The military, social movements, clubs, religious affiliations and the more rigid complex organizations are but the most obvious targets for criticism and avoidance on the part of the innovator. In
order to maximize his benefits while minimizing costs, he must stay clear of any social arrangement which begins to operate in noncontractual fashion at least in his business and professional concerns. But even in less formal relationships and settings, he becomes the artist in the realm of "traveling light". Property means involvement with and time spent in the upkeep of. Noncontractual relations mean time and energy having to be expended which under contractual arrangements could be avoided, if that be desired. Along the same lines, it is necessary to point out the sad lack of "helpful" structures in current society designed to benefit those who wish to enrich their lives through interpersonal innovation. The lacuna now present (everywhere except perhaps in the most liberated sectors of metropolitan culture) insures for the innovator a degree of probable ineffectiveness and loneliness which prevents most societal participants from even considering innovational roles. Costs are thought to outweigh benefits to an extreme degree.

In its most precise expression, the innovator's position may be summarized in this way: there are a regretably few and finite number of moments in life; expenditures of time, energy and attention are not to be slóppily allocated, but whenever possible activities are to be rationalized with the intention of utilizing one's life-space to the fullest; this is done in the hope of realizing maximum satisfaction of those few but precisely formulated personally-defined "goods". The cumulative effect of this Weltanschung
across the culture is wide-scale social change. Whereas Weber was made apprehensive by this position, the post-ascetic innovator feels less anxiety over it. Those historically evolved relationships and behaviors which do not prove viable in the post-modern setting, he sets aside, often with severe regrets - and no ready alternatives. His job - the subject of the thesis - is to refashion social arrangements to suit his overarching schema. That of course is when the innovation comes in, and when negative social sanctions become the most pronounced. In reconstructing one's culture to suit oneself, the loss at the outset in terms of comforting abstract sentiments, literature and similar cultural productions may seem unbearably heavy. But the promised rewards of final emancipation from historically spent components of social organization and the beliefs which invariably accompany them, is in the opinion of the innovator worth the effort and sacrifice.

While I risk stating the obvious, it seems advisable at this point, in concluding an introductory statement of the theory, to remark about its historical position. In the development of some new mental constructs, it is possible to assess them as peculiar to only a specific time in history, e.g., that air power was something that ought to be exploited militarily, a realization only possible circa 1910 and in no other time. This theory is not of that nature. It is likely that those who were entirely disenchanted with their particular socio-historical matrix, at whatever time in
history, happened upon this theory, approximately, but threw up their hands when the possibility of implementing alternatives arose. LaPiere overstates slightly the case for the innovator, in semipolemic style, with the intention of offsetting the drift in social theory towards the collectivity. But his even bigger error is to understate the importance to change of the cumulative nature of culture, not precisely or in every case the result of single innovators' works. The point I wish to make here is that my theory makes some sense of the modern situation and is capable of predicting significant change in all major institutions of the post-modern cultures. But the fact that it does is a function not only of its attempted comprehensiveness, but more importantly, because it responds to the possibilities for change at all levels inherent in current society which were distinctly lacking in all previous societies. This is not so much the case of the epoch being ready for the idea (ideas of personal freedom being very old), but the idea having found the suitable epoch. This also explains why the theory is useful in predicting change only in those relatively small but extremely important areas of the world being termed "post-modern". The other areas are in varying states of inter-epochal flux, some frozen in extreme static congruence at the primitive level (Sicily), others in painful static incongruence (much of Africa) and still others in the beginning of dynamic incongruence necessary to the production of post-modern culture (the more advanced Latin
American countries). One tragic aspect of this is the fact that in some of these areas, there are foreign-educated nationals who have experienced resocialization while studying abroad and therefore seek the same kinds of freedom through change that I have been discussing. Their's is a sad lot unless they wish to migrate to more advanced areas (which they often do of course). One can imagine the pain of a sociologist taking his Ph.D. at Berkeley, then having to return to Japan or Thailand or any of the Latin American oligopolies, areas where the feudal-religious orientation still holds sway. However, the same kind of personal dilemma might ensue when the American student from Iowa studies with the critical school at Frankfurt or with left-wing intellectuals in Italy, only to return to his unliberated home. This kind of difficulty, personal emancipation in the midst of structural repression, will become in the non-advanced sectors (as it is currently here) more and more of a problem, to add to their already excessive list.
CHAPTER III
SOCIAL CHANGE IN HISTORY

Prefatory note
The writing of this section was done with the awareness that certain unanticipated difficulties of scholarship seriously handicapped me in presenting an adequate selection of data to support my thesis. This is not an apologia, but a methodological explanation regarding the problems of working both the historical and sociological fields in pursuit of demonstrable Truth.

As every scholar, I had in mind the "ideal method" of handling the phenomenon in question: to secure from historians the finest bibliography of works dealing with social change; to sift patiently through them seeking data to support (or refute) my thesis about the history and future of change; and to present the findings in a grand synthesis similar in spirit, if not in method, to Sorokin's masterpiece. (Aging scholars smile at such youthful plans of grandiose dimension.) Nevertheless, I compiled an enormous list of suitable studies, began in earnest the sifting, and to my dismay these months later, have concluded that the task overwhelms and depresses me. For several reasons.

First, the sheer magnitude.