ENDNOTES:


13. Memorandum from Vice President's office concerning conversation with Herbert Matthews (NYT) and Maurice Bernbaum (OSA), 15 May, 1958, Richard M. Nixon Pre Presidential Papers, NARA Laguna Niguel, CA: Series 390 South American Trip box 3 of 3 Folder - San Marcos; JFDOHP, Princeton University Library, Transcript of a Recorded Interview with John W. Hanes, Jr. Philip A. Crowl Interviewer. Great Fall, VA 29 January


18. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 16 May, 1958 (11:39am), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 8 Telephone Conversations Series January 2, 1958 - July 31, 1958. I am assuming they referred to Wayne Morse, the maverick senator from Oregon. Morse sat on the foreign relations committee and could well have called for an inquiry.


28. Ibid.: 534.


34. Ibid.: 513.

35. Folder: Are Good Will Trips Worth While, Richard M. Nixon The Presidential Papers, NARA Laguna Niguel, CA: Vice President, General Correspondence  Box 49.
Chapter 6
Down to Earth: The Eisenhower-Nixon Relationship

While the Vice President worked hard to expand his foreign policy role in the Administration, President Eisenhower's authority remained supreme. Regardless of how Nixon proved his worth, he was limited to the roles Ike assigned or Dulles devised. Herbert Parmet commented that Nixon's "activism as Vice President, however much a landmark in the evolution of the office, also carried with it the penalty of subservience that galled and humiliated Nixon and others who held the position." Another historian explained, Nixon rebelled against the notion that Eisenhower was his mentor, "for he felt personally that he owed nothing to Eisenhower except the memory of uphill struggles and political martyrdom." Ike did not pave the Vice President's way with gold, or even asphalt. He used Nixon only as a political workhorse and congressional contact. Any exceptions arose from requests made by Secretary Dulles, who had his own agenda for Nixon. From the start, Eisenhower reserved judgment on Nixon's character. In 1952, Ike effectively forced his runningmate to make public his personal finances in order to disprove media charges that he had accepted illicit campaign donations. Eisenhower told reporters Nixon would have to show himself clean as a hound's tooth to prove his innocence. The result was the famous "Checkers speech" in which the Californian disclosed his finances, but also melodramatically announced he would not give up the family dog Checkers - a gift from an admirer - regardless of what anyone said. Nixon
stayed on the ticket, but resented the embarrassing invasion of his privacy, and Eisenhower's unwillingness to lend him more support. The President never became close to Nixon.

Nixon's assignments from Eisenhower typically fell into two categories: election campaigner and legislative advocate. Through all the elections of the Administration - congressional, gubernatorial and presidential - Nixon campaigned for Republican candidates. Eisenhower kept his hands clean, while Nixon hurled political accusations and insults. This was a task with which Nixon already had great familiarity, and he performed it well. He knew how to play a crowd, how to deliver a catch phrase and how to praise an ally.

His second job was as executive liaison to Congress. Nixon's work on Capital Hill was tied to his position in the Administration, rather than to the Republican party. Because he presided over the Senate, he had constitutional authority to work with the Senators and the Representatives. Ike recognized that and used it.

Both of these assignments were essentially political in nature. In the President's mind, that was the main purpose of a Vice President, or specifically of his Vice President. Nixon had no choice but to accept these two roles and perform them to his utmost ability. His successful expansion of the vice presidency, in terms of foreign relations, came about only through skilled opportunism. Eisenhower's vision of the position, although more extensive than previous presidents, did not include a globe roaming second-in-command.

By the first election of the new Administration, Nixon already had his marching orders. During the March 5, 1954 Cabinet meeting, Nixon recommended that the attendees keep speaking calendars open for September and October. Although an off year election, they might be called upon to lend support to Republican candidates before the vote. High ranking
officials made excellent celebrities for campaign podiums.

At the first Cabinet meeting after election day, Eisenhower called on Nixon for an analysis of the results. The Vice President explained that the Republican party had lost some seats, but not an astounding number. He claimed the election had been a "dead heat." To conclude his presentation, he wound up a mechanical drummer boy and released it across the conference table. With that he noted "that the Administration must continue to 'beat the drum' of achievement." Unfortunately for Nixon, Eisenhower liked the effect. The Vice President's proven political skill assured that he received these domestic assignments.

By its nature, the vice presidency included a domestic collar. Nixon never abandoned these duties, although he continued to work to increase his international role. The Vice President supplied political advice and analysis to Eisenhower through the entire Administration.

Ironically, Nixon's reluctant work in domestic politics helped his presidential aspirations as much, or more, than his aspired role as statesman. Through his campaigning, he gained a national reputation among Republicans of all ilk. Nixon helped small time politicians running for county seats, just as he sat on podiums with congressional candidates. Before the end of the Eisenhower Administration, he had used his position to build a loyal grassroots support network.

By Fall 1953, Eisenhower had determined the Vice President's primary duty. While Nixon was still traveling through Asia, Dulles recommended the additon of Saudi Arabia to the itinerary, but Ike would not agree to it. Although Dulles wanted an updated report on a region he had visited in May, Eisenhower preferred that Nixon manage congressional
relations.

Dulles noted on November 21 that the President "is not disposed to recommend it [expanded itinerary]. . . . he is very anxious that the Vice President should get back as soon as possible to participate in meetings scheduled in early December with congressional leaders." Implicitly, Ike exposed his own insecurity about addressing the Congressmen without Nixon's experience to support him. Perhaps, another reason Ike vetoed the detour was that he was uncomfortable with the young Vice President representing the United States overseas.

One of the most important congressional liaison/advisor assignments the President delegated to Nixon, came about in December 1953. At that time, Eisenhower put Nixon to work on a major challenge - dealing with Republican Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. Nixon and McCarthy had been colleagues onHUAC and Eisenhower hoped that the Vice President could reason with the unmanageable Senator. On Ike's orders, Nixon met with the powerful anti-Communist demagogue, and seemingly convinced him to cease his indiscriminate attacks on the Republican Administration. Nixon's immediate success with McCarthy was short-lived. The Wisconsin native soon abrogated the agreement and renewed his charges of Communist security risks in the government. For the next year, Nixon attempted to control McCarthy. To reduce his potency, Ike used Nixon as an anti-Communist spokesman and drew attention away from McCarthy. In the end, it was committee hearings involving an Army dentist that brought McCarthy's reign to an end.

Once a national audience witnessed the sloppy, abusive, cruel methods employed by McCarthy, he lost his credibility. Without an audience, he had no power. Although Nixon
did not contain McCarthy's attacks as Ike wanted, he did make every attempt. He completed the assignment as well as possible.

More characteristic of Nixon's role under Eisenhower was recruiting congressional support for Administration initiatives. May 1954 brought a crisis requiring the Vice President's persuasive skills. As the agonizing defeat of a French garrison at Dien Bien Phu approached, Eisenhower assigned him the task of reconciling the Republican right wing to the President's middle of the road approach. Conservatives called for immediate military support of the French. Ike refused to intervene unilaterally. Nixon's lobbying succeeded and serious right wing opposition to Eisenhower's plan never materialized.

After Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, Nixon again stepped into his congressional liaison role. He recommended that top senatorial leaders of both parties be fully briefed on the crisis. The Vice President expected to mute reaction from the Hill by giving the Senators enough information to make them feel apprised and consulted. Eisenhower reacted to the suggestion as though the Senators might try to limit his actions. He warned "he won't stand by and let our nationals be abused." He implied any legislative move to block an aggressive response would be side-stepped by the Executive branch. Within a few days, however, Egyptian actions made it clear that US nationals were safe and canal traffic would sail smoothly. Ironically, the Administration condemned the allied attack on Egypt, instead of partaking in it. How much Nixon's briefing helped to control the reaction from legislators is unclear, but by keeping the Congressmen informed the session must have benefited executive-congressional relations.

Eisenhower repeatedly handed Nixon the Administration's Capital Hill problems. The
legislature was the only issue on which Eisenhower consistently consulted Nixon. Ten days before his stroke in November 1957, Ike wrote Nixon a memorandum. "Will you carefully read the enclosed documents, both of them directed to the subject of establishing good relationships with the Congress." There were two letters, one addressed to US Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and the other to White House staff congressional liaison, General Wilton B. "Jerry" Persons. To protect the Administration from recriminations, the President ordered Nixon to personally destroy the notes after reading and approving them. He sought to avoid leaks about "any concerted effort along this line..."6 Ike assumed the media would publicly criticize a White House that deliberately tried to obtain congressional conformity. It was thus imperative that secrecy be maintained. Nixon undoubtedly followed his instructions and obliterated the documents once he had read and commented on them.

When Washington was presented with a foreign crisis, Nixon usually arranged for the briefing of Congressmen by White House officials. He also acted as a middle man when Eisenhower met with Representatives and Senators. The Vice President presented the situation and responded to questions, while Eisenhower listened. Occasionally the President would add some comment, but Ike left the wrangling with individual legislators to Nixon.7 While the Vice President resented this work - as he did campaigning - it again eased his path toward the presidency. Nixon formed relationships with powerful Congressmen whom he called on for support in 1960, and again in 1968.

Unexpectedly in the spring of 1959, Nixon almost found himself performing an international task solely at the President's behest. On March 31, Eisenhower asked him to
head a delegation to the Inter-American Conference in Buenos Aires. The request was conditional on Dulles not being able to attend the Foreign Ministers Conference beginning in six weeks. Ike explained "if Foster was not able to go to the Foreign Ministers Conference on May 11th, he [Ike] was in quite a jam for someone to head the delegation to Buenos Aires for the Conference beginning April 27th. Dillon has to go to the SEATO Conference." Eisenhower continued that "he did not want to add a burden to the Vice President, but wondered if he would consider this and in a day or two call Acting Secretary Herter. . . . [Instead of sending Milton Eisenhower], he thought it would be more desirable to have the highest possible ranking official of government [attend]. . . ." The President did not wish to offend the Latinos. Implicitly, if Dulles could not go to the Foreign Ministers Conference, the President would take his place. Otherwise, Ike would go to South America and Dulles to Geneva. One can surmise that Ike asked Nixon to cover in Buenos Aires because the latter had experience there. Eisenhower would go to Europe, his area of expertise, and probably the more important conference. But, the President carefully appealed to Nixon's own sense of importance by mentioning he wanted the highest level person available to attend the conference in Latin America. The request came only because Ike envisioned a lack of top personnel for the events he listed. However, such a shortage never actually occurred, so Nixon did not attend the Buenos Aires conference.8

From his clean as a hounds tooth pronouncement onward, historians concur that Ike maintained a respectable distance between himself and the Vice President. The ambivalent attitude became apparent early in the Administration. For example, during a September 1953 NSC meeting, Nixon commented on some leaks that had appeared in the newspapers that
morning. The story discussed the Council's consideration of continental defense issues. According to the Vice President, "What really concerned him was the problem of public reaction to the present continental defense problem in view of the great hullabaloo in the press on the subject." Nixon's comment did not seem unreasonable.

Ike, however, trivialized the younger man's concern, in a less than complimentary way. The President responded: "it was unwise for the members of the Council to let themselves get so excited about what the columnists reported, as to fail to use common sense in reaching a decision. He said he was inclined to order Council members in the future not to read the newspapers on mornings before meetings of the National Security Council (Laughter)." The only member who appeared "excited" was Nixon and thus the laughter was at his expense. Although not an overt insult, Ike's comment was demeaning, in implying the Vice President had overreacted. And it undoubtedly embarrassed Nixon.

Eisenhower routinely belittled worries that Nixon brought before the National Security Council. On August 12, 1954, Nixon expressed apprehension about making decisions without adequate discussion time. He told the Council "He thought it unwise to make final decisions on the Far Eastern Policy on the basis of an hour's discussion." Eisenhower responded that in principle he was correct, but after all, "it was necessary to reach decisions and that this was the place to reach them." The comment had a humiliating aspect to it, as though the President were speaking to a child, and not a seasoned professional. It must have stung the Vice President and certainly reflected Ike's notion that Nixon was inexperienced and immature.

Although careful not to openly voice his ambivalence to Nixon, Eisenhower did not
effectively hide it when he talked about the constitutional second-in-command. His public pronouncements about the Vice President often hinted at his true aversion. Responding to a letter from Clare Francis praising Nixon, Eisenhower could not completely hide his discomfort. Ms. Francis lauded Nixon's performance at the Union League Club. "He not only sold this group of 'moss-backed' Republicans on the actual position of the Republican party and the need of their active and enlightened support, but in so doing he sold them on Dick Nixon right down to his heels." Eisenhower accepted the compliment to Nixon in stride, while himself responding with a back handed compliment to the Vice President. "Dear Clare, I am delighted -- but not astonished -- at your report of Dick Nixon's talk to the members of the Union League Club. He has a remarkable and enviable ability to adjust his remarks to the mood and background of his audience."10

That Eisenhower actually envied his subordinate's aptitude for deceptive speaking is improbable. Ike valued honesty and integrity. Nixon's uncommon gift for tailoring his words to his audience was the mark of a consummate politician, not necessarily a model citizen. The Vice President could change the topics he emphasized and modify his position just enough to please any specific group of people. It did not reflect an undying commitment to truth, but his artifice. So Ike's comment, while an accurate reflection of Nixon's skills, was not the compliment it might have appeared to be to a casual reader.

The President's doubts about the Californian were most public during the 1956 Presidential campaign. At the March 7 presidential news conference, a main topic of discussion was Nixon's place on the ticket. Eisenhower explained that he would not condone any maneuver to remove Mr. Nixon from the ticket. However, he claimed "I have not
presumed to tell the Vice President what he should do with his own future. . . ." Ike
continued that his second-in-command was a "comer" in the Republican party who "so far as I
know . . . is deeply dedicated to the same principles of government that I am." Then the
President made the comment that would find its way to newspaper headlines. "The only thing
I have asked him to do is to chart out his own course, and tell me what he would like to do
[italics added]." Regardless of what Eisenhower claimed, his statement carried with it
negative connotations. Political analysts, pundits and the Democratic opposition interpreted
the statement to mean Ike did not support Nixon's candidacy. The Vice President took it the
same way. He immediately wrote a letter of resignation, which he only destroyed after
Republican National Committee Chair, Leonard Hall, convinced him to wait.

The President's public comments not only revealed his skepticism about Nixon as a
candidate, they labeled the Vice President only a comer and indirectly cast doubts about
Nixon's political integrity. Although not much remembered, Eisenhower also noted "so far
as I know he [Nixon] is deeply dedicated to the same principles of government that I am."
Ike was not sure. He knew Nixon was "vigorou, healthy, and deeply informed on the
processes of our Government," but would not unequivocally endorse the man who would
replace him in the event death or disability.11 It was another subtle sign of Eisenhower's
ambivalence about the Vice President.

Eisenhower's 1957 New Year's well wishing to Nixon also showed how he felt. In a
formal note, Ike thanked Nixon for his indispensable help. The note came across as cold and
Eisenhower added the post script "In view of the intimacy of our friendship, this letter may
seem to you a bit on the formal side. It is not meant to be. I am simply trying to make of
record an expression of my grateful thanks."\textsuperscript{12} When Eisenhower wrote a letter that reflected the intimacy of his relationship with someone, there was no mistaking it. He did not see Nixon socially, nor did he banter with the Vice President. The card did establish, for the record, Eisenhower's official gratitude. It did not, however, confirm their close relationship. The President considered Nixon distasteful for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was Nixon's political aspirations.

In a December 1954 letter to childhood friend, Everett "Swede" Hazlett, Eisenhower wrote a denouncement of politically motivated men. Presumably, the elections of November brought the subject to mind. He told Swede, "so great is the politician's thirst for power and personal prestige that philosophical and doctrinal differences are unimportant to partisans seeking office." The remark seemed to describe someone like Nixon and perhaps provided a hint about why Eisenhower doubted his runningmate's principles of government in 1956. It was not until later in the Administration, however, that Eisenhower directly complained about the Vice President's political expediency.

On June 11, 1959, Ann Whitman, the personal secretary to the President, recorded an incident involving Ike and Nixon. She noted Nixon had joined the President for breakfast that morning. After the Vice President left, Eisenhower made a remark she felt compelled to record. He commented "'it is terrible when people get politically ambitious -- they have so many problems'. He did not elaborate." In fact, he did explain a little by adding that Nixon had urged the President to "take some of his [Nixon's] friends for a weekend on the Barbara Anne [the presidential yacht], playing golf at some of the nearby courses such as Quantico."\textsuperscript{13} Given the context - Eisenhower's preceding comment and the approaching 1960 presidential
campaign - "friends" probably referred to Nixon's political backers.

The General did not respect motives derived from a craving for personal power, rather than national duty. Ike might understand a desire to enhance one's prestige, but "political ambitions" were distastefully Machiavellian. His own goal to bring peace to the world before he left office, was motivated not only from a desire for personal recognition, but also from an altruistic need to save the world from itself. Nixon's request, however, was too political and self-centered for Ike to entertain.

During the final year and a half of the Administration, Nixon's political aspirations began to surpass his sense of duty. To help win election, the Vice President hoped to appear to wield more power than commonly perceived. He wanted to demonstrate his leadership skills. He needed to display at least a competency in dealing with the Communists. All would improve his reputation among the voting public. Eisenhower found exactly this behavior disagreeable. Intellectually, he understood that some of the maneuvering was necessary. He did not, however, respect the practice of selling one's image for public consumption, or respect Nixon for doing it.

Even after his trip to Russia, Nixon could not command the respect he yearned for from Eisenhower, or for that matter, the president's staff. At the Cabinet meeting on August 7, Nixon presented an hour and a quarter briefing to the assembled officials. Just before he began, the President excused himself but invited Cabinet members to remain. They all did. Nixon explained that he had already "informed the President and the Secretary of State in detail on those aspects of his discussion with Mr. Khrushchev which bore upon substantive issues; he did not recount these discussions in the Cabinet." According to the hand written
notes of the meeting, Secretary Herter stayed for Nixon's talk, even though he had already heard the pertinent information. Whatever Nixon said, it could not have been too interesting. L.A. Minnich, who took the minutes, made no more mention of the lecture than that the presentation occurred. One can assume also, that Minnich concluded Eisenhower had no interest in preserving a record of Nixon's remarks. Ike's departure reflected his priorities. Listening to the Vice President pontificate about Russia ranked lower than most any other business.

In a way, the performance was a repeat of one in 1953, after Nixon returned from his first Asian trip. At that time, the President only expressed an interest in assurances that Syngman Rhee could be controlled. Once the Vice President confidently stated this was true, Ike's attention went elsewhere. Even this late in the Administration, Nixon could not gain a serious hearing from the President. His position degraded further when Eisenhower usurped his most impressive foreign relations credential, travel abroad.

During the summer, Eisenhower decided to make a series of international tours before he left office. He had already visited Europe that August. In December, the President embarked on a trip that took him to Greece, India, Italy, Pakistan, Spain and Turkey (among others). On December 8, from Karachi, Pakistan, Eisenhower sent a telegram to Nixon. Except for a message following Latin American confrontations in 1958, Ike had not communicated with Nixon when either one of them was abroad. This bulletin described the throngs of adoring crowds that met Eisenhower at each stop. While public reaction in Rome was dampened by poor weather, the "reception in Turkey was colorful and outstandingly warm. Here in Karachi, however, I was literally overwhelmed by the sheer number of people
on the street." Ike mentioned in a few sentences the basic foreign policy goals of the countries he had visited. These were simplistically stated and Nixon undoubtedly already knew these fundamentals.\textsuperscript{15}

The point of this telegram was not clear. Ike might have sent it because he was visiting a region in which the Vice President claimed expertise. It was as close as the President ever came to informing Nixon of the foreign policy situation, the way Dulles had. Unlike Dulles' messages, Eisenhower reported little of substance. Rather, Ike, ebullient about the welcoming crowds and unable to contain his excitement, wrote Nixon this note to describe the events. If Eisenhower enjoyed spite, he might have written the note to illustrate his popularity, in comparison to Nixon's. Certainly, the public effect of Ike's trips for the Vice President was to highlight Eisenhower's achievements, skills and expertise over those of Nixon.

It is doubtful, Eisenhower wrote to keep Nixon informed about the world situation. Even after the international trips taken for the Administration and the competence the Vice President showed in foreign policy analysis, Eisenhower did not see the his second-in-command as a foreign relations expert. It was perhaps in this respect that the President and his Secretary of State differed the most. Ike and Dulles saw foreign relations in particularly similar terms. They agreed on most aspects of policy. But, on Nixon's foreign relations skills, they were near opposites. Dulles respected the Vice President's international affairs expertise and sent him to Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe on State Department business. According to Herbert Parmet, "[international] travel, all coordinated with Secretary Dulles, became a more prominent function of his office than any previous Vice President. . .
"Nixon served as "an adjunct to the Secretary of State, doing those things that Dulles thought he should not do for himself."\textsuperscript{16} Dulles' aid helped empower the vice presidency with new importance domestically and internationally. This modification of the office became a standard after 1960.

From 1959 until the election in November 1960, Eisenhower provided few opportunities to Nixon. Although the President preferred Nixon over John F. Kennedy, he could not suppress his discomfort about Nixon. Ike believed the Vice President was not yet ready to be President - "immature." He found the media's concentration on the campaign, and consequent inattention to his Administration, infuriating. This combined displeasure led to one of the most damaging remarks about the Vice President that Eisenhower ever made.

August 24, 1960, marked Eisenhower's one hundred and ninetieth presidential news conference. As it closed, newsman Charles H. Mohr asked about Richard M. Nixon's role in the Administration. It was a question that had been rephrased several times that day. Mohr wanted Eisenhower to "give us an example of a major idea of his [Nixon's] that you had adopted. . . ." Eisenhower, feeling besieged and frustrated, replied "If you give me a week, I might think of one. I don't remember." Annoyed, he ended the session immediately after the comment. The President's closing answer nearly set in stone the image of Nixon as un-influential in the decision making process. Eight years of effort evaporated with that single phrase. The Vice President must have seethed with anger.

The response made headlines and in doing so overshadowed Eisenhower's positive comments about Nixon's role in the Administration. A few minutes before the Mohr question, Ike had noted that the Californian took an active role in the advising process in the