Committee that "'We will meet our export quotas in every case in which we will be able to take it out on the hides of the British people.'" That kind of no-nonsense statement appealed to the freshman Congressman. The Californian was equally impressed by the fact that Cripps repeated the comment to the British media. Given Nixon's general dislike of the press and his penchant for seeking the "tough" stance, the examples provided by Cripps reinforced similar traits in Nixon and remained integral aspects of the Nixon persona, reappearing in profusion later in his career. They reflected his attraction to decisiveness and unyielding need to lead.

While in England Nixon began another practice that became part of his foreign relations repertoire - a constant effort to talk to the commoners of every nation he toured. He explained in the report that "in order to round out a picture" one had to talk to people besides politicians. It was a tactic that possibly related back to his domestic campaigning style. He met with all comers on the campaign trail and learned the mood of the country through his efforts. His goal was similar in this circumstance. Thus, in England, Nixon talked with dock workers, farmers and shop keepers. As Vice President and President, his efforts to "reach the people" proved popular internationally with both press and public.

In 1947, Communism was already an important theme for the Congressman. His report reflected that fact. He concluded that England would never go Communist because its roots in democracy were so deep. But, in France he saw a greater problem. Complaining about the weakness of the French political structure, Nixon wrote "the Communists control the labor unions and also are the second strongest party in France, and the French government is plagued with the multi-party system which does not place responsibility on any political
party." He concluded that without U.S. aid "France would undoubtedly end up with a totalitarian government - probably of the Communist variety."14 Nixon's anti-Communism remained ardent to the end of his political career.

Besides aid from the United States, the best hope for France would come from a strong leader with a good plan. France had the former in Charles DeGaulle. DeGaulle's independent nature hindered the formation of a plan. The French leader "too often acts upon impulse rather [sic] upon a predetermined plan which is needed by the country if it is going to recover." DeGaulle "refused to work with other people in developing programs for the country."15 Nixon's critical comments also contained an ironic element.

Without admitting it, he admired the strong leadership example. At least unconsciously he appreciated impulse, since he acted on his own regularly. He illustrated as much during the latter parts of this trip. And, the longer Nixon stayed in political office the more he reflected DeGaulle's refusal to work with others. He came to rely only on himself and a few trusted advisors.16 Like Cripps, DeGaulle's personality appealed to Nixon because Nixon sought to manifest those same characteristics. DeGaulle's example bolstered Nixon in his desire to be a man of action and a man who made his own decisions.

While Nixon failed to mention any contact with the public in France, he definitely moved among the German populace. As he did, Nixon revealed that not only did he seek out and talk to members of the public, but he also sought out adventures. Nixon's willingness - even desire - to take risks in foreign relations never decreased. He recognized it as a flaw in DeGaulle, but employed it as a model for himself.

Nixon enjoyed risk taking. He saw it as an integral part of taking action. In the field,
he combined both by creating opportunities for exploration. He made his first unplanned excursion in Germany and followed it with several more in his subcommittee's region.

While other members of the Committee remained in relative isolation from the German people, Nixon and another Congressman obtained a guide and a driver. They proceeded "down into the ruins of Essen." The city was filled with people in overcrowded cellars, living in atrocious conditions. Nixon witnessed tuberculosis in every living quarter. Dresden contained similar squalor. Visiting a hospital amongst the bombed out ruins, he found 200 children "suffering from advanced stages of tuberculosis." This undoubtedly affected him. His brother Harold died after a long battle with TB. According to historian Fawn Brodie, Nixon never recovered from that traumatic loss. If nothing else, Nixon's exploration of Essen and Dresden would have made him sympathetic to Germany's plight. He certainly gained an intimate picture of the horrific conditions there.

Before Nixon had left the country, he gained additional reasons to support German aid. His notes documented his ever deepening belief in German redevelopment. As Vice President, he would find allies for this cause in Secretary of State Dulles and President Eisenhower, but in 1947 Nixon was willing to support German manufacturing alone, if necessary.

His advocacy arose partly because of a special briefing made to the Committee by General Lucius Clay, then Commander of United States Forces in Europe and Military Governor of the U.S. Zone in Germany. Nixon came away from that meeting firmly believing that "if the American taxpayers are going to get the German people and the rest of the people of Europe off their backs, it is essential to increase German production of
peacetime goods." Much of Europe traditionally relied on German manufacturing and without it recovery could not succeed.\textsuperscript{19} Clay's briefing reinforced Nixon's support for the Marshall plan. It also helped cement Nixon's unavering defense of foreign aid. He had concluded that such aid improved America's prestige and influence, while reducing potential Communist advances.

From Germany, Nixon's subcommittee traveled to Italy. In Rome, Nixon and his three subcommittee colleagues used the U.S. embassy as a base camp. From there, the Congressmen took reconnaissance trips through their assigned regions, Italy, Trieste and Greece. Nixon began his discourse with Greece.

In Greece, Nixon's report took on a new level of detail and analysis. His subcommittee's responsibility for the region undoubtedly led him to report in greater depth than England, France or Germany. He concentrated on Communist influence there, relating his first meeting with Communist operatives, in a foreign country. He continued to interview peasants, managed another adventure and talked with Greek government officials. Nixon's commentary on his experiences provides an excellent view of his solidifying foreign policy beliefs and tactics.

As in Germany, the Committee had the benefit of a briefing by the resident expert. Nixon excluded this conversation from his personal report, but the minutes, presented in a memo, retell what happened at that meeting. Nixon's mindset going into the briefing was highlighted by an exchange between himself and staff consultant L. J. Cromie. Cromie asserted that a Communist take over in Greece would cause a "political chain reaction against the United States . . . should the United States fail to live up to its moral commitment to
defend Greek independence and territorial integrity." Nixon asked "whether there would be any difference between our 'moral failure' to protect Greece and our 'moral failure' to protect the countries of eastern Europe now integrated into or dominated by the Soviet Union." To this Cromie replied that leaving aside moral questions different political consequences arose from "being obliged to recognize a fait accompli . . . and the weakness that would be implied by relinquishing something we hold to the adversary."\(^{20}\)

The exchange illustrated several things about Cromie and Nixon. First, Cromie revealed he was not a politician. Nixon identified "moral" as the defining word in Cromie's statement, but as the response indicates, Cromie used the term loosely. He wanted to emphasize the serious repercussions to not halting Communism. Nixon's response pointed to his political training. He put Cromie on the defensive, probably not maliciously, but by instinct. His questioning of U.S. moral failure in Eastern Europe reflected his partisanship. The loss of that region could be blamed on the Democrats.

Cromie clarified the stakes for Nixon, when he realized his poor word choice. He dismissed the moral issue as a means of analyzing the Communist threat and instead concentrated on the political cost of additional losses. Nixon's question stands in interesting contrast to his later statements, which have a tone similar to Cromie's answer. And, it is safe to conclude that Cromie's argument convinced Nixon of the dangerous situation in Greece. The conversation showed Nixon shifting from his political side to his developing international mantle. He would learn to integrate the two more smoothly before much longer.

After Cromie's warning, the subcommittee ventured away from Athens "and to the north of the country where the fighting is going on between the Greek government and the
guerrillas." Not satisfied with getting close to the area controlled by guerrilla forces, Nixon and Congressman James Richards flew to Florina, a town on the Yugoslav border, "completely surrounded by guerrillas." In comparison to Essen, this adventure proved far more exciting. Before reaching the ground the danger had begun. Their Greek pilot expected to land his twin engine Douglas airplane on a 2,500 foot runway. Both Nixon and Richards were sure the plane needed 32,000 [sic] feet to stop. With all assurances the Greek successfully brought the plane down.21 Once safely on the ground, Nixon and Richards began interviewing local officials, captured guerrillas and town residents. His experiences in Florina would influence his perception of Communists and his reactions to Communism for all future confrontations.

In Florina, Nixon learned that Communist propaganda portrayed the guerrillas as nationalists fighting for a democratic Greece. One captured soldier told Nixon that the guerrillas were being supplied by the "democratic" countries of Albania, Serbia and Bulgaria. His leaders claimed they would be fighting soon side by side with Russians to conquer the United States and Great Britain.22 These deceptive and manipulative tactics fit extremely well into Nixon's own image of Communist operatives. Nixon also heard the story of a woman who claimed Communist guerrillas had "sliced off her left breast when she refused to tell them where her brother was hiding."23 Whether or not the story was true, Nixon recorded it as fact. This type of barbarism surely disgusted Nixon and increased his hatred and distrust of Communism.

Analyzing his observations, Nixon concluded that Greece could be saved simply by taking action. He advised that "if the United Nations were to step in and assume the
responsibility of policing the Greek border and keeping out help from Communist dominated Albania and Yugoslavia for the guerrillas, that the Greek Army would dispose of the guerrilla situation in Greece within a matter of weeks." His optimism was based on the proposition that by eliminating Communist demagogy and intervention, Greek inclinations toward democratic ideals would reassert themselves. He continued "It is only the support from the outside which is being received by guerrilla forces that allows them to disrupt the entire recovery program of Greece, which the United States, of course, is financing." He was confident that "this is simply another case when the Communists by force are attempting to impose upon the people of a country the system of government which they are unable to impose upon them legally through ballot." 24

Nixon's conclusions applied to every corner of the world. A firm supporter of containment, his Greek adventure reiterated the basic soundness of that policy in an extremely personal way. He saw first hand how Communists operated. Action, definite and direct, would solve the problems. This was a formula Nixon called upon again and again.

Italy and Trieste also were important markers in Nixon's lessons on how to deal with Communists. With the headquarters for the subcommittee in Rome, Nixon was able to spend enough time there to do some in-depth research. He arranged for interviews with many of the top political leaders of Italy, Communist and otherwise. These were Nixon's first recorded debates with leading members of the Communist party, and he made the best of the opportunities.

The Congressman from California interviewed three high ranking Communists party leaders in Italy. Umberto Terricini, according to Nixon, held a position parallel to Joseph
Martin's (Speaker of the House). Terricini wore "the red flag of Moscow in the button hole of his coat and significantly enough, his beautiful office was decorated in red velvet." Nixon missed the irony of referring to the office as beautiful, then hinting its color implied a Communist affiliation. He noted Terricini was suave and smooth, the "brain of the Italian Communist Party." In Terricini, Nixon saw a formidable opponent positively tied to Russia, as evidenced by the pin.

Nixon next described Palmiro Togliatti, head of the CP in Italy. Togliatti exiled himself to Moscow during Mussolini's reign. He used nationalism to win adherents by linking the Communist party to the nineteenth century Italian hero Garibaldi. At an adversarial level Nixon probably admired Togliatti's clever methods, and may have taken note of them so as to be able to react to such tactics later. He observed these same tactics repeatedly during his career, including among the Greek Communists who also displayed an aptitude for misrepresentation.

The third Communist whom Nixon interviewed was Giuseppe De Vittorio. This meeting was the most notable of the three, assuming Nixon's more detailed account of the event is an indication of the importance he placed on it. In some ways, it was a precursor to the famous kitchen debate with Nikita Khrushchev. At the meeting Nixon and De Vittorio verbally sparred about the merits of their respective political credos. The exchange appealed to Nixon's self-created tough guy image and to his desire to learn more about Communist thought.

Nixon first asked his adversary "what kind of government he favored in relationship to the labor unions in Italy." De Vittorio replied he preferred one that gave the right to strike.
Nixon retorted that this described the United States, but not the Soviet Union. De Vittorio, according to Nixon’s account, responding with a doctrinal diatribe. He claimed U.S. workers had to "obtain rights from the Capitalist reactionaries and employers" and thus needed to strike to gain anything, but Soviets were not capitalistic and so had no need to strike. De Vittorio also explained, in response to further questions from Nixon, that U.S. foreign policy was imperialistic because of Capitalism. He reapplied the reasoning about strikes stating that, lacking Capitalists, Russia’s foreign policy could not be imperialistic. However, when Nixon countered the arguments, De Vittorio complained that "the gentleman and I are not speaking the same language." While probably the literal truth, figuratively the Italian meant he and Nixon did not see eye to eye. That was the only point on which the two politicians agreed. Nixon gained from this conversation lessons he would never forget.

First, the inflexibility of Communist dogma did not escape Nixon. De Vittorio rejected any position that did not support his own. The only result of such a conversation could be disagreement. The next time Nixon debated a high ranking Communist, he did so in public. At least then the audience might be swayed, since the Communist would not be.

Nixon came away from the experience having no doubts about a Communist’s allegiance. Analyzing the discussion Nixon wrote "From this conversation it can be seen that the Italian Communist, despite his protestations of loyalty to his own country in the event of a struggle of that country and Russia would be bound to be on the side of the Communist country, because by definition the foreign policy of the Communist country is always right and the foreign policy of a non-Communist country is always wrong in the eyes of the Communist." Nixon provided further proof by claiming he had had an identical conversation
in Great Britain with a member of the miners' union. This was enough evidence to convince him that Moscow controlled international Communism. The inflexibility of their doctrine kept Communist operatives in line.

In Rome Nixon gained important experience in verbally confronting Communists. He expanded his intellectual understanding of Communism. Trieste, the third region assigned to the subcommittee, presented Nixon with a physical understanding. There he encountered, first hand, the violence of their aggression.

Nixon performed a bit of deception in making Trieste the final section of his report. He placed it after the discussion of Greece and Italy, when he actually visited Trieste before Greece and possibly before his Italian encounters. But, Nixon's experiences in Trieste were far more dramatic and potentially dangerous than in Italy or even Greece - as he told the story. A politician and showman, he probably saved the best for the last. Even though this report was never made public and there is no evidence the document circulated among more than a few close associates, Nixon wanted to present the events in the most enticing order. In Trieste, Nixon experienced his first taste of Communist inspired mob rioting and his first images of the people who instigated it. If the De Vittorio escapade was a precursor to the kitchen debate, Trieste was the pilot for Lima, Peru and Caracas, Venezuela.

Nixon's party arrived in Trieste on Wednesday, September 17. As he settled into his hotel room, Nixon heard a commotion outside. The Californian claimed that, looking out the window, he saw a parade of 500 people waving red flags and singing the International. They gave a clenched fist salute to "Moscow" as they passed the Communist Party Headquarters, adjacent to the subcommittee's hotel.
Nixon, the risk taker, could not resist this opportunity. He reported "Immediately, two of us obtained an Italian interpreter and went down into the street to see what the situation was. Just as we reached the street we heard an explosion at the end of the block."

According to Nixon's account, the explosion was a hand grenade tossed from the second story window of the Communist HQ. It landed amongst a group forming to protest the Communist parade. Now a young man of about 20 was dead, his head blown off by the explosion. In the street Nixon saw a pool of blood.

As he made his way toward the town square, residents became more aggressive. "We moved up on the street with the crowd and by this time it was getting out of hand. People were gesticulating wildly shouting at the top of their voices and gathering at the town square."

As the rioting and violence continued through the night, 5 people died and 75 were wounded. The Communist instigated demonstration illustrated their inhumanity. This became more evident when Nixon witnessed a large CP member run down a 75 year old woman, while being pursued by the police. In such an atmosphere, Nixon gained a new appreciation for the violent methods of Communists and the warlike battle that had to be fought for the survival of Democracy. His dramatic retelling portrayed his courage and impressed its reader with the gravity of the situation.

Nixon's report of the explosive events in Trieste was frightening. He intended it that way. The veracity of his report, however, comes into question after examining his handwritten notes, made just after the incident. His notes made no mention of many of the details he included in his report. The location of the Communist headquarters, paraders carrying red flags and singing the International, the clenched fist salute and the physical
description of the head blown off, were not written down at the time. It is impossible to know whether he fabricated these details or simply remembered them while rereading his comments. But, because these details add much of the drama to Nixon's story, one cannot help but suspect he embellished events to some extent. His penchant for manipulating facts, apparent later in his career, probably had a place in this story.

However embellished this report was, additional evidence corroborates that Nixon did not fabricate the entire adventure in Trieste. After the committee returned to the United States, the chairman of Nixon's subcommittee, Thomas Jenkins (R-OH), created gag stationery with the heading Jenkins Raiders. Nixon was listed on the left margin as a commando. On the right edge, under engagements, Jenkins included "Nixon's Charge, Trieste." That accolade supported Nixon's claim of running from his hotel into the mob filled street.

From either version of the events - notes or report - Nixon would draw the same conclusions about the Communist menace and the dangers it posed to the free world. He had witnessed distressing violence in Trieste. Not surprisingly, he applied and refined the lessons learned from these experiences again and again.

Nixon's party spent several days in Trieste, then returned to Italy. After his visit to Greece, the group traveled to Paris. From Paris, the subcommittee flew to London and on October 4 all the Herter Committee members boarded the Queen Mary and sailed back toward the United States. The entire European journey took over a month. In that time Nixon's opinions about Communism were confirmed and his foreign affairs experience expanded. As a bonus, he made the acquaintance of intelligence expert Allen Dulles, a contact that would
prove to be extremely important to his future.

Historian Fawn Brodie admitted Nixon became "something of an internationalist" because of this trip. She claimed that Nixon's primary concern remained containment of the Communists and that he saw the Marshall Plan as the best means to that end. The report supported Brodie's conclusion, since it concentrated on the Communist threat and revealed Russia's influence in Europe. Concurrently and contradictorily, Nixon's report also downplayed the Communist threat. In that respect it showed his true concern for humanitarian issues, especially with Germany. This juxtaposition of Communism and social issues remained a constant with Nixon. Communism was important, but Nixon consistently examined the grassroots side also. His political instincts attracted him to themes that stirred public interest.

During the trip, he remarked on the improbability of England, Germany and Greece going Communist, regardless of how terrible conditions became. Upon his return from Europe, he concluded that Italy was almost out of danger. He found danger in Trieste, but remarked "in free elections [they] have overwhelmingly voted against a Communist form of government." With firmness Trieste would survive. Only in France was the "danger of Communist domination of the country . . . a great one." France also had the best chance of recovery because of its near self-sufficiency. That raised the possibility of Communist influence, since a recovery independent of U.S. supervision opened doors to non-democratic infiltration.

Despite Nixon's concerns about Communism in Europe, a careful analysis of the report revealed a de facto acceptance that Western Europe was relatively safe from Red
domination. Also, whatever level of concern he maintained about Europe's freedom, it was not so great as to eclipse his distress about Europe's plight. Nixon did not ignore the hardship and need.

The Congressman made numerous sympathetic remarks about the destruction in Europe, and especially the physical devastation of Germany. He expressed his disgust at the hunger in each country and the lack of material goods. In Essen, he retold how Representative Edward Eugene Cox (R-GA), who "had never previously been noted for being particularly emotional" gave clothing, soap and candy to the children he met by the train. Cox said he could not help himself. Nixon described a woman in Verona whose child suffered from rickets. She had no fuel to heat her house. When Nixon asked what they did in the winter she replied, "'We go to bed.'"35 Nixon did not paint an appealing picture.

At the same time, the Communist issues were not ignored. Nixon did not justify the Marshall Plan only on humanitarian grounds. He saw the tremendous need in Europe as an opportunity which Communist infiltrators sought to exploit. He wrote in an article in the Spring of 1948, "The only chance for the forces of Communism to succeed in their attempt to dominate the still free peoples of Europe and Asia is for the United States to discontinue its aid program. Communism thrives on misery, hunger and desperation, and where a political vacuum exists the Communists are there. . . ."36 There was an unspoken confidence that Western Europe was safe from Communist rule. There was also the explicit warning that U.S. aid had to continue to maintain that security.

Nixon's post trip correspondence concentrated on Communist threats, rather than the humanitarian needs. The former was a political issue, much harder to predict and control
than the tangible flow of supplies and food to Europe. Communist aggression required constant counter-action. Humanitarian aid did not. This mail represented the final element in Nixon's foreign trip methodology - the follow-up. As with any campaign, after the vote was in, a series of letters went out discussing any outstanding details and rehashing the issues. Probably because he stayed at the US embassy in Rome, his messages were limited to a few foreign service officers stationed in Italy. In subsequent years, his post-trip correspondence significantly increased.

The most informal advice came from a woman identified only as Rosette R. She must have been associated with the foreign service, since she wrote on foreign service stationery. Her comments sound whimsical, as though she were attracted to the young Congressman. She bade him not to think her a revolutionary, because she was just teasing some, "though I still hold the opinion that certain things like the danger of Communism in Italy are very much exaggerated." Nixon read the letter, but did not answer her. Or if Nixon replied, a copy did not end up in the files. Despite this, evidence suggests he agreed with her conclusions.

Rosette's second letter lacked the playful tone of the first. She held to the notion that Communist Party influence had waned in Italy. As she saw it, those who had joined the party now discovered that the Communists would not fulfill their promises of reform. Young and moderate members were leaving the CP as they became increasingly disillusioned. Nixon seems not to have answered this letter either. In both, however, Rosette provided a moderate's view of the situation in Italy. More analytical, the second memo contained a perspective Nixon could not ignore. Her themes paralleled Nixon's later conclusions. Communist deceptions could not be concealed indefinitely. Rosette believed they were being
discovered in 1947.

The Congressman also maintained a brief correspondence with Foreign Service officer, J. Wesley Jones. Before leaving Rome, Nixon had asked for biographical sketches of the top ten Italian government officials - several of whom Nixon had met. On October 14, Jones satisfied Nixon's request. It is difficult to know whether Nixon had made more or less of an impression on Jones than he had on Rosette R. Jones opened his memo "Dear Nick," which was either a typo or a reference to Nixon's Navy nickname.39

Whichever, five weeks later Nixon asked Jones to confirm his own opinion on Italy. "The recent disturbances in Italy have been very interesting to all of us who were there and, in my opinion, indicate that the Communists realize they are defeated and are simply making a last ditch stand. If your opinion is otherwise I would appreciate your dropping me a note to that effect."40 Nixon did not mention Rosette R.'s comments - also made during November - but his message contained the essence of her conclusions. Italian Communism was on the decline.

Why Nixon chose to discuss this with Jones, and not Rosette, can be surmised. First, the gender discrimination of the time made it probable that Jones held a higher position in the embassy than Rosette. Nixon's practice was to consult with the upper echelon whenever possible.

Also, his reply to Jones alone implied he did not fully trust Rosette's analysis. Brodie claimed that Nixon was hostile to women who spoke out, were adept at politics or who went beyond their accepted station, as he defined it. "The women Nixon openly resented were those gifted at attack."41 He could easily interpret Rosette's comments as an attack. She
offered an opinion with which he must have disagreed, at some point. Why else would she
begin by defending herself as not a revolutionary? Added to that was the apparent flirtatious
nature of the first note. One can assume that for Nixon, Rosette’s opinions did not carry the
same weight as those of Jones.

While Nixon failed to respond to Rosette’s comments, he nonetheless adopted her
conclusions. Communism could not represent a tremendous threat, if the Italian CP was
disintegrating. In December, Nixon received a final confirmation of Italy’s safety from
Henry Tasca, a senior Foreign Service officer. Tasca commended the speed with which
Congress had approved interim aid and jubilantly reported "the Italian picture shows
considerable signs of vitality and ability to resist Communist violence. . . ." Tasca attributed
his optimism also to the Truman Doctrine which was "making Moscow think twice before
ordering its Italian wing to go into action."42 For partisan reasons, Nixon may not have
agreed with Tasca’s praise of the doctrine, but Tasca did end at the same point as Nixon -
democracy would prevail over Communism. Tasca also confirmed the Congressman’s
conclusion that humanitarian relief could counteract Communist propaganda.

Nixon’s communication with Foreign Service officials recalls his unending search to
increase his knowledge. He studied prior to the trip and continued to educate himself
following it. By the time of his vice-presidency, international relations education like this had
become an ongoing occupation. In 1947, it exposed him to a subject he found intriguing and
exciting.

Nixon’s report carries with it an aura of relative inexperience, naiveté and youth. It is
unlike any official paper he wrote after this trip, being both less formal and less dogmatic.
Through his comments, Nixon unintentionally revealed some of his infamous character traits. He appreciated action, risks and toughness. He also hinted at an already developed distrust of the media. More importantly, the nature of this document allows a rare glimpse at the dawning of Nixon's foreign relations interest and the formation of his tactics.

Visiting Europe as a member of the Herter Committee he quickly established a regimen he followed on all subsequent trips abroad. In many ways, this formula mimicked his campaigning tactics. He met with countless people, including government officials and commoners. He debated his opponents by confronting Communist sympathizers. He took bold actions, going on adventures wherever he could.

The trip also gave Nixon first-hand experience with Communism. From his exploits in Greece, Italy and Trieste, Nixon developed his conclusions about Communist infiltration, methods and operatives. He integrated those components into his foreign policy philosophy. The Communist threat attracted him to international relations.

Nixon's next extended exposure to foreign relations would not come until he joined the Eisenhower Administration. In the meantime, he returned to his congressional duties. But, he did not leave the foreign arena altogether. Instead, he built his reputation among international affairs experts in the Republican party.
ENDNOTES:


3. Ibid.: 149


6. Itineraries, Background Information, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947: PSS206.131. Members of the subcommittee also included Thomas A. Jenkins (OH), James P. Richards (SC) and George H. Mahon, (TX), consultant Franklin A. Lindsey. These Congressmen each had over a decade of service in the House. PPS206.47.3 Trip File Correspondence 1947, August 15-31.


and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA, Trip File 1947 Correspondence, August 1-14: PPS206.21; Itineraries, Background Information, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947: PSS206.131


15. Ibid: 2.

16. Nixon would experience this type of leadership again when he was excluded from Eisenhower's inner circle of admirers. He adopted it as President also.


18. Fawn Brodie, Richard Nixon The Shaping of his Character, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1981: 106. Brodie's argument rests on Nixon's personality being a reflection of his childhood experiences. Harold as the older brother was in ways revered by Nixon. His emotional distress over the loss of Harold and the mental scars that resulted are an important aspect of Brodie's explanation of why Nixon reacts as he does.


20. Memorandum of conversation between members of Subcommittee on Italy & Greece and staff consultant and Embassy staff, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence, October: PPS206.88.2.