
22. Greece: 2-3, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Nixon, Richard Milhous 1913- Folder "typed report of the observations by country.": PPS206.159; Report on Visit to Florina, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence, October: PPS206.88.3. In his report, Nixon changes the countries mentioned by the informant to Yugoslavia, Albania, Poland and Russia. His embellishment is designed to increase the angst about Soviet influence in Greece. To some extent, he probably equated all the countries with the Communist monolith he believed to be controlled by Moscow.

23. Ibid.


37. Letter from Rossette R. to Richard M. Nixon, 1 October 1947, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence 1947, October: PPS206.77. The letter is intriguing also for the personal glimpse we get of Nixon. We can imagine him in the eyes of Rossette - a 35 year old Congressman. Well dressed, intelligent, interested and interesting. This is not an image of Nixon often seen.

38. Letter from Rossette R. to Richard M. Nixon, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence 1947, November: PPS206.95. Rossette's second note might have been less playful because of a rebuff from Richard Nixon. If he had responded, he probably would have written a formal, cold note - most of his notes are just that, even to family.

Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence 1947, October: PPS206.80.1; Trip File 1947 Correspondence 1947, October: PPS206.80.2-11; Ambrose, Nixon Volume I: 112. Nixon was shortened to Nick by poker playing buddies.


41. Brodie: 236, 238.

Chapter 2:  
An Uncommon Bond - Nixon Dulles Relations

Nixon's initial attraction to foreign relations was personal. He enjoyed travel, he appreciated the challenges and he adored the attention. But, the Congressman soon began to consider international relations in professional terms, as well. He developed contacts on the Herter Committee which he maintained and expanded to eventually include Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Nixon and Dulles would become close friends after 1953, but their initial contact predated the Eisenhower presidency. The two had met and consulted in 1948. In fact, Foster Dulles probably recognized who the Representative from California was even before their first meeting. Dulles' younger brother Allen had been a consultant to the Herter Committee, the previous year. He and Nixon became friendly during the trip. Since the Dulles brothers frequently talked, it would be reasonable to assume that Allen mentioned the young Congressman to Foster.

During the Second World War, Allen pursued a successful career in the Office of Strategic Services. After the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, however, he resigned. Dulles family biographer Leonard Mosley claimed that Allen left because the Democratic administration would not allow him to retain a position in the CIA that reflected his accomplishments and experience. Despite his exclusion from the CIA, Allen maintained contacts in the intelligence community by taking advantage of any opportunities he had for
European travel. According to Mosley, Allen used his status as Herter Committee advisor to join the Congressmen on the *Queen Mary*. Once on the continent, he could refresh his European associations. Allen's presence was especially suspicious because the trip itinerary listed him as a "home consultant," implying he might brief the Congressmen before they embarked, but probably would not travel with them.¹

Mosley noted that Allen and Nixon became close friends during the trip.² Nixon made no mention of his new familiarity with Allen in his report or notes, but then Allen probably did not accompany Nixon, while in Europe. He did not specialize in Nixon's subcommittee region. More likely, Nixon and Allen struck up an easy repartee during the cruises to and from Great Britain. The *Queen Mary* took about seven days to cross the Atlantic Ocean.³ That provided them with two weeks to become well acquainted. Their friendship continued after the trip. And, in time, it expanded to include Foster Dulles.

Taking advantage of his acquaintance with Allen, Nixon initiated a relationship with Foster. The two corresponded intermittently after the Herter trip. Nixon immediately recognized the utility of connecting his name and Dulles'. Dulles held an influential position among Republicans and stood as heir apparent to head the State Department. On June 2, 1948 Dulles wrote the Representative about supporting legislation Nixon was associated with—probably the Nixon-Mundt bill. "I was a little bit embarrassed by the press handling of my letter to you, particularly in Oregon, where headlines apparently gave the impression that I had unqualifiedly endorsed the Bill in every particular."⁴ Chances are Nixon planted the notion that Dulles wholeheartedly supported his bill by referring to the letter. Dulles' note mentioned at least one previous letter to Nixon and implied a response from Nixon. Dulles
and Nixon were not total strangers when they met for their first documented face to face conversation on August 11, 1948.

This initial consultation concerned the Hiss Case. As a member of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), Nixon listened to the testimony of Whittaker Chambers, a self-acknowledged former Communist party member. Chambers accused the respected foreign relations expert Alger Hiss of pre-World War II espionage against America. After hearing secret testimony given by Chambers, Nixon wanted to pursue the case in earnest. But, before he followed this instinct, he asked for a meeting with John Foster Dulles. Dulles chaired the Carnegie Endowment, a foreign policy think tank that employed Alger Hiss. Nixon sought Dulles' blessing, particularly because Hiss had asked Dulles for a letter of support in regard to the HUAC case. Nixon did not want to upset or embarrass Dulles.

On that second Wednesday of August, Nixon met Foster Dulles in Manhattan's Roosevelt Hotel. The meeting included several of their mutual acquaintances. When Nixon arrived, he found along with Foster, brother Allen, Christian Herter and New York Banker, Douglas Dillon (appointed Undersecretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration). Whether Nixon knew Dillon cannot be determined, but he did know Allen, Herter and Foster. These four men formulated much of the Republican international relations platform.

Nixon made a good impression on Foster by carefully and methodically presenting his evidence against Hiss. Dulles valued a well defended argument. A few years later an Assistant Secretary of State noted "if he [Dulles] determined that you could hold your own, then he would permit you to say anything you wanted to, without any real dressing down or


embarrassment." Nixon held his own. By the end of the meeting he had the group's support for an in-depth investigation of Hiss' Communist connections. The Hiss trial introduced Dulles to Nixon's style and gave Nixon a prominence he previously had not had. Nixon's career benefited from both factors.

In *Six Crises* Nixon claimed that the Hiss case, as his first major political crisis, taught him an important lesson. "I would never forget that where the battle against Communism is concerned, victories are never final so long as the Communists are still able to fight. There is never a time when it is safe to relax or let down. When you have won a battle is the time when you should step up your effort to win another - until final victory is achieved." Nixon would press his advantage.

Of course, Nixon had actually adopted this perspective as a Herter Committee member. The Hiss case simply reiterated and reinforced his conclusions. The debate with De Vittorio, and conversations with Greek guerrillas, had illustrated the necessity for constant vigilance. The dangers in France and Trieste revealed the importance of a strong defense and an active offense. The Hiss case, while important in bringing Nixon to greater prominence in the political scene, did little to further his foreign relations career. In that respect, the more important effect of the case was his personal introduction to the future Secretary of State.

From this first meeting, Nixon recognized Dulles' expertise and ability. Dulles presented the younger man with an opportunity for further education and access to powerful people. Nixon pursued these avenues, while maintaining deference and loyalty to the man who accepted the role of patron.

Building on the positive impression he had made, Nixon made it a point to keep Dulles
informed on the HUAC proceedings against Hiss. On September 7, he sent Dulles two letters pertaining to the case, one general and the other specific. First, Nixon had to maintain Dulles' confidence. In the general letter he answered Democratic charges that the espionage hearings were a "red herring." He stated Elizabeth Bentley was a viable witness, despite questions about the veracity of her testimony and claimed Truman should "forget politics and . . . cooperate with the Congress in getting the Communists out of the government." The second letter appealed to Dulles' predilection for the law. It could have been the closing argument against Hiss. Nixon explained the latest testimony in the case and asked Dulles to reconsider Hiss' position on the Carnegie Endowment.9 His effort to keep Dulles informed about the trial recognized Dulles' position as a top ranking Republican. From these contacts a foundation on which the two Republicans built stronger ties was created.

Even after the Republican candidate for president, Thomas Dewey, lost the 1948 presidential election - ending Dulles' immediate chance to be Secretary of State - Nixon continued to provide Dulles with information about the trial. At the end of 1948, he sent Dulles a transcript of the espionage hearings with the noteworthy sections underlined.10 At the year's end, Hiss was indicted on two counts of perjury. The indictments ended Nixon's main excuse to write to Dulles and a year long lapse in correspondence followed. Undoubtedly, in 1949 they had some inter-action but it was not documented.

That year proved a particularly busy one for Dulles. Dewey, then governor of New York, offered Senator Robert Wagner's seat in Congress to Dulles. Near the end of his term, Wagner had resigned because of poor health. Dulles reluctantly agreed to take the position for the six remaining weeks, but made no commitment to run for the seat that Fall. Dulles
wanted a position that allowed him to work on international relations, not legislative jockeying. But, once in Washington, he changed his mind. Although a freshman Senator, Dulles immediately spoke on the floor - in favor of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Senate gave him a public forum to discuss international affairs. With the help of Dewey's political advisors, he tried to retain Wagner's seat. It was to no avail. His opponent, Herbert Lehman, won the election.\(^{11}\)

While Dulles tried his hand in the Senate, Nixon continued his activities in the House. He worked diligently on HUAC and attended to other House duties. His responsibilities kept him busy. With both men members of Congress, it is probable they communicated less formally than by letter.

As such, it was not until February 1950 that Dulles sent Nixon another letter. While they had left no record of contact in 1949, Dulles had been watching Nixon. He wrote on the heels of Hiss' perjury convictions: "I often think of our long talk together at the Hotel Roosevelt and I think that the result justifies your perseverance in this matter."\(^{12}\) Nixon welcomed Dulles' support. About to run for retiring Senator Sheridan Downey's seat, Dulles' compliment could only bolster Nixon's confidence. Although the compliment might have been pro-forma, it also reflected Nixon's rising star. The young Representative's success earned him respect and influence in the Republican party.

Nixon campaigned against Helen Gahagan Douglas for the seat and won. Soon after the victory, Dulles took time from his now full schedule - he was negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty - to contact Nixon. Again Dulles recalled the Hiss case and complimented Nixon. His formal letter of November 15 opened: "Dear Mr. Nixon: I am delighted at your
election to the United States Senate." Dulles expressed his regret that he could not personally welcome Nixon into the Senate chamber, but noted "I recall very well your sound and sober judgments as a member of the Committee on Un-American activities and am very happy that this will now be available in the Senate." Nixon had made an indelible impression on Dulles at the Roosevelt Hotel, and with his subsequent prospection of Hiss. Dulles' repeated compliments indicate that he respected and admired the Californian. His letters foreshadowed the later decision to take Nixon under his wing.

The Nixon-Dulles communications lapsed yet again after this note. Through most of 1951 Dulles was either negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty, or arranging for its international and domestic support. Not until March 20, 1952 did the Senate ratify the treaty and provide Dulles with an opportunity to send Truman his resignation. The day before the vote, Nixon confirmed with his colleague William Knowland that General McArthur approved of the treaty. Knowland claimed, when he asked McArthur if he would vote for Dulles' treaty, the general replied, "'I would.'" This convinced Nixon to vote yea on the treaty.13 By then, the Republican party was gearing up for the 1952 presidential campaign. Dulles and Nixon crossed paths once more as both became involved in the election.

During 1952, Nixon and Dulles formed a more personal association. They wrote to each other repeatedly about campaign issues and tactics. The most interesting aspect of these letters was not the topics discussed, but the increasing geniality of relations. Previously, Dulles and Nixon had carried on a stiff and formal correspondence. By January 1952, Nixon addressed his notes to "Foster" instead of Mr. Dulles and signed them Dick or Rich. Dulles, accordingly, began to respond "Dear Richard" and, within several months, "Dear Dick."14
Their increased contact reflected their expanding roles in the campaign, as well as Nixon's efforts to court the man who would likely be Secretary of State. This increased contact further paved the way for Dulles' patronage of the Vice President. Nixon reciprocated Dulles' earlier praise with notes complimenting Dulles on speeches. He asked for a copy of the talk Dulles delivered at the National Conference of Christians and Jews because "I would like to have the views of a man I respect as an expert!" Nixon did not over exaggerate his respect, but at the same time he clearly fed Dulles' ego.\textsuperscript{15}

The solidifying relations were not only a result of Nixon's efforts. Roderic O'Connor, one of Dulles' top State Department assistants, claimed that Dulles was intrigued by political power. It was what attracted him to Eisenhower. By extension, Dulles would have been attracted to Nixon. Nixon had used his exposure on HUAC and his monumental efforts for the party to climb the rungs of the Republican party with amazing speed.\textsuperscript{16} If Dulles wanted to watch a master political strategist at work - and a self-promoter - Nixon was the man.

Hence, by 1952, Nixon's interest in Dulles was mirrored by Dulles' interest in Nixon. They pursued each other in hopes of developing a stronger relationship for their own individual self-interest. In the process each profited, creating by the end of Ike's first Administration an almost symbiotic relationship, in which each man manipulated and was manipulated, largely to the benefit of both.

The Nixon-Dulles correspondence prior to Eisenhower's election was intermittent, at best. It tended to center on official and mundane topics and therefore does not reveal a great deal about their relationship between 1949 and 1953. Yet, it does illustrate their interest in one another and a growing mutual respect. They were not close before the Eisenhower
Administration, but these few letters show that each had a working knowledge of the other and sought to maintain a positive impression. Their limited association in the late forties and early fifties provided them with a good basis for the ensuing close interaction during Ike's presidency.

Richard Nixon's role in the Eisenhower Administration was dichotomous. He was, without question, the most well informed, involved Vice President America had seen to that time (and possibly since). Concurrently, he was excluded from Eisenhower's inner circle of advisors. Ike failed to consult with the VP about priority policy options, except in terms of domestic political consequences. Furthermore, despite his status as outsider, Nixon managed to obtain inside information. He developed a means of breaching the closed circle through his increasingly close association with John Foster Dulles. Dulles aide, John Hanes, once commented that his boss was an expert in diplomatic negotiations, but a novice at cocktail party small talk. Hanes said Dulles "was a very shy man in private. . . . [who] was not good in light conversation. . . . He had trouble relating to people not of his generation, especially those who lacked his experience in foreign relations."^17 Nixon shared Dulles' discomfort with small talk. And, because of his unfailing interest in foreign relations, he proved the exception to the generational rule.

Nixon and Dulles formed a strong bond during the Administration, despite the twenty five year age difference. In 1953, they began regularly consulting each other on a bevy of official subjects including speeches, post assignments and legislation. More than that, in a city where neither man had many close associates, they formed a strong friendship. Dulles shared with Nixon information on U.S. policy toward its allies, enemies and neutrals and updated
Nixon on summit negotiations. During crises like Quemoy and Matsu, Suez and Sputnik, the Vice President turned directly to Dulles for his briefings. By consulting with and advising the Secretary, Nixon gained an influence on Administration decisions.

While the Nixon-Dulles relationship has not been closely examined by scholars, some historians have delved into the post-election period and noted Nixon’s appreciation for Dulles. They universally concluded that Nixon respected the Secretary. He considered Dulles, not Ike, the foreign relations expert of the Administration and worked to learn from the master. Nixon acted as his un-official advisor/assistant, in Herbert Parmet’s words, "as an adjunct to the Secretary of State, doing those things that Dulles thought he should not do for himself."

While Nixon served as Dulles’ alter-ego, Dulles served as Nixon’s informant. But, none of this interaction could have been possible, had Nixon and Dulles not discovered early on that they shared many interests and from these commonalities forged their relationship.

Historian Stephen Ambrose pointed out that Nixon had few close friends in Congress or the Cabinet "except for Dulles, with whom he continued to exchange almost daily calls and often visited at home for a late-night drink or a weekend meal." When they had the chance Mr. and Mrs. Nixon liked to join the Secretary and his wife for a relaxed dinner. Dick and Foster shared family news with each other and talked sports together. Nixon might invite Dulles to join him for a New York Yankees baseball game. While Dick left Pat at home, Foster usually brought Janet to the game.18

Nixon consistently claimed Dulles as one of his closest friends in the Eisenhower Administration. In Six Crises, he referred to Dulles as "one of my warmest friends and supporters in government." Twenty five years later Nixon still maintained "he was closer to
John Foster Dulles than to any other member of the cabinet."\textsuperscript{19} While Nixon and Dulles grew significantly closer in 1955, as a result of their consultation immediately after Eisenhower's heart attack, they had formed a definite friendship during the preceding two years.\textsuperscript{20}

Their relationship was built on similar beliefs and working styles. Both men studied hard to prepare for overseas trips. They read and reread briefing books and situation papers. They listened to oral briefings with great care and interest. And, they processed every scrap of information with calculated efficiency. Dulles and Nixon were ardent anti-Communist crusaders, fully steeped in the Cold War ideology. They believed that America could only persevere if its policy-makers refused to submit to the Soviets. A tough stance would keep the Communists in line. At the same time, both men wanted to keep their options open for as long as possible. Closed doors were difficult to reopen, and they saw no reason to limit the direction in which they might next move.\textsuperscript{21} Both men had a drive for power that made them crave the wrangling so prevalent in politics and diplomacy. It was a lifestyle for which, incidentally, their respective wives harbored serious misgivings.\textsuperscript{22}

The expanding relationship between Nixon and Dulles can be traced through an examination of their respective letters during the Eisenhower Administration. The bulk of this correspondence consists of congratulatory notes and general praise of each other's accomplishments. However, enough of the documents illustrate the Nixon-Dulles consultation, shared perspective and genuine mutual concern, to gain an understanding of how these men related to one another.\textsuperscript{23} I will leave it to the next chapter to examine how they manipulated each other.

Dulles was not content to rely on providence to expand his relations with Nixon.
Taking advantage of Nixon's eagerness, the Secretary of State regularly assigned three duties to his protégé. All ensured Nixon an increased role, but also served a purpose for Dulles. First, Dulles sometimes asked Nixon to help meet or entertain foreign dignitaries. In addition, he used Nixon to support his positions in meetings, the Administration and on policy. This probably was not a formalized arrangement, but an incidental consequence of their relationship. They agreed on many tactics, in any case. And, it was in Nixon's best interest to support the Secretary when he could, since Dulles acted as his patron. Finally, Dulles combined his use of Nixon with Eisenhower's. He employed Nixon as congressional liaison for the State Department. In this capacity, Nixon gained a hand in foreign policy discussion and still acted in a position Eisenhower considered appropriate.

Just two months into the new Administration, Dulles went out of his way to give the Vice President press exposure and an opportunity to meet a foreign dignitary. On March 24, Dulles called Nixon to ask if he cared to greet French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault at the airport. Nixon could accompany Dulles after that morning's National Security Council meeting. "The Vice President said he would be glad to do so. The Secretary said that they would draft up a little statement for him." While the Secretary may have invited Nixon to accompany him in order to increase the number of US officials waiting for Bidault, the tenor of the conversation implied additional motivation. Dulles specifically offered a ride and a speaking role to Nixon. In fact, neither of these gestures were necessary to enhance Bidault's arrival. Coming from Dulles, a man who ignored most social niceties, the offer can only be seen as an effort to ingratiate himself to Nixon.

On July 13, 1954 - about six months after Nixon returned from an extended trip to
- Dulles asked the Vice President to host a luncheon for Prince Wan, an Asian dignitary. Dulles would be flying to Paris for the Indochina Peace talks then. The Secretary chose Nixon over one of his undersecretaries. As second to the President, Nixon brought more prestige to the affair than anyone under Dulles. Whether or not the luncheon required someone of the Vice President's caliber was determined by Dulles. Undoubtedly, Nixon relished the chance to practice his statesmanship.

While Dulles found Nixon to be a reliable diplomatic aide, the Vice President discovered he and his mentor shared similarly partisan visions of the government. Nixon detected in Foster deep suspicions concerning the Democrats. This paranoia allowed them to envision a conspiracy directed against the Republican Administration by their foes.

The conspiracy extended to many civil servants in the State Department. Thus the Vice President and the Secretary of State concluded that most of these veterans were "Middle-aged New Dealers." Both Dulles aides, John Hanes and Roderic O'Connor, agreed that Dulles believed a large portion of State Department staffers were not loyal to the Eisenhower Administration. Relics from the Roosevelt-Truman era could not be trusted to support the new initiatives or assist in the implementation of policy. Nixon expressed his distrust when he made disparaging remarks to the Secretary about American diplomats who had served in the Truman Administration, and carried over after 1953. "This gang is constantly undercutting. You sat with them in Manila and they leaked. This proves his [Nixon's] point above re talking too much." Nixon referred to a claim he had just made that the more people Dulles brought to an upcoming meeting, the more probable someone - implicitly a Democrat - would talk to the press. The Vice President felt certain 75 percent of State's Planning Board
Department was against the Secretary. In Nixon's view, it was him and Dulles against the entire Planning Board Department. The odds were stacked against them, but this challenge appealed to Nixon's tough guy image and the bi-polar analytical system he employed.25 In a world of Democracy challenging Communism, Republican opposing Democrat, Administration versus media, it was not surprising that Nixon relied on a confrontational scenario. Dulles frequently applied the same basic formula, although he allowed for more subtle distinctions.

Nixon's comment illustrated that a fear of leaks to the press was a second suspicion shared by these men - unless they had themselves sanctioned the disclosure. For example, on June 5, 1953 they discussed Nixon's fall travel plan, his first overseas trip as Vice President. Dulles suggested a destination of Asia, since the Secretary had just returned from the Middle East and Milton Eisenhower was about to visit Latin America. Notwithstanding the region, Nixon and Dulles dismissed Eisenhower's idea of taking Senators along for the ride. While some of these legislators would have been Republicans, Nixon realized from his experiences as a Congressman, that regardless of the party affiliation, they could not be relied on to remain silent. "They would be anxious to report back and get in the news and would probably leak everything." In a similar situation Nixon would have.

A month later, Nixon complained that Robert Allen's latest column had leaked his proposed trip. Nixon suggested to Dulles "Since it has apparently leaked out it might be better to announce it." If ignored, the media would ask Eisenhower about the rumor at his next press conference.26 Nixon's famous anti-media stance during his own presidency was not a distrust that developed out of Watergate and Vietnam. As Vice President, he privately
derided the news industry for unfair stories about him, the Administration and the State Department. He charged that reporters wanted to trap him in inaccuracies or contradictions, and that they overemphasized minor statements in order to misrepresent his actual intent. $^{27}$ His dislike of leaks may have been encouraged by Dulles. But, his extreme hostility toward the media - although a logical extension - was not shared by his mentor.

Both of Dulles' assistants maintained that the Secretary decried the leaks, but appreciated the power of the press. O'Connor noted that Dulles enjoyed the sparring and debating of a press conference. He and Hanes agreed that Dulles attempted to foster positive relations with reporters because "a great many people in the Department had close relations, very often with rather unfriendly sectors of the press." Those personnel would leak to their friends. It was essential for Dulles to win over as many media people as he could to avoid embarrassing leaks. But, O'Connor pointed out Dulles "never attempted to try to stop them in any formal sense. He recognized that would have been a grave mistake." $^{28}$ Any such program to crack down on leaking would only have made more enemies within the Department, and among the press corps. Nixon never comprehended that subtlety.

Hane's and O'Connor's comments imply that the Secretary had a more reasonable grasp than Nixon, on the problem of leaking. While Nixon hoped for a vendetta against leakers, Dulles accepted unauthorized leaking as par for the course. He took a more relaxed perspective on leaks, so much so, that he actually joked about the topic. In a meeting with Chancellor Adenauer on May 29, 1956, he reported "We discussed the problem of leakages and Chancellor Adenauer expressed the opinion that it was very wrong and dangerous to make memoranda of conversations [because they could be leaked]. Therefore, this is a
memorandum to end all memoranda." This was an uncommon glimpse of Dulles' often noted, but rarely recorded, sense of humor.

While Dulles' remark poked fun at the overly cautious stance, there was no doubt that he shared Adenauer's displeasure with leaks. Two weeks later, Adenaur asked to visit President Eisenhower, who had checked into Walter Reed Hospital after an ileitis attack. Dulles stated that if Ike was up to the visit, Adenauer could proceed, but "there should be absolutely no advance leakage of this possibility."29 When Dulles perceived national security risks he was as disturbed by leaking as Nixon. He made it clear that he did not want the media present while Adenauer talked with the bedridden President. Generally, however, his concerns - and those of Nixon - centered on unauthorized leaks. Both men detested leaks from the opposition, but they were willing to use the same tactic to benefit personal or Administration interests.

On April 16, 1954 Nixon made an off the record comment advocating American troop intervention in Indochina, in the event of an imminent Communist victory. He claimed the US would have to "send in the boys" to head off such a defeat. The remark, which came during a luncheon with the American Society of Newspaper Editors, immediately leaked. It was viewed as a trial balloon for the Administration. Evidence suggests, however, that Nixon was at most expressing Dulles' view, and probably only voicing his own opinion. In any case, Nixon claimed he had been double crossed by the press. He never explained what he expected would happen when he made a controversial statement to a room full of newspaper editors. A savvy politician like Nixon assumed the comment would get out and his actions displayed his own willingness to leak information when it suited his purposes.30
Nixon's "send in the boys" comment illustrated a deceptive method for presenting his unofficial opinion as one with an authoritative aura. Just by saying it, he gained national attention and bolstered his reputation in foreign relations. Indeed, many of the leaks Nixon approved during his presidency were intended to improve the public's perception of him. He had the same goal in mind when he grabbed headlines after the American Society of Editors speech.

Because Nixon's role in foreign policy was largely determined by Dulles, it was no surprise that Nixon sought to improve Dulles' public reputation when he could. Making the Secretary look good through well crafted leaks earned him Dulles' gratitude and fit with approved tactics. The seasoned statesman also released unofficial statements to benefit his reputation. Nor were Nixon and Dulles above jointly planned leaks.

An excellent example of this came on March 11, 1955. Dulles had just returned from a trip to South East Asia. There he consulted with King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and Chaing Kai Shek of Taiwan. That afternoon Nixon and Dulles discussed the situation between Nationalist and Communist China. Nixon suggested that he leak some positive statement about Dulles. Dulles' secretary transcribed the conversation: "N. asked if it would be helpful if an authoritative source said that the President has been very greatly impressed by the Sec.'s briefings on his return and is solidly united behind the Sec.'s policy. The Sec. said he thinks it would be good. They agreed N. would do it with Drummond." The comfort with which Nixon recommended, and Dulles approved, an authorized leak implied the process was neither distasteful nor unprecedented.

Nixon also recommended strategic leaks as a means for improving the State