Department's public image. In an animated discussion about department performance, Dulles claimed "each in his Dept. should be thinking in terms of not just doing a competent job but do things out of the ordinary and provide a basis for showmanship." In support, Nixon added they should "do it the right way. Leak stories and meet with off-the-record groups. . . ." 32 Nixon's experience with off-the-record groups proved they were just another means of delivering unofficial information.

Such shared characteristics attracted these men to one another. In addition, the circumstances and events of the early 1950s brought them together. Every Administration has cliques competing for the President's attention. The Dulles-Nixon partnership was one such alliance. Nixon and Dulles worked together to thwart Defense Secretary Charles Wilson, White House advisor Sherman Adams or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Administration rivalries particularly strengthened the alliance between Nixon and Dulles immediately following Eisenhower's 1955 heart attack. During the crisis, Dulles advised Nixon on his conduct and statements. After Ike recovered, the Secretary took a more personal interest in Nixon's political career. Dulles backed his man when he could. And, Nixon needed the help in 1956.

During the 1956 presidential campaign Nixon contended with Ike's obstinacy. The President refused to state for the record that he wanted Nixon as his Vice President. Publicly, he claimed Nixon had to choose his own road. Away from the media, Eisenhower hinted that Nixon should take a Cabinet position instead of remaining Vice President. Eisenhower sensed Nixon's presidential aspirations and did not appreciate them. He believed Nixon needed better administrative skills to be a good president. As head of a department, Nixon could
gain that experience. But, even behind Oval Office doors, Ike would not definitively tell Nixon to stay on or get off the ticket. He hoped Nixon might take his cue. And, because Ike had no better vice presidential candidates, his efforts to exclude Nixon were not constant or exhaustive.

Ike's ambivalence allowed a "dump Nixon" movement to develop, making Nixon's place on the ticket appear precarious. Dulles came to his friend's aid when Eisenhower remained aloof. The Secretary of State was enough of a patron and friend to look for opportunities to increase the Vice President's prestige and also offer him well considered advice.

Helping Nixon, however, placed Dulles in a potentially awkward position. He sought to simultaneously promote Nixon's ambitions, advocate Eisenhower's preference, and protect his own relationship with the President. Dulles succeeded in his triangular balancing maneuver, although he did not achieve any compromise between Nixon and Ike.

Dulles talked separately with the Vice President and the President to try to find a satisfactory resolution. First, he advised Nixon to take some Cabinet post. Dulles informed his friend that, in American history, vice presidents rarely succeeded to the presidency. Nixon could and should be a US President, but first the Vice President needed to prepare via an important Cabinet position. His argument paralleled Eisenhower's, except in that Dulles had more confidence in Nixon's ability to perform the duties of a president.

From the other side, Dulles attempted to convince Eisenhower that he should offer Nixon a more prestigious slot than Secretary of Commerce. Dulles had in mind his own assignment, Secretary of State. If the research of historians Ambrose and Parmet was
correct, Dulles twice suggested to Ike that Nixon replace him. Ambrose wrote that on February 9, 1956 Dulles and Ike discussed Nixon's predicament. "Dulles doubted that Nixon would take it [Secretary of Commerce], and suggested that Nixon succeed him as Secretary of State. Eisenhower laughed and said Dulles was not going to get out of his job that easily, then added that 'he doubted in any event that Nixon had the qualifications to be Secretary of State.'" In Parmet's account, Dulles brought up the subject two weeks later. He stated the Secretary "somewhat whimsically" suggested that Ike make Nixon his next Secretary of State. Neither historian presented Dulles' suggestion as serious. Parmet wrote, "If Dulles was, after all, truly prepared to step down at that point, there were far more seasoned potential candidates." While Parmet's conclusion appeared viable, it ignored too much of Dulles' character and experience. Several factors point to the idea that Dulles made the comment in earnest.

First among them is the importance that Dulles placed upon language. He wrote and revised his own speeches to help clarify his thoughts. Similarly, he drafted, edited and re-edited his press statements before delivering them. In Cabinet meetings, Dulles was known to start talking, stop in mid-sentence while he formulated the exact meaning he wanted and then resume his thought. In short, he did not speak without thoroughly considering each word. It is improbable that Dulles would "whimsically" suggest to the President of the United States that he be replaced in the next term unless he intended to retire.

Further, Dulles did not joke about foreign policy issues. He had been raised to understand the implications of international relations because his grandfather and uncle both had diplomatic careers. His maternal grandfather, John Watson Foster, had enjoyed a foreign
relations career spanning from the mid-1870s to 1910. John Foster served as minister to Spain, Russia and Mexico and also spent a short time as Secretary of State under Benjamin Harrison. Dulles' uncle, Robert Lansing, was Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State during World War I. Dulles himself attended the Versailles Peace Conference. A man raised on international relations, and devoted to the secretaryship, would not nominate his own replacement without considering the consequences. Had Ike accepted his suggestion, Nixon could have become Secretary of State. Dulles recognized this possibility and he would not have introduced the subject had he not considered Nixon a suitable successor.56

In addition, Ike's final comment in the Ambrose quotation illustrated that he took Dulles seriously. The President gave a direct reason why Nixon would not be an acceptable replacement as Secretary of State - inexperience. Eisenhower did not change his mind.

Rather than just trying to amuse Eisenhower, Dulles probably had an involved game plan. He hoped to subtly manipulate both Nixon and Ike into accepting his compromise. The Secretary recognized that Eisenhower occasionally latched onto ideas that were presented in an informal setting. The President sometimes heard an off-the-cuff suggestion and immediately adopted it. If one assumed Dulles was considering retirement (this will be addressed below), he might have hoped to secure the position for Nixon. That would provide Nixon with a Cabinet post sufficiently prestigious for him to leave the ticket and still be in a position to launch a presidential campaign in 1960.57 Dulles possibly mentioned Nixon as his own successor intending to gauge Eisenhower's response. In the best case, Ike would like the idea and pursue it. In the worst, he would laugh it off as a joke. Neither reaction could jeopardize Dulles' working relationship with the President.
As long as he was Secretary of State, he needed to maintain Ike's confidence. But, if Dulles saw Nixon as a suitable replacement, one must ask why he was looking to name his heir. Was he ready to retire?

On February 25, 1956 John Foster Dulles would be 68 years old. Grandfather Foster had been 57 when his term as Secretary ended. Robert Lansing had been 56 at his term's end. On top of that, the average retiring age of all twentieth century Secretaries of State through the Truman Administration was 62. If Dulles retained the secretaryship through a second term he would be 72 before he retired, older than all but Secretaries Cordell Hull and Frank Kellogg. And Dulles was aware of the age issue. In 1953, he refused to reappoint Joseph Green - a Princeton classmate - to the Ambassadorship of Jordan because he believed Green was too old.

In addition, there was his own life expectancy to consider. He was far from perfect health. And, of the family males with an immediate connection to Dulles, only Grandpa Foster lived a bit past age 80. Dulles' father was 76 when he passed away and his paternal grandfather had died in 1886, at age 63. If family history revealed anything, it told Dulles that he could not expect to live more than a few more years. A man like Dulles wanted to have time to write his memoirs (as his Grandfather had). If he stayed on another four years as Secretary his chances of completing an autobiographical work would be significantly reduced.

Eisenhower might have accepted Dulles' recommendation, had it come ten months later. On November 2, Dulles was hospitalized for severe stomach cramps that mimicked appendicitis. Exploratory surgery revealed it was actually cancer of the colon. Doctors
removed the cancer, but it would return within two years and cause Dulles' death in 1959.

From this analysis, one can conclude that Dulles probably did consider Nixon as a viable replacement after 1956. He and Nixon discussed the international situation. If Dulles saw Nixon as his protégé, perhaps he was ready to pass the torch in 1956. Although inexperienced in comparison to Dulles or Ike, Nixon had shown his competency to the Secretary's satisfaction. They shared a similar world view, with America as the preserver of democracy and Russia the destroyer. Dulles knew Nixon would work to maintain the same principles he upheld. He knew the Vice President would not fold in the face of Communist aggression. And, he knew Nixon would continue to consult him often. Nixon was the perfect successor because he ensured Dulles maintained a hold on foreign policy. Nixon could cement Dulles' legacy. Of course, he never found out how Nixon would have handled himself, since Eisenhower refused to accept the suggestion.

That Dulles recommended Nixon at all, illustrated his own respect for and confidence in the younger man's foreign relations abilities. Dulles' suggestion also reflected his friendship with the Vice President. At the tender age of 43, Dulles believed Nixon could take on the responsibilities of Secretary of State. When his efforts to obtain the position for Nixon failed, he dropped the subject. Ike would not consent, so there was no reason to pursue the topic. Dulles remained the Secretary of State, died in office and never published a page of memoir.

While it is possible Nixon would have accepted an appointment as Secretary of State, his real objective was the Oval Office. He had sipped the presidential nectar following Eisenhower's coronary in 1955. Given Ike's health and age, Nixon's chances at a promotion
were better than ever. Pundits commonly wondered if the General would live through another four years. If Ike died in Office, Nixon advanced to the presidency without even the trouble of a campaign.

He also declined a Cabinet position because he assumed his chances for winning the Republican party presidential nomination in 1960 were higher coming from the VP spot than any other. Nixon was evolving the role of Vice President. Using his political connections, public recognition and expanded duties, Nixon transformed the vice presidency into the position he envisioned - a jump off point for the top slot. Historically that was not the case. From 1956 onward he worked to present himself as a viable and capable candidate for President. However, he had to be cautious to balance his presidential aspirations against his subservient position in the Administration.

Although Dulles could not secure his secretaryship for Nixon, he could offer advice on the Californian's quest for the presidency. And, despite his battle against terminal cancer, Dulles remained focused on world affairs. Nixon continued as his confidant and pupil. After 1956, their consultation still included official and personal issues, but expanded to cover Nixon's political prospects as well.

In November 1958, Dulles and Nixon discussed the recently held congressional elections. The Republicans had lost 50 seats in the House, but both men concluded Nixon's heavy campaigning before election day had kept the results from being a complete Democratic triumph. Looking forward, Dulles mentioned to the Vice President that "we need to be thinking pretty hard pretty soon about 1960..." They decided to meet on Saturday to assess the situation and discuss options. The Secretary mentioned that he also wanted to talk
about his own future plans, but did not give any details.\textsuperscript{41} Exactly what they discussed on Saturday, November 8, was not recorded. It probably covered Nixon's strategy for the immediate future, his chances at the Republican nomination and the potential competition in 1960. Both men understood Nixon had to remain in the public eye and maintain his contacts in the Republican party.

A memorandum from January 1958 hinted at what Dulles' personal plans might have been. The Secretary and Nixon were discussing some type of transfer of responsibility in the State Department. For national security reasons, the subject matter could not have been widely discussed. The transcribed conversation, as often happened, used the preposition "it" in place of the topic at hand. But, the subject can be determined even if the exact plan being considered cannot.

Dulles explained to Nixon that "he talked to AWD [Allen Welsh Dulles] about the matter they discussed and he is very much opposed to it. He said there could not be such a transition without giving an impression of weakness." Dulles stated that his brother did not see a way to change the current State department structure "that would not be misinterpreted." Nixon concluded that the plan could only work if it were tried "from scratch" - probably meaning in a new Administration. The implication was that Dulles wanted to reduce his work load. He hoped to transfer some of his responsibilities - knowing Dulles, probably the onerous administrative duties - to a subordinate. Undoubtedly, his advancing illness played a role in this proposal. Nixon tried to support Dulles' goal despite Allen's advice. He was concerned for Dulles' welfare. "N still thinks we can explore ways in which the Sec can call Herter in and have him take greater responsibility in certain areas."\textsuperscript{42} That Dulles formulated
his plans with Nixon - the memorandum makes it clear they had previously discussed these issues - illustrated the personal trust and the valued judgement that he placed in the Vice President.

Allen Dulles, as brother and CIA director, was a person with whom to confide. But, Nixon, as Vice President, had no business knowing Dulles' plans, unless Dulles determined Nixon would provide constructive and sound advice. Perhaps Dulles still believed Nixon might be convinced to succeed him as Secretary of State. He certainly maintained an interest in Nixon's political course.

Dulles reiterated his concern for Nixon's political future on Saturday, January 24, 1959. The two discussed the merits of a reorganization plan Eisenhower had revealed at the Cabinet meeting that week. Neither Dulles nor Nixon was pleased with the scheme which called for, in Dulles' words, "two 'Assistant Presidents,' one dealing with more or less domestic affairs and the other dealing with international affairs." The greatest concern they voiced revolved around how the proposal might appear to Congressmen and the public. Nixon complained that unless there was "broad support in the Congress for this and not great debate about it, it would very likely play into the idea of the President wanting to get rid of some of his duties." Just as Dulles could not pass any of his work to a subordinate, Ike could not assign his tasks to assistants. To implement such a modification so late in the Administration had domestic ramifications in addition to international consequences. And, in terms of Nixon's future, the reaction could disrupt the party, increase desire for change, and "make Nixon's prospects [in 1960] pretty dim."43 This prognosis did not comfort either man.

Dulles' interest in the political future of Dick Nixon reflected his concern for the
younger man. By January 1959, it was clear that Dulles could not remain Secretary of State to the end of the Administration. The only question was when he would resign. He entered Walter Reed Hospital with terminal cancer in February and so had no personal stake in the 1960 election. While he wanted a Republican to remain in the Oval office, his choice of Nixon was not a foregone conclusion. Eisenhower had a list of five or six men whom he believed qualified to take up the reigns. Nixon was on the list, but not at the top of it. Yet, Dulles concluded that the Vice President was the best choice. His close association with, and observations of Nixon, helped confirm this conviction.

In the Spring of 1959 Dulles' poor health became a higher priority than Nixon's election prospects. On April 13, Dulles called Nixon. Presumably discussing his own resignation, Dulles noted he had made no decision yet, "although the Sec recognizes the inevitable more or less." Dulles planned to wait another week, while Nixon encouraged him to "give it every chance." The Secretary mentioned that he would start a new treatment the next day and the conversation ended. He resigned two days later.45

Dulles was dying, new treatment or not. In under a month and a half he would be gone. But, Nixon continued to meet with the Secretary in his room at Walter Reed Hospital. And Dulles continued to advise Nixon on his political predicament. On May 2, they discussed the Vice President's upcoming trip to Moscow. In addition, Dulles offered the names of various Republican party members whom he believed could be helpful in Nixon's pursuit of the presidency. Dulles, only three weeks from death, "urged the Vice President to keep in touch with Mr. Dewey. . . . The Secretary also suggested that Mr. Arthur Dean has an influential, although inconspicuous, role in Republican affairs."46 Dulles' death bed advice
was concerned and paternalistic. Nixon knew the Republican party better than almost anyone. And he understood who he could rely upon as allies. Dulles could not offer anything greater by then, however, and for his part Nixon graciously accepted the suggestions.

John Foster Dulles died on May 24, 1959. Nixon wrote a tribute about the Secretary of State two weeks later for Life magazine. In it, Nixon not only expressed his deep admiration and respect for Dulles, he revealed their close relationship by way of a personal comment Dulles had made to him. Days before his death Dulles described his last negotiations. The dying man admitted to Nixon "I never felt any pain while the negotiating was taking place. Then at the end of the day it would come down on me like a crushing weight." His statement reflected more than an ability to control excruciating discomfort. It was a confession that admitted his weakness and described his hardship. Dulles, a reserved man, did not share such intimate details about himself with most people. But, Nixon was not just anybody.

Dulles' death brought to an end what Ambrose referred to as "a solid team... [that] had helped each other as occasion demanded..." since 1953. Their similar beliefs and methods attracted them to each other. The friendship and trust that ensued was rare for Dulles and even more so for Nixon. It allowed them to discuss both private and Administration topics with great ease. Nixon admired Dulles' great experience in the realm of foreign policy and Dulles respected Nixon's grasp of the issues and desire to learn more. They had a genuine concern for one another that was manifested in their personal association as well as their professional consultation.

The Nixon-Dulles relationship went much further than friendship and respect. They
maintained a close working relationship which although hinted at in this chapter, has not been fully examined. Nixon took full advantage of Dulles' inner circle status, while Dulles probed Nixon for advice on numerous decisions. The image of Nixon as uninformed about Administration policy disregards Dulles' frequent willingness to brief Nixon on the most up to date information. Their professional relationship, the mutual consultation they shared, will be the subject of the next chapter.
ENDNOTES:


2. Ibid.


17. JFDOPH, John W. Hanes: 4, 220.


21. JFDHOHP, Roderic L. O’Connor: 37, 70; Nixon, Six Crises: 186; Nixon, Memoirs, Volume 1: 203; Memo of Conversation John Foster Dulles and Henry Cabot Lodge, 6 March, 1958, JFDPEL 1951-1959, General Correspondence and Memoranda Conversation Subseries A-Conversation Subseries Z; Nixon, Six Crises: 200; Ambrose, Nixon Volume II: 31; JFDHOHP, John W. Hanes: 204, 205. Even in personal habits Nixon and Dulles shared similarities. As examples: they both swam for exercise and enjoyment; both took notes on yellow legal sized pads; they loved adventure and risk taking (After World War I, Dulles and an acquaintance traveled from Ruhr - following a Red coup - through Essen using only bravado and courage [Beal: 75]. Nixon's trip through the ruins of Essen nicely parallels Dulles' earlier foray); and they enjoyed relaxing over a conversation about sports.

22. Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973: 43. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume I: 126, 244, 350. Janet and Pat hated it for slightly different reasons. Janet always traveled with her husband, but unlike Pat did not meet with anyone. Instead she sat, bored in her hotel room for hours on end, while Dulles sat at the negotiating table. Pat Nixon detested the campaign trail that she and her husband pounded about every two years and felt consuming guilt when she left their daughters to travel abroad.

23. Most of the Dulles-Nixon notes read like greeting cards with Dulles or Nixon writing, "Thanks for the text of your speech," "You did a great job," or "Thanks for the compliments in your last speech," etc.


26. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 7 July, 1953 (12:45pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Subject Series, Alphabetical." Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 5 June, 1953, JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 1 Telephone Conversations Series January 1953--October 31, 1953. There is some question in my mind about whether or not Nixon was actually the source of the leak revealing his trip. Making the trip public knowledge could only increase the VP's visibility.


29. Memo of Conversation John Foster Dulles and Conrad Adenauer, 29 May, 1957, JFDPEL 1951-1959, General Correspondence and Memoranda Conversation Subseries A-Conversation Subseries Z; Memo of Conversation John Foster Dulles and Conrad Adenauer, 12 June, 1956, JFDPEL 1951-1959, General Correspondence and Memoranda Conversation Subseries A-Conversation Subseries Z.


32. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 15 November, 1958 (3:26pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 7 Telephone Conversations Series July 1, 1957 - December 27, 1957. Nixon had shown how off-the-record meetings could be used as a means to leak with his comments about US intervention in Indochina.

34. Parmet: 264; Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower The President, Volume II*, New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984: 292. The sources cited by Parmet and Ambrose have two separate dates. It is possible, however, one of these citation has the wrong date and Dulles only brought up the subject of Nixon as Secretary of State once.


36. Schonberger: 238; William A. Degregorio, *The Complete Book of Presidents, New York: Barricade Books*, 1991: 338; JFDOHP Allen Dulles, Interview 1: 2, 12, 22-26; JFDOHP Allen Dulles, Interview 2: 49; JFDOHP, Eleanor Lansing Dulles: 9; Hoopes: 11; John Robinson Beal, *John Foster Dulles A Biography*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957: 51-52, 59-60. Several sources, including Dulles himself, attest to his interest in being the Secretary of State. In May 1952, Dulles told C.L. Sulzberger it had been an ambition of his since boyhood [Sulzberger, *In a Row of Candles*: 749]. Ike told his assistant Bernard Shanley that Dulles "was trained from boyhood to be Secretary of State... with the experience he's had in the past, all these factors make the difference between Foster Dulles and the ordinary mortal." [JFDOHP Bernard Shanley: 12]. And Allen Dulles admitted his brother probably aspired to the position [JFDOHP Allen Dulles, Interview II: 49.]

37. Nixon claimed in *Six Crises* [160-162] that Dulles offered him the Secretaryship but he turned it down because he concluded it would appear as a demotion from the Vice Presidency. If Nixon truly believed that he was living in denial. Few people in the Administration, media or general population would have considered Vice President Nixon as in a higher position than Secretary of State Dulles. Dulles was Ike's enviable right hand man, while Nixon was a political hack. As such, the position of Secretary had to have carried at least as much prestige as that of Vice President. Nixon most likely turned down Dulles' gift in the hopes that Eisenhower would not live through the second term. Dulles did point out to Nixon that only three of eleven 20th century vice presidents had ascended to the presidency. Of those, only Calvin Coolidge did it through election. Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Truman succeeded by right of survivorship. Vice President was not necessarily a strong jumping off point for the higher office.


40. Edmund Randolph 1794 to 1795 (under President George Washington) had been the youngest Secretary of State (age 41). Only a handful of other men younger than 50 have served as Secretary of State since Randolph.


43. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 24 January, 1959 (11:30am), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 9 Telephone Conversations Series August 1, 1958 - May 8, 1959. Nixon's argument against Ike's plan has ironic overtones given his later reorganization of the Executive office. Nixon noted that "what concerned him was that it was a much more revolutionary plan than the President realizes. In effect it puts in two people between the Cabinet and the Pres. who would have the power of 'Assistant Presidents'." Nixon's analysis in 1959 parallels the complaints made against his two assistants, H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman from 1968 through 1974.

44. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume I: 517.

45. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 13 April, 1959 (1:08pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 9 Telephone Conversations Series August 1, 1958 - May 8, 1959; Crowl (compiler), "A Chronology of United States Foreign Relations During the Career of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State." 1959: 3.

46. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, Walter Reed Hospital, 2 May, 1959 (11:30am), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Subject Series, Alphabetical. Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper. Interestingly, Dulles separated the topic of Moscow and the more personal conversation containing the advice to Nixon into two memoranda. They have the same date, time and place, but different topics. This example illustrates how Dulles differentiated between professional and private relations.

Chapter 3
An Unequal Partnership - Nixon and Dulles in the Administration

After Dulles' death, Vice President Nixon recalled "at least four occasions when he [Dulles] was under attack he asked for my advice." In truth, Dulles sought Nixon's advice often, irrespective of any outside criticism. To do that, the Secretary regularly briefed Nixon on a host of subjects, sharing with Nixon his thoughts on domestic and international topics. Nixon gained an insider's knowledge of foreign relations because Dulles fed him information on the Middle East, Far East, Soviet strategies, State Department appointments, content of speeches and Nixon's own role in the Administration. By examining the consultation between Nixon and Dulles, beginning in earnest about 1955, and continuing up until Dulles' death in May 1959, Nixon's actual role in the Eisenhower Administration becomes clear. His efforts to adapt the vice presidency to suit his political ambitions also appear.

Dulles assistant John Hanes reported that the Secretary often conferred with individuals in private 15 to 30 minute interviews. He met with his Undersecretaries for such meetings early in the morning, but these mini-conferences extended beyond State Department staff. Allen Dulles often came in for short briefings. Hanes noted "whoever it might be, would come in and just the two of them would sit down and go over things.... And he would do it with others that he was close to -- have long personal conversations. Most of those things he never recorded, of course. He would record things, only if he felt there was a
Although Hanes did not mention Nixon, he was undoubtedly one of the "others." Dulles kept transcripts of many of the phone calls and meetings he had with Nixon.

However, there are nowhere near the number of memoranda of conversations to match the number of discussions that Nixon and Dulles had. Hanes admitted that Dulles only kept notes on official conversations. Since many of the talks between him and Nixon were personal, they did not get transcribed. The professional exchanges, however, shed light on their consultative relationship.

From early in the Administration, Dulles and Nixon consulted on speeches. Dulles regularly circulated his drafts for comments from trusted associates. Nixon was among those consulted. In deference to his mentor, Nixon cleared many of his speeches with Dulles and asked for guidance on the content. He wanted Dulles to synthesize the Eisenhower-Dulles policy. Or Nixon asked Dulles if he should emphasize any particular foreign policy topics. Such dialogue was frequent, typically involving suggestions about word choice or syntax. Rarely did their discussions about speeches move beyond literary criticism, although sometimes they talked of political ramifications.

Dulles and Nixon also conferred about candidates to fill vacant State Department positions. Dulles' reason for asking Nixon about these choices might have been the Vice President's political savvy. However, Dulles also seemed to value Nixon's assessment of the abilities of these candidates. At least twice, Dulles asked for Nixon's nomination advice without any consideration of politics.

In August 1954, the Secretary called Nixon to discuss a replacement for outgoing Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Henry Byroade.