Nixon argued that it would be difficult to find a candidate who would be impartial about the Middle East. Most were either pro- or anti-Zionist. Reacting to an unrecorded statement by Dulles, Nixon advised against the appointment of George Allen. The Vice President complained Mr. Allen was too flexible. However, as the conversation ended Nixon seemed to sense Dulles' advocacy of the candidate, and admitted Allen "will be very loyal to any principles the Sec. laid down." Nixon's advice came in a non-confrontational package. He disliked Allen, but did not dismiss him. Perhaps Nixon was trying to avoid a disagreement with the Secretary. Just as probable, the Vice President expressed his true assessment of George Allen. The man did not fit Nixon's ideal, but a loyal subordinate was hard to find. Dulles agreed and Allen assumed the position in January 1955. Nixon's concern centered on how Allen would perform his duties, not the political efficacy of nominating a Republican.

In the Spring of 1957, they again talked about a high level appointment to the State Department. On the morning of April 18, Dulles asked Nixon about a replacement for the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. Nixon immediately suggested Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Joseph Palmer II. Dulles asked the Vice President to call him if he had any names to add. At the end of May, Dulles and Nixon again talked about who to appoint to the position. Dulles mentioned two candidates: Julius C. Holmes (Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs) and Ambassador James P. Richards. Nixon preferred Holmes and claimed that Richards did not "have the subtlety necessary to deal with the kind of problems that arose in South Africa. . . ." Presumably, partisan requirements were not at issue in this case, since Richards was a Democrat. The Secretary did not need Nixon to advise him on the political suitability of a nominee. The
Vice President instead offered an assessment of Richards' capabilities. Who filled the position is not clear, but neither man named that day.

Although Nixon had a role as the Administration's political workhorse, Dulles often asked for his advice on non-political issues. The patron genuinely respected the Vice President's opinion. Certainly Dulles' confidence in Nixon was unprecedented between any other Secretary of State and Vice President. The relationship that they shared helped transform the vice presidency from obscurity to celebrity.

Given Nixon's political specialization, however, Dulles did not ignore him as a partisan tactician. For example, when planning the tenth anniversary United Nations conference, Dulles asked if Nixon thought it would be acceptable to invite major participants of the 1945 U.N. conference. He mentioned several well connected Democrats, including President Truman and Eleanor Roosevelt, and one or two Republicans (Harold Stassen being the most prominent). Nixon immediately affirmed the appropriateness of inviting them. Had Dulles been concerned about the partisan consequences of inviting Truman and Roosevelt, Nixon's nonchalant reply laid his mind to rest. Nixon instantly understood the major participants of 1945 could not be excluded because of their party affiliation.

More overtly political were Dulles-Nixon consultations on gaining congressional support for Executive initiatives. A veteran Senator and Representative, Nixon used his many contacts to sound out members of both houses. As Vice President, he presided over Senate sessions adding to his effectiveness in guiding legislation through Congress. Nixon represented a direct line to the Executive branch, a factor that made him important to Senators seeking the President's ear. Throughout the Administration, Dulles and Nixon discussed how
to help their legislative program survive Capitol Hill.\textsuperscript{6}

Richard Nixon's input on political issues does not come as a surprise to anyone. But, his international involvement with Dulles is less familiar. The Secretary treated the Vice President like a foreign policy advisor, rather than a powerless appendage of the Executive branch.

On April 26, 1954, representatives from Europe and South East Asia met in Geneva, Switzerland to begin negotiating an end to hostilities in Indochina. As the conference neared its close, Nixon and Dulles recognized that the Geneva settlement probably would not parallel American goals for the region. When Dulles admitted he might join the American representatives for the closing ceremonies, Nixon advised against it. He believed "the line will be that Geneva is a sell-out - a failure of diplomacy." Dulles' presence at the meeting would serve to increase the US stake at Geneva, and he did not "like to see us give respectability or be a part of a deal which we don't believe in." Nixon abhorred the US being associated with an agreement that left Ho Chi Minh's Communist government in power. He may also have recalled the stigma attached to the Democrats who negotiated the Yalta Accords. Making deals with Communists led to domestic political vulnerability. Dulles undoubtedly agreed with his friend's assessment, but he could not act otherwise. Despite the risk of legitimizing the negotiations, as Secretary of State he could not ignore such proceedings.\textsuperscript{7}

This was neither the first nor the last time Nixon and Dulles consulted on American foreign policy. Although Nixon's suggestion could not be followed, Dulles supported the principle behind it. At the conference, he refused to shake hands with Chinese Foreign
Minister Chou En Lai, resulting in a diplomatic slight that would not be rectified until Nixon went to China in 1972. Dulles’ insult left no doubt that the United States viewed the settlement as a capitulation to Communist forces.

In November of the following year, Dulles was again in Europe. In between visits to Franco in Spain and Tito in Yugoslavia, Dulles sat in on security talks with the Soviets, again in Geneva. On the fifth, the Secretary sent Nixon a detailed description of the negotiations. "The original Soviet proposal on security was a moth-eaten draft which had first appeared at Berlin two years ago..." Dulles complained that it lacked any substance. But, "under pressure of our proposal and argumentation about it, the Russians then came up with a new proposal which coincides in most important respects with our own proposal." Unmentioned, was the diplomatic maneuver of visiting and wooing neutralist governments away from Soviet influence. Dulles included a long exposition detailing how the Soviets had been forced to abandon the position that their security depended on a reunified Germany. The Secretary claimed that the Soviet argument for reunification now rested on the weaker ideological and political concepts, rather than strategic considerations. This modified Soviet position helped clear the way for what Dulles anticipated would be the eventual reunification of Germany.  

Dulles was under no obligation to keep Nixon briefed on the negotiations in Geneva, let alone explain how the proceedings were moving forward and provide as well a personal analysis of the progress. Such a report might have gone to Eisenhower, but not to the Vice President. Dulles’ message could only have been motivated by his desire to keep Nixon informed because he was a friend and protégé.

In October 1957, Dulles asked for Nixon’s advice for dealing with an official from
Ghana - presumably because Nixon had stopped in that West African country during his Spring trip. The issue was one of form, rather than policy. Dulles had entertained the Ghanaian minister at his home and now wondered whether or not it was appropriate for the man to breakfast with Eisenhower in the White House. Nixon thought it was and noted that the official "was a very sensitive fellow. All those people were." Somehow Dulles interpreted a political aspect to such a breakfast also, since he asked "if it would be regarded as playing politics. . ." The Vice President replied candidly, "everything was regarded that way." 9 Since the Vice President could see politics in every government action, he assumed the Democrats could also.

Often during phone calls either Dulles or Nixon suggested they meet. Dulles would ask Nixon to drop by, or Nixon might suggest that they "get together and talk about current developments." During these conversations they discussed treaty negotiations, economic aid issues, international events and the Cold War in general. These were informal meetings - like those Hanes mentioned - that occurred after standard working hours. 10

During the last year of his life, Foster Dulles spent many hours evaluating the dangers of Soviet economic warfare; the potential for the Communists to disrupt the global economy. The Soviets employed two tactics. Primarily, the U.S.S.R. disbursed economic aid to developing countries as a means of gaining political influence. Russia's willingness to finance the Aswan Dam project in Egypt stood as the most prominent example of these efforts.

Second, Dulles feared any Communist government's ability to ignore profit. Russia could bribe foreign nations by arranging trades that had no economic benefit to itself. By bartering or selling commodities below cost, the purchasing country became indebted to and
dependent upon the U.S.S.R. And, because Russia had a totalitarian government, the
domestic effects were not an issue. Dulles held similar concerns about the People's Republic
of China's influence in Asia. At the beginning of 1958, he shared these concerns with the
Vice President.

At the Cabinet meeting on January 3, 1958, Dulles and Nixon both recommended that
Eisenhower include something about economic warfare in his State of the Union address.
"Sec. Dulles saw some possibility that the message would be criticized as being on the
complacent side and he called attention to the various forms of the Russian threat, especially
economic warfare." "The Vice President hoped the message would contain at least a sentence
on the great increase in Russian economic efforts." As it turned out, Ike devoted two
paragraphs to the subject. But the President's speech greatly emphasized the military threat
over the economic one. As such, it was not surprising to find Dulles again discussing this
issue with Nixon, after the speech. Ike had included a passage about economic warfare, but
he had not given it the weight Dulles thought it deserved.

Dulles privately broached the topic with Nixon on January 8, during a morning talk at
the Secretary's home. Nixon had not arrived expecting to discuss the Soviet economic
offensive. He initially "referred to a talk which he had just had with the President dealing
with possible 'inability'. He referred to an exchange of letters [outlining when Nixon would
assume command] between him and the President along the lines of a draft which the
President had shown me and on which I had made comments the day before." Eisenhower
had consulted with Dulles before he talked with Nixon about a matter concerned specifically
with Nixon, not the Secretary. But, Dulles did not reveal this to the Vice President. The
secret arrangement was of great interest to Nixon because it put in writing Nixon's role as leader in the event of Ike's incapacitation. Not even Nixon could justify leaking that agreement, but his reputation as a leader would have benefited had the media been informed. Uninterested in discussing the arrangement, Dulles changed the subject to economic warfare. As senior partner, he typically determined the content of meetings. On topic, Dulles immediately proposed the formation of a "Cabinet level group to study possible Soviet Economic Warfare." Although he feared the potential Soviet economic aggression, he did not detect it readily enough to dispense with a study group.

In a formal memorandum on January 10, Dulles presented Nixon with his plan for a Cabinet investigation. His fears stemmed from "the ability of the Western-fashioned economic system of private enterprise, the operation of which depends on profits, to survive in the event of all-out economic warfare by the Sino-Soviet industrialized totalitarian state system, which operates without regard to profits and which can channel the economic efforts of its people into international economic warfare." Dulles saw dangers in Communist natural resource barter deals, intentional manipulation of staple markets and advocacy of nationalization of foreign investment. His concerns were that the U.S.S.R. could negotiate transactions far more beneficial to small countries in Asia and Africa, than America could manage. With trade came influence over a vast sector of non-aligned nations.

Economic warfare, although important, was still a single weapon among many in the Communist arsenal. Dulles visited the Vice President's residence in the early evening of Saturday, January 11, to discuss Cold War strategies in macro terms. He was troubled by the current "organization of cold war activities on the part of the United States." Nixon
maintained that that organization had to be improved. Typical of Dulles memoranda, the Secretary excluded all specifics, except to write that "We reviewed the problem in considerable detail, weighing the pros and cons and possibilities. I suggested the Vice President should give this matter further thought, and he said he would do so." Their discussion almost certainly covered US foreign aid, military preparedness, allied policy and America's reaction to Soviet global influence, including its economic presence. Once again, Dulles' trust in Nixon's foreign policy expertise prompted him to consult.

The Secretary actively sought Nixon's advice on issues that concerned and determined America's international policy. Because of this, the Vice President was able to mimic Eisenhower's hidden hand maneuver and maintain an influence on policy while the illusion persisted that he had none. He exploited a situation that brought him into the policy making circle, without actually stepping inside the ring. In fact, however, Nixon would have preferred to publicize the role.

On Tuesday, January 21, Dulles again mentioned a Cabinet subcommittee investigation of economic warfare. The Secretary expected to give Nixon a copy of his proposal by the end of the week. Nixon updated Dulles on his efforts to gain support for the program. He had scheduled, for the following day, a meeting with Clarence Randall (one of Ike's special economic advisors) and C. Douglas Dillon (advisor, Ambassador to France and soon to be Undersecretary Of State for Economic Affairs).

Dulles brought Nixon into his campaign to examine economic warfare for several reasons. First, he understood that Nixon was a loyal ally on this topic. Nixon agreed with Dulles' analysis and fears. He had always - especially after the Herter Committee - supported
foreign aid initiatives to counteract Soviet economic intrusions. Dulles' answer to Russia's economic warfare was increased US aid. In addition, Dulles knew Nixon could help recruit the support of other Administration officials, not yet convinced of the efficacy of Dulles' plans. The Vice President undoubtedly met with Dillon and Randall to gain their approval of Dulles' proposed study group.

In February and March, Dulles and Nixon continued to discuss the ramification of and possible defenses against economic warfare. On Saturday, February 8, they met at the Secretary's house. "We discussed at some length the project for a study of economic warfare." They again concluded that the Soviet Union could potentially disrupt the capitalist economy. In terms of meeting the Soviet threat, Nixon and Dulles determined that US economic aid programs "and meeting the Soviet bloc competition of the less developed countries" were important tactics. Nixon expressed his belief, with Dulles' agreement, that there remained room for "greater unity and efficiency . . . in this field of foreign aid." 13 The conversation reiterated much of what Dulles and Nixon had been discussing for a month. Dulles' concern was high, as is apparent by his repeated broaching of the subject with Nixon. But, it was not until the beginning of March that the Cabinet actually discussed Sino-Soviet economic warfare.

During a lunchtime conversation at the State Department, the two associates talked about a possible summit conference, future dates for Nixon to travel to Europe and economic warfare. Dulles reported that they had "discussed the possibility of looking into the economic threat from the Soviet Union along the broad lines that had been discussed at Cabinet and our conversation at my house on February 8." 14 His comment illustrated three facts. First, the
Cabinet had at least examined the topic. Next, the conversation of February 8 must have been in-depth and significant. It had occurred a month before and Dulles still cited it as an example. And finally, Dulles still was not satisfied with the Administration's efforts in regard to economic warfare. He continued to want an investigation of the economic threat posed by the Soviet Union. He continued to seek Nixon's assistance. He continued to debate the issues with the Vice President.

Nixon's close consultation with Dulles gave the impression that he worked for the Secretary, rather than the President. No past Vice President had enjoyed nearly the contact with the Secretary of State that Nixon shared with Dulles. Just the consultation with Dulles about overseas trips marked a notable departure from previous administrations. Up to that point, Vice Presidents simply had not traveled extensively, domestically or internationally. In a revolutionary evolution of the vice presidential office, Nixon gained a role as policy advisor to Dulles, as well.

Immediately after Gamal Nasser's 1956 seizure of the Suez Canal, Dulles phoned Nixon to discuss the situation. During the conversation the Secretary admitted "it is bad. The British and French are really anxious to start a war and get us into it etc. The Sec. said he is doing his best to make them realize they [British and French] may have to do it alone etc."\textsuperscript{15} Nixon expressed an interest in talking about the situation in person, and Dulles agreed that they should. Events, however, did not allow them to consult at length about the Suez crisis. Within a few weeks Dulles was incapacitated by his first battle against cancer, and Nixon became distracted with a battle of his own - against Democrats in the 1956 presidential campaign.
The Vice President and the Secretary both won their respective engagements of 1956. And Nixon's involvement with Dulles during the second Administration remained constant, if not greater. Perhaps as Dulles' illness returned and increased following the election, he relied more on the advice and talents of the Vice President.

In 1957, Dulles arranged for another departure from the traditional vice presidential role. Nixon requested, in February, that Dulles assign him some substantive task. The Vice President claimed he wanted a low publicity job, and "had in mind such tasks as disarmament, international economic development, or possibly such tasks as the development of the OAS." Dulles responded positively to this request, stating "I was confident that things of this sort would come along and promised the Vice President that I would be on the lookout for opportunities of public service of this character which he might perform." The Secretary proved true to his word, although it took him six or seven months to offer the expanded role, and it was not what the Vice President had envisioned. Instead of a greater foreign policy role, Dulles expanded Nixon's congressional relations function.

Dulles once complained that "the Secretary of State nowadays doesn't have nearly enough time to really create policy. He is tied up on Administration and he is always going to congressional committees." Dulles resented the hours that congressional hearings took from his schedule. Nixon's new assignment meant Dulles could concentrate on foreign relations. It amounted to the formalization of an ad hoc chore Nixon already performed, since the Vice President had participated in State-Congress relations from the first months of the Administration.

At dinner on August 24, Dulles and Nixon "spoke at some length about the possibility
of a more active role of the Vice President in relation to congressional affairs, having in mind the fact that he was the only official having constitutional and legal authority both with the Executive as a statutory member of the NSC and in the Congress as a presiding officer of the Senate." Dulles conceived of an assignment that took advantage of the few responsibilities given to someone in the vice presidential office, and therefore also met the parameters Ike set for Nixon's administrative duties.

Dulles' recollection of this conversation failed to mention one important aspect of the plan. The Secretary intended to allow Nixon to handle international affairs legislation in Congress, not just domestic. This made an otherwise unwelcome chore palatable for Nixon.

The Secretary carefully aligned supporters before approaching Eisenhower with his proposal. A week after discussing the enlarged role with Nixon, he broached the subject with Ike's close friend, Attorney General Herbert Brownell. Dulles told Brownell "Nixon should play a greater role as an intermediary between the Executive and the Congress . . ." adding he "did not think that the Vice-President would take the responsibility unless he had a clear-cut [presidential] mandate." The Attorney General agreed with the idea, thereby providing Dulles with a strong ally and legal clearance when he approached the President. Dulles knew that the additional voice would bolster his case and help him obtain the mandate. The directive served two purposes. First, it gave added prestige to the assignment, something Nixon always appreciated. Second, it gave the Vice President no choice but to accept.

On September 2, Dulles suggested to Eisenhower that Nixon be given "a greater role in preparing our congressional plans." He clarified his position further by noting "I did not of course think in terms of the VP doing liaison work and dealing with members of Congress,
but merely functioning at the upper strategy level." Dulles presented upper strategy level as something less crucial than front line liaison work in Congress. But Eisenhower's military career had been as a strategic planner, not a trench soldier. The value Eisenhower placed on liaison work versus planning was apparent in the fact that Nixon already performed the former for the President.

Ike expressed reservations, explaining he did not want to give Nixon a hand in all the programs. But, Dulles convinced Ike to accept Nixon's help in planning strategy for Mutual Security Assistance, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act and the Bricker Amendment.

That same day, Eisenhower dictated a draft letter to Nixon. He presented the Vice President with a bounded version of Dulles' plan. He began "My basic thought is that you might find it possible -- and intriguing -- to be of even more help in our whole government program with affairs abroad than you have been in the past." Eisenhower praised Nixon's "inestimable assistance to the Secretary of State and me" and his "unusual and comprehensive" knowledge of US foreign affairs. The President then relayed Dulles' plan for Nixon to take a greater role in steering Executive legislation through Congress. He limited the Vice President to "strictly State Department legislation. . . ." Ike told Nixon the "main mission I would see for you would be helping the State Department plan its legislative presentations." To ensure Dulles did not expand Nixon's role, Eisenhower insisted that the Vice President consult with the White House staff in charge of congressional relations "so that the entire legislative program could be presented in the most advantageous manner." While correlating State and White House efforts was a sound procedure, the directive also allowed Ike to monitor Nixon's actions.
The letter appealed to Nixon with rare presidential praise. Eisenhower, however, avoided any reference to strategic planning and implied Nixon would not commence an advisory position in State. Still, the President's coolness did not inhibit Dulles from using Nixon as a congressional relations consultant. And, while Nixon longed for a greater influence in foreign policy decisions, he recognized that openly advising Dulles on international legislation in Congress was an important advancement.

Dulles repeated the tactic he had used when he recommended Nixon for the position of Secretary of State. His plan included elements that appealed to both Nixon and Eisenhower, but was motivated by enlightened self-interest. He lost no time in consulting with Nixon about how to push the 1958 legislative program through Congress. And, Nixon quickly appropriated the Development Loan Fund issue, a project acceptable to Eisenhower.¹⁹

Congressional relations was by no means the only interaction Dulles and Nixon shared after the 1956 election. The Secretary continued to rely on Nixon's advice. During a term plagued with international crises, Dulles included Nixon in the deliberations concerning at least three: the Soviet launching of the first man made satellite, Sputnik, the US intervention in Lebanon and the second mainland Chinese bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu.

On October 4, 1957, Russia launched Sputnik. The orbiting satellite shocked Americans in every walk of life. For the Administration, it raised questions about the adequacy of US missile development, scientific education in schools and security from surprise attack. On top of these issues came the problem of dealing with the psychological blow dealt to the American people by losing the race into space to their nemesis. The November 3 launching of Sputnik II intensified all the US reactions. This second Russian
satellite carried a live dog into space.\textsuperscript{20}

In the midst of this crisis, Nixon fell prey to Dulles' revised agenda. With his new legislative aide, the Secretary's willingness to send Nixon abroad waned. On October 15, Dulles withdrew support for a trip to Europe he and Nixon had discussed for several months. Instead, Dulles claimed he needed Nixon for the legislative program. As they discussed Congress and the reaction to Sputnik, the Secretary, suggested "We have to break down the [congressional] insolidarity which is imposed upon us so we can have a larger measure of cooperation on nuclear weapons among our allies." Dulles wanted to expand missile programs. Nixon advised that the Administration had to seize the initiative, before Congress opened an investigation on why America had not launched a satellite first. He offered his analysis, but did not abandon his travel request. Ignoring Dulles' initial suggestion to sideline the trip, Nixon restated his willingness to tour Europe, only adding that if Ike wanted him to stay home, he would.\textsuperscript{21} The Vice President did not go abroad.

Sputnik spurred high level meetings throughout the Administration to discuss the US reaction. Dulles, the new Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy (appointed October 9), his Deputy Secretary Donald Quarles, Nixon, presidential assistant, Sherman Adams, and unnamed "others" came together for one such meeting on November 27.\textsuperscript{22} The situation required that Dulles and Defense department officials consult outside of regular Cabinet meetings. However, the reason behind Adams' and Nixon's inclusion was not immediately clear.

Adams maintained that White House staff members rarely took part in policy discussions, yet he sat in on this critical meeting. He never would have attended had the
President not fallen ill two days before. Eisenhower suffered a minor stroke on November 25 and he was not yet up to attending meetings. He spent that Wednesday working on papers in his private rooms. If not ill, he would not have missed a meeting that dealt with the national security of the United States. Adams undoubtedly acted as Eisenhower's representative.

Nixon's inclusion also was unexpected. While he went to most Cabinet and National Security Council meetings, he seldom attended this type of inter-departmental session. Like Adams, his presence at this meeting might best be explained by Eisenhower's lack of attendance. With Eisenhower briefly out of commission, it was appropriate that his technical second in command attend an important meeting. Appropriate or not, however, Dulles did not have to invite Nixon because Eisenhower had not been fully incapacitated and Adams represented the President. Nixon's presence was a result of the good will of Dulles. The Secretary took advantage of the situation to bring Nixon, at least this once, into the inner circle of advisors.23

Dulles chaired the event, if not officially, then by default. McElroy was new to his position and Dulles outranked everyone else, except technically Nixon. The discussion centered on two issues. First, was the need to accelerate work in the long range missile program. Second, the question of the psychological importance of deploying intermediate range missiles in NATO countries as a response to Sputnik. Russia's ability to orbit a satellite was taken as a sign that the US had fallen behind in rocket science. Thus, America's missile program instantly became a national concern.

At the meeting, Dulles explained that he favored a single missile program instead of the current double efforts with the Thor and Jupiter projects. He admitted, however, "other
factors were controlling and that there was an irresistible pressure to accelerate the program and demonstrate our capacity as rapidly as possible." The participants appeared to be in accord. There was little to disagree about. The United States had to illustrate its own technological aptitude or concede to Soviet superiority.

Despite the small role Nixon took during this meeting, his participation represented a rare chance for him to join directly in the foreign policy decision making process. The next time Dulles included Nixon in a national security concern, the Vice President was unable to come directly into the fold. They reverted to their standard method of unofficial consultation.

In 1958, the Administration detected increasingly disturbing trends in the Middle East. American intelligence perceived Nasserite subversion in Iraq and threats to the pro-US monarchy in Jordan. In July, concerns compounded when Lebanese President Camille Chamoun requested an American military intervention to help stabilize his government and end a coup against him. Examining the region using domino theory logic, Administration members feared the loss of one anti-Communist or pro-western regime would weaken resistance among the other Arab countries and lead to Communist domination. They were faced with three possible defeats in the Middle East.

Chamoun's request for US intervention presented Eisenhower with a perfect opportunity to increase America's presence in the Middle East, and protect its interests. On the morning of July 14, the President gathered his advisors to discuss the US response to Lebanon's plight. Eisenhower wanted an invasion force. That afternoon he explained the situation to a bipartisan group of Congressmen. The following day marines were on the beaches of Lebanon. The US force, consisting of at least 5,000 troops, remained in Lebanon
until October.

The historical importance of the Lebanese landing generally has been downplayed. If mentioned at all, historians include only a few sentences about the event. The marines found beautiful beaches and surprised vacationers, but little more insidious. Yet, at the time, Administration officials considered the action with a greater urgency. This is evident both in Eisenhower's recollection of the events - discussed in Waging Peace - and in documents relating to the intervention.

It is therefore of some significance that Nixon knew about the operation from the beginning. This was an operation that would become public abruptly - when the marines landed - so perhaps Dulles felt it prudent to keep Nixon informed. In any case, he and the Vice President talked on the phone just minutes before the marines went ashore. Nixon predicted "if it works we are all heroes and if not we are bums and it will probably be something in between." Dulles noted "in 7 minutes they [marines] should land. The Pres will issue a short statement as soon as we get a flash and Lodge will speak at the UN at 10." Without Dulles, it is doubtful Nixon could have amassed as much information as he did before the landing.25

A second telephone conversation between Dulles and Nixon illustrated both the importance of the intervention, and Nixon's line to the Oval Office through Dulles. At 6:49 in the evening on July 15, Nixon called Dulles to discuss current affairs. They touched on two subjects - the Sherman Adams scandal and the situation in Lebanon.26 The Vice President's interest in Adams' predicament rested on two factors. Since Eisenhower's heart attack in 1955 their rivalry for Ike's attentions had become more definite. Nixon rarely came
out ahead. Also, with a touch of irony, Eisenhower ordered Nixon to convince Adams to resign. So, it was no surprise that Nixon talked about the Presidential assistant. In regard to the decision-making about Lebanon, however, Nixon had no direct involvement. Both Dulles brothers were officially consulted about the intervention, Nixon was not. Nevertheless, Nixon and Dulles discussed the situation in detail.

Nixon advocated a strong US position in the Middle East. He feared that Eisenhower might vacillate, despite having taken the initial step. While Jordan and Iraq still faced anti-western influences, Nixon concluded that Great Britain could take the lead in those areas. But, he maintained that America had to support any British action in those areas "in the event [of] similar circumstances [to Lebanon]." Dulles cautioned that the US did not want to "get bogged down like the Br in Suez and have to pull out. We have assets in Lebanon we don't have in other places." Dulles, hesitant to commit to Jordan and Iraq, did not sway Nixon. He ignored the caution and addressed what he saw at the heart of the issue. "N said the point is Lebanon is not too important and the Sec agreed. The Sec said Jordan is unimportant." They agreed that "Iraq is the big thing" - probably because of oil interests. Dulles mentioned that British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd might come to Washington to discuss the situation.27

This after-hours conversation revealed how Nixon gained access into the decision making process. Without Dulles, he acted only as Eisenhower's messenger boy, as in the case of Sherman Adams. Dulles provided Nixon with opportunities to expand his knowledge of the Administration's foreign relations activities. The Vice President made the most of those opportunities.
Another international incident broke a month later. On August 23, 1958, mainland China began shelling two islands claimed by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces. Four years earlier the islands Quemoy and Matsu first had been attacked by the Communist regime. In response to that assault, Eisenhower proposed and saw passed the Formosa Resolution, a congressional act authorizing the President to protect the area from Communist aggression using whatever means he deemed necessary. When the Chinese Communists attacked again in 1958, Eisenhower had the ability to respond instantly and did. He sent the Seventh Fleet to protect supply convoys from Taiwan to Quemoy.28

Nixon's first recorded briefing on the situation in Asia came during a lunch conversation with the Secretary on September 5. Dulles "discussed with the Vice President the situation in the Taiwan Straits and briefed him on what we are doing about it." The Vice President wondered whether certain Congressmen should be briefed. Although Nixon recommended a standard tactic - Ike used it with the Lebanese intervention - Dulles probably rejected it in view of the blanket authority provided by the Formosa Resolution.

The upcoming congressional elections gave Nixon a valid excuse to pester Dulles for up-to-date information on the crisis. The Vice President had speeches to make and media to inform. He used the situation to broach foreign relations topics in terms of domestic politics. On September 25, he asked how to handle Quemoy and Matsu at an upcoming press conference.29 Although not prompted to, the Secretary launched into a detailed explanation of the situation, laid out his position and gave Nixon the opportunity to present his own viewpoint.

Dulles first explained why America had to protect Quemoy, despite a common belief