that US involvement was not worth risking a Sino-American confrontation. Dulles said "we don't want to fight for them but the problem cannot be simplified in that way." He complained that Chaing would not give up his island bases, regardless of US wishes. Further, if American aid stopped the islands would be captured and Communist China could continue its aggression until it conquered Taiwan. "The broad challenge is are we going to keep the Western shores of the Pacific in friendly hands or not?" Working in the domino theory mindset, Dulles saw no choice but to defend Quemoy and Matsu to prevent Formosa from succumbing to China. As China's influence expanded, Dulles envisioned Japan eventually being forced to make terms with this foe. The Secretary's analysis mirrored Eisenhower's own conclusions, and thereby provided Nixon with an accurate understanding of top policy decisions.

Nixon assumed he "would be on firm ground to take the same firm line." Dulles replied that the Administration was "flexible on the offshore islands. We would take any solution short of retreat or surrender so these islands would cease to be provocations." What Dulles intended as an alternate solution is not clear. But, it was apparent that he did not want Nixon to publicly espouse a plan that the Administration might later renounce. By advising Nixon against the firm line approach, he protected his ability to change his policy without media or partisan recriminations.

By reputation, flexibility was not Dulles' hallmark, but in fact he opposed one track responses. In public he favored simple, judicious remarks. Historian Frederick Marks, however, noted that Dulles' "straight forward public statements were totally at variance with the wealth of distinctions and qualifications that regularly informed his private thought." The
Secretary believed the public did not have the sophistication to deal with the nuances of foreign relations and simplified his public remarks to present a concise, easily digestible product. Yet, he also recognized the dangers of the exaggerated statements which appealed to Nixon. He reminded Nixon of the need for cautious comments, with the hope of maintaining his policy options.

Dulles' response also provided Nixon with a little more insight on American aims in the region. The Secretary wanted to end this confrontation quickly because he feared it might expand inadvertently. Already a recurring problem, he hoped to find a solution that would remove Quemoy and Matsu as contentious factors. To most inquirers Dulles probably would not have dispensed this detailed analysis. But then, Dulles did not invite most people to Sunday dinner as he did Nixon, when their conversation ended. 30

About two weeks later, Nixon asked for another briefing on Quemoy and Matsu - this time in regard to a speech the Vice President had scheduled. When Nixon asked for advice Dulles responded in kind. Discussing Red China's decision to bombard the islands every other day, Dulles asked for Nixon's guidance, but did not present the Vice President with any policy questions. Instead, he described the situation in full and waited for Nixon to respond. "The Sec said it is an extraordinarily interesting development. We had always hoped that there would come about not through our talks in Warsaw but through force of events a de facto cease-fire..." Now, during off days, ships could resupply the outposts as much as desired. China had effectively closed the doors on an invasion. The Secretary expressed his disbelief and satisfaction with the new Chinese policy. By unilaterally withdrawing, China had submitted to world pressures and limited its ability to reinitiate hostilities. "Unless they
[PRC] can get some pretext from the Nationalists it does not make much sense. They would take the onus of starting it again." Renewed shelling would create an international outcry against the Communists. The US just had to ensure Chiang did not provoke an attack from the mainland.

The Secretary assumed that global opinion would keep the PRC in check. He recognized that the size of mainland China precluded its isolation from world affairs for more than a few decades. In fact, he welcomed their participation. He reasoned that for mainland China to gain acceptance, it would have to renounce its more aggressive philosophies and accept international laws. The Red Chinese retreat signified an acknowledgment that world opinion influenced mainland China. Dulles guessed that "they have decided the better line is to try at the moment to work on internal dissension in Taiwan . . . ." That tactic avoided the international forum. Eisenhower joked that the revised bombarding schedule resembled a "Gilbert and Sullivan war." Certainly, the face saving tactic of shelling on odd days was unimpressive to the vast majority of global spectators.

When Dulles finished, Nixon replied. He considered both his immediate question of how to deal with the upcoming speech and, by implication, provided Dulles his counsel. Trying to determine guidelines, he asked if "a [dependable] de facto cease-fire would be sufficient to allow a reduction of forces." Nixon also wondered "if the Sec had no objection to his continuing to say our policy of firmness in rejecting the concept of the use of force to accomplish international objectives and with our willingness to negotiate in the event force is not used. . . ."31 These two positions were not contentious and therefore satisfied Dulles. In voicing them, Nixon also offered the Secretary a practical policy stance. A de facto cease-fire
meant Dulles could advocate a decreased role for American forces (and probably a troop
reduction of Chaing's garrisons on Quemoy and Matsu). Plus, Nixon noted the US
willingness to negotiate, after Red China ended its aggression. The PRC would then be
working within the free world's moral framework. Nixon's analysis implied a previous
familiarity with Dulles' conception of how to deal with the Red Chinese.

Nixon consulted with Dulles almost to the last day of the Secretary's life. On April 4,
less than two weeks before Dulles resigned as Secretary of State, they discussed a bevy of
topics. Nixon asked whether or not he should meet with the newly empowered Cuban leader
Fidel Castro. Dulles recommended it, but only after thorough consultation with R. Richard
Rubottom - Undersecretary for Latin American Affairs. The Vice President also mentioned
his reluctance to head the American delegation to the Inter-American Conference, "in view of
the experiences of his last trip to South America" - although Eisenhower had already raised
the subject. Whether or not Nixon feared a return to Latin America, or just raised the topic
for dramatic effect, he did not go to the conference. And, in fact, by April Dulles probably
did not have any influence on that decision.

Finally, Nixon wondered if Dulles had any misgivings about him visiting the Soviet
Union during the summer. To Nixon's great pleasure, Dulles supported the initiative. "The
Secretary... said he would have no objection to the Vice President raising the matter with
the President."

On May 2, Nixon talked with Dulles at Walter Reed Hospital. By this time, Nixon's
trip to Moscow had been approved. Dulles advised the Vice President not to stop in Great
Britain, Germany or France before he visited Russia. Instead, Nixon could consult with the
allies on his way back if "during his visit to Moscow the Vice President learned something of real significance. . . ." On May 20, four days before Dulles died, they met again to discuss the trip to Russia. Dulles advised his friend to let Khrushchev know that America would not allow the Soviets to compete in the Capitalist world, while banning competition in the Communist world. 32 His comment harkened back to his fear of economic warfare. Whether Nixon listened to this advice out of respect for his dying mentor, or to gain an edge with Khrushchev is unknowable. With the loss of his strength, Dulles also lost his influence. Nixon's incentive to follow Dulles' suggestions over his own instinct waned. When the Vice President reached Moscow, he largely ignored the Secretary's concerns.

However, throughout most of their association Nixon valued the consultation he and Dulles shared. In appreciation, he developed a fierce loyalty for the Secretary - defending Dulles, when the Secretary could not do so himself. During the June 15, 1955 NSC meeting - over which Nixon presided - the Vice President revealed this allegiance. After listening to various Council members discuss "what we should and should not do with respect to getting rid of outmoded military concepts. . . ." he noted they were overstepping their bounds. Nixon remarked that Dulles (probably absent from the meeting because Chancellor Adenauer was in Washington) "may well have something to say about what is feasible and what is not feasible from a political point of view with respect to dumping old concepts and defense strategies." 33 Invoking Dulles' authority, Nixon brought the discussion to a halt. He assumed the Secretary would not support the line of reasoning that these NSC members were following. The interruption made it easier for Dulles to argue against their positions later, since they had no chance to draw conclusions, or make recommendations. It also bestowed authority on Nixon
as the Secretary's representative. He specifically avoided mention of Ike because he could not claim a close association with the President.

Recognizing Dulles' patronage, Nixon used whatever opportunities he found to support the Dulles position. He admitted as much during a telephone conversation at the end of August, 1955, while consulting with Dulles about a speech. Dulles instructed Nixon to deny the talk was cleared by State. The Vice President accepted that. An un-sanctioned speech gave the illusion of some independence from the Administration. With that came a modicum of perceived foreign relations authority assigned by the media. Nixon added "he likes to say things the Sec. might want to say but can't himself." This remark revealed the adroitness of his scheme. The authority Nixon gained by speaking independently of Dulles was reinforced by the fact that he was actually proposing a State Department condoned policy. He could be an unofficial spokesman for State without ever admitting it, benefiting his and Dulles' causes. Nixon remained steadfast for the Secretary, until Dulles' final day. Yet, he did not put Dulles' priorities before his own.34

It should never be concluded that the Nixon-Dulles relationship had any basis in equality. Dulles helped his friend when he benefited from the arrangement. If the Secretary anticipated detrimental results to State, he gave no aid. Nixon understood that Dulles would preserve his own position over Nixon's. And, if he did not, Dulles made it completely apparent in 1957.

One Saturday in February, the Secretary raised the subject of a proposal to appoint Nixon as Chair of the Operations Coordinating Board - a committee that organized foreign relations efforts throughout the government. Dulles disapproved of the suggestion. He
candidly explained "I did not consider it compatible with good organization that someone speaking with the authority of the Vice President and presumably in the name of the President should go over my head to give directives to my subordinates in the State Department. . . . I must oppose a step which seemed to be to be [sic] incompatible with my authority in the State Department." Dulles expected to be Eisenhower's primary source in foreign relations decisions, and was not about to hand over some of that authority to his apprentice. 35 While Nixon wanted to accept the promotion, he knew Dulles would not allow it. If he pressed for a determination from Eisenhower, he would lose the argument and in the process injure his relationship with the Secretary. Nixon preferred to fight battles less costly.

Dulles died eighteen months before the end of the Eisenhower Administration. He would have appreciated some of the events that occurred during that year and a half. Most obviously, Dulles missed the event on which he had advised Nixon during the final month - the Vice President's trip to Russia. Despite Nixon's lack of concrete results, Dulles would have admired Nixon's historic tour, highlighted by the kitchen debate with Khrushchev and the televised broadcast of a speech to the Russian people. The Secretary also did not live to see Khrushchev's reciprocal visit to the US or the invitation Ike received to visit Russia in 1960.

On the other hand, almost a year after Dulles' death a U-2 airplane piloted by Francis Gary Powers was shot down over Soviet airspace. Following American denials of wrongdoing, Dulles was spared the embarrassing Communist revelation that Powers was alive and his mission one of espionage. The Secretary also did not live to see the resultant breakdown of the 1960 Summit and rising tensions between the U.S.S.R. and America.
The Secretary's death left Nixon to fend for himself. During the next year, the Vice President worked alone to maintain his presidential prospects. Unfortunately for Nixon, as the end of the Administration approached, Eisenhower began asserting his own character. Ike wanted to bring peace to the world.\textsuperscript{36} He wanted his leadership skills to show.

The President publicized his international relations expertise by taking four overseas goodwill tours before the end of his term. Had the U-2 incident been avoided, Eisenhower would also have visited Moscow. Although Khrushchev manipulated the US government with great skill during the crisis, the President still handled the events with courage and determination. Despite his failure to bring a new understanding between the Capitalist and the Communist worlds, Ike left office with much of his popularity and respectability intact. Nixon's public forum was eclipsed. His foreign travel was restricted by Ike's actions and his own campaign. He lost the 1960 presidential election and had no obvious future prospects.

The Nixon-Dulles alliance was close both in terms of friendship and consultation. The previous chapter illustrated the amicability present between the Secretary of State and the Vice President. This chapter has shown the professional side of their relationship. Dulles frequently discussed his positions with the Vice President. He brought Nixon into his confidence, shared ideas, listened to advice and suggested tactics. The relationship affected both men in their official capacities.

But, Dulles' patronage had limits. He revealed them in October 1957, when he adopted the same stance Eisenhower had taken in December 1953. The Secretary valued Nixon's help on legislative matters above his friends' desire for international affairs experience. The change confirmed that the Secretary would help his friend until their
respective purposes contradicted. Then Dulles gently pulled rank, as in the OCB incident.

Nixon's relationship with Dulles was a determining factor in how the Vice President was able to present himself to the world. Dulles handed Nixon opportunities to enhance his image and increase his power that the President would not consider. Nixon made the best of Dulles' help, while still seeking to expand his role beyond what the Secretary offered. And, of course, he had always to contend with the limits that Eisenhower placed on his office.
ENDNOTES:


2. Eric P. Roorda, "The President and His Boy: The Relationship Between Dwight D. Eisenhower and Richard M. Nixon." (Unpublished Honors Thesis) Williamsburg, Virginia: College of William and Mary, 1983: 58. Eric Roorda writes in his Masters thesis about several methods Nixon used to obtain policy information independently from Dulles. Roorda notes, "Nixon was not treated to special briefings in order to insure his knowledge of the Administration agenda, rather he obtained his detailed grasp of current issues through persistence and individual study, taking every opportunity to increase his formidable store of information. One of his regular practices was daily visits to the White House for coffee, at which time he kept abreast of various situations in an ad hoc way." While this description is undoubtedly accurate, it does not take into account Foster Dulles, the tremendous fountain of information from which Nixon regularly quenched his thirst.


8. Letter from John Foster Dulles to Richard M. Nixon, 5 November, 1955, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton, NJ, John Foster Dulles Papers: Selected Correspondence and Related Material, Box: 96 Nixon, Richard M., 1955. Dulles' letter to Nixon is interesting in its detail and the opportunity it provides us with to see Dulles, as he thinks. He wrote to Nixon, "This represents the major gain which I hoped we might achieve at this conference, namely to create a situation so that the Soviets could no longer effectively claim that the reunification of Germany would involve their security." Dulles did not believe immediate reunification would be achieved, but noted that the tremendous progress toward that end. He continued, "We have, however, maneuvered the Soviets into a position where their defense of the division of Germany has now to be based primarily upon ideological and political considerations, i.e., the unnatural and dangerous division of a great people merely to extend the rule of Communism rather than upon security factors. This makes their moral position much weaker and I believe over the coming months it will be possible to hammer it hard. Their whole world position can be damaged by the weakness of their present position on German Reunification."


11. Informal meeting Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 8 January, 1958 (11:00am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical, Box 6: Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper; Cabinet Meeting, 3 January, 1958, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: Cabinet Series, Box 10; Memorandum John Foster Dulles to Richard


16. On June 9, 1953, Nixon organized a breakfast meeting between Dulles and several young senators. Interestingly, the following day the morning repast had expanded to 40 Representatives and ten Senators. The intended purpose of the meeting was to provide a briefing to Republican Congressmen on the world situation. The breakfast apparently went well, since Nixon continued to advise Dulles on congressional relation to various degrees. Like Eisenhower, Dulles recognized the Vice President as an able congressional liaison. In 1954, Nixon advised Dulles on which Congressmen to take to Geneva with him. Later during the year he recommended against consulting with Congress on the Quemoy/Matsu crisis, although he added that immediately before Ike took action, Senator Knowland should be informed. This was even a suggestion that Dulles passed onto Eisenhower, in Nixon's name. Likewise, during the early days of the Suez Crisis, Dulles discussed congressional relations with Nixon to determine which Congressmen should accompany him to the London Conference. Cyrus L. Sulzberger, *A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries* [1934 - 1954]. The Macmillan Company: Toronto, Canada, 1969: 749; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 9 June, 1953 (6:20pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 1 Telephone Conversations Series January 1953--October 31, 1953; Ibid: 10 June, 1953 (9:45am); Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 29 March, 1954 (11:21am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 2 Telephone Conversations Series November 1, 1953--August 31, 1954; Telephone call John Foster Dulles and Dwight D. Eisenhower, 5 October, 1954,


21. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 15 October, 1957, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 7 Telephone Conversations Series July 1, 1957 - December 27, 1957; Memorandum of conversation Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 24 August, 1957, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical, Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper. Dulles continued to employ Nixon as a congressional advisor and lobbyist for State Department programs. In October, the Vice President met with "a fairly potent group." He told Dulles, "his primary purpose will be to give a shot in the arm to economic aid etc." The topic was a State Department cause which Nixon hoped to convince these men to support. Whether or not they were Congressmen, undoubtedly they would have an influence in Congress. This assignment, however, revealed that despite Dulles' attempt to make Nixon a political strategist for State Department legislation, the Vice President frequently ended up in his role as liaison - just as Eisenhower preferred. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon to John Foster Dulles, 21 September, 1957 (5:13pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 7 Telephone Conversations Series July 1, 1957 - December 27, 1957.

22. Memorandum of meeting, 27 November, 1957, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 1 General Correspondence and Memoranda; Conversation Subseries A-Conversation Subseries Z. I assume the "others" mentioned in this memorandum were low level advisors and support
staff, since they are not recognized as holding any positions of authority.


24. Memorandum of meeting, 27 November, 1957, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 1 General Correspondence and Memoranda; Conversation Subseries A-Conversation Subseries Z Folder 1. I only noticed this memorandum because of Nixon's extraordinary inclusion in the meeting. He did not attend many inter-departmental meetings.


26. Adams was accused of taking bribes from a New Hampshire businessman, Mr. Goldfine. In exchange Adams supposedly attempted to influence an SEC investigation of Mr. Goldfine's real estate company.


29. Memorandum of lunch meeting Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 5 September, 1958, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical, Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper. Keep in mind that Nixon did not ask many people for advice on what to discuss in his press conferences or include in his speeches. He was notorious for doing things his own way. That he consulted Dulles on how to discuss foreign relations matters implied that he a) hoped to flatter Dulles by asking him, b) wanted to increase his knowledge about Administration foreign relations issues, c) respected Dulles' analysis and information.


Chapter 4
Nixon's Search for a Role - The First Term

Richard Nixon's vice presidential duties were considerable and varied. For the Administration as a whole, he acted as a congressional liaison, political advisor, roving ambassador, die hard campaigner, international relations expert and media target. Among those roles, however, Nixon sought to emphasize his expertise in foreign affairs. Although he did not shy away from political name calling or congressional wrangling, he yearned for the prestige and respect accorded a statesman. He also understood experience in international affairs could help him toward the Oval Office.

During his vice presidency, Nixon attempted to enhance his image as a foreign specialist publicly and in the Administration. Concurrently, Eisenhower envisioned a much different picture of Mr. Nixon. When they entered the White House in 1953, Ike assured Nixon a greater role in the Administration than any previous Vice President, and he was true to his word. But, that did not mean Nixon was informed of every decision or that he was consulted on each crisis. Ike valued the Vice President's political worth above all else. He emphasized Nixon's ability as a congressional advisor and negotiator for the Executive branch. Although a much less dignified job than foreign relations advisor, there was no question that Nixon managed this role well.
Nixon's friend and patron Foster Dulles saw a combination of roles for the Vice President. He found Nixon's talents extended beyond congressional relations. He attempted to use the Vice President's skills wherever they could be applied. Hence, Dulles gave Nixon some of the foreign relations prestige he desperately craved, kept Nixon working on congressional problems and had the Vice President serve as an information source.

Although they had built a relationship by 1953, Dulles' earnest mentorship of Nixon did not begin from day one. Nixon was without an ally at the start of the Administration, as he would be again after Dulles died. Of necessity, the Californian fended for himself.

Nixon's position in the Administration took most of the first year to solidify. As he sought to carve a niche out, Nixon responded to the personalities of Ike and Dulles. He attempted to make his responses compatible with theirs. Initially, he was unsure of how to act. At the pre-inaugural cabinet meeting in the Commodore Hotel, Nixon manifested this insecurity. According to historian Stephen Ambrose, "Nixon limited his remarks to heartily endorsing whatever Eisenhower said" during the meeting. It was not a surprising reaction, given the circumstances. Ike exuded confidence and control. Nixon was unsure of his position in the Administration and of how to approach the situation. For all of his political expertise, he was out of his element, part of a meeting where everyone was his senior and most knew the President-elect more intimately than he did. He may even have been star struck by his close proximity to the commanding general of World War II.

The Vice President did not remain passive for too long. Following the inauguration, he began to carefully feel for his footing, taking exploratory steps to find where he could comfortably stand and where he hit quicksand. He would spend the entire Administration
doing this to some extent. However, after his first trip abroad in the Fall of 1953, he adopted a more confident and assertive manner.

In Administration meetings Nixon made a point of being heard, even if his comments were ignored. When he had something relevant to add to the discussion he did, but he sometimes interjected remarks that only marginally concerned the topic at hand. This probably reflected his insecurity and his desire to be an active participant in the decision making process.

At one of the first National Security Council meetings Nixon revealed his discomfort as Vice President. The discussion dealt with Mohammed Mossadegh’s reign in Iran. When Nixon spoke up he relied on his debating techniques and inserted a prosecutorial diatribe against Communist infiltration in Iran that was vaguely reminiscent of his verbal attack on L. J. Cromie in 1947. As though on HUAC, Nixon predicted "greater rather than less hostility was to be expected from the Russians after Stalin’s death. It was quite likely, therefore, that they would increase their presence in Iran to secure its control as rapidly as possible by a coup d’etat."\(^3\) Nixon’s reference to Stalin came without warning. His emphasis on Russian intervention had not been discussed. Finally, his analysis that the Soviets would become more aggressive, rather than less, did not reflect the general belief expressed at the meeting. Nixon’s line of argument did not seem to convince anyone, nor did he again raise it in this manner. He realized the inappropriate tone of his outburst and adapted his anti-Communism to be less demagogic. The next time he spoke up, Nixon would be more analytical.

At the May 13, NSC meeting, the minutes recorded that "The Vice President again reverted to the view he had expressed at last week’s Council meeting, that the decision which
the Council must presently take, with respect to alternative courses of action in Korea in the event of a break down of the armistice negotiations, should be taken only in the context of the longer-term problem which would confront us when the Soviet Union had amassed a sufficient stockpile of atomic weapons to deal us a critical blow and to rob us of the initiatives in the area of foreign policy." Nixon's anti-Communism was still evident, but now he presented his argument in a more sophisticated manner. To his disappointment, Eisenhower explained that Project Solarium "was being initiated with this precise problem in mind." Nixon appeared to be a step behind. Worse yet, he was excluded from the Solarium discussions.

Nixon continued trying to refine his comments to better mesh with the demeanor of the Administration. In the process, he also worked toward defining his own role as Vice President. He seemed naturally attracted to foreign relations policy-making. His interest arose from the anti-Communist reputation he had earned on HUAC and his European trip with the Herter Commission. Eisenhower did not believe these experiences endowed Nixon with special qualifications and expressed no interest in Nixon's foreign affairs appraisal. The Vice President, however, never stopped trying to advise the President.

Throughout the two terms as Vice President, Nixon made sure he said something in almost every Cabinet or NSC meeting he attended. He frequently waited until the last few minutes of the meetings to make any comments. This perhaps reflected his own interest in hearing everyone else's position before revealing his own. He may, however, have used this as a tactic to ensure his ideas were remembered. As almost the last part of the discussion, Nixon's remarks might be better recalled than comments heard earlier in the meeting.
An example of Nixon's need to be heard came on June 25, 1953. The conversation centered on Japan. During the discussion the subject of anti-American feelings in Japan was raised. The President commented on how in his experience, almost universally, occupational forces earned the malignity of the native people in whose country they stayed. He noted that this very problem now afflicted American-Japanese relations. Nixon commented that he was disturbed by this aspect of occupational forces. Nixon's concern, however, did not come until several minutes after Ike's original comment. In the interim seven different people talked. The conversation had drifted away from Eisenhower's aside, to Japan's strategic importance. By the time Nixon voiced his opinion, it was totally out of context in the conversation. He said nothing more in the meeting, which ended soon thereafter. It was a reasonable comment which showed an interest and respect for Ike's experience. But, the statement added nothing of consequence to the discussion. Nixon's response provoked no more reaction than that it was recorded in the NSC minutes.

As Nixon found his place in the Administration, he more often raised salient points, rather than disconnected comments. But the latter behavior sporadically reappeared for the duration of the Administration. Nixon wanted to be heard, whether or not his point bore any relevance on the conversation. The tactic ensured he had some voice in the Administration.

That first year Nixon seemed more comfortable at meetings Eisenhower did not attend. Left to preside over the Cabinet meeting on August 27, he stepped up to the role of leader without any hesitation. When in charge, Nixon had no problem querying the second most intimidating man in the Cabinet, Dulles. After the Secretary briefed the Cabinet on his recent trip to Korea, Nixon questioned him intelligently and with confidence. The Vice President