


31. Memorandum Richard M. Nixon to Dwight D. Eisenhower, undated, Eisenhower, Dwight D: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-62, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series Box 28, File Nixon, Richard M. I date the memo around June 1955 because Khrushchev did not visit Tito until then. The meeting resulted in a declaration of friendship and cooperation with the Yugoslavian dictator. Subsequent contacts did not produce similar protocols; Ambrose, Eisenhower The President Volume II: 263.


36. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 7 December, 1956 (11:01am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 5 Telephone Conversations Series January, 3 1956 - December 29,
1956; Press Release, 12 December, 1956, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: Official File Series, Box 853 File 161-B Vice President's Trip to Austria Dec., 1956; A Chronology of Richard M. Nixon's Pre-Presidential International Travel (And Selected Important Events Affecting Nixon). Compiled by Benjamin J. Goldberg, 6/10/96; Memorandum of conversation Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 15 December, 1956, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: Official File Series. Box 853 File 161-B Vice President's Trip to Austria Dec., 1956. Nixon's eagerness to send Ike's wife and Pat on the President's aircraft and unwillingness to go himself if it would be deemed "a grandstand play," illustrates Nixon's ability to ignore the truth, even when it was undeniable. How much more grandstand could you get than sending the wives of America's leaders to pick up some refugees? It was fine to send others on such missions, as long as he did not have to go!

Chapter 5
Nixon's Search for a Role - The Second Term

The Vice President did not have to wait long after the new year for more orders. Only two weeks after Nixon returned from Europe, Dulles phoned with a new assignment. On Tuesday, January 8, 1957, at 6:30p.m., the Secretary "wondered what he thought about the Vice President heading the Delegation to the Gold Coast when it gets its independence." Dulles hoped to maintain positive relations with this "coming continent." Nixon refrained from a direct answer, explaining it depended on whether or not the congressional situation allowed him to leave. The irony was that Nixon invoked the congressional duties he typically wished to avoid, to evade a tour he liked even less. Three weeks later, Nixon proposed his conditions for making the trip. He gently demanded a presidential mandate. "N said that if the Pres asks him to go to Africa, he will." The Vice President repeated the tactic he used before going to Austria, in order to raise the diplomatic importance of the assignment.

Wednesday evening Dulles called Nixon to relay Ike’s personal request that the Vice President go to Africa. The same day, Eisenhower wrote a memorandum asking, "could you [Nixon] find it possible to head the United States Delegation to the Gold Coast Independence Ceremonies, to be held on March 6, 1957." Regardless of this presidential directive, the Vice President continued to seek ways of attaching more importance to the trip.

In February, Nixon pressed the Secretary again for an expansion, during a Saturday
lunch meeting at the Dulles home. The younger man turned the discussion to his Gold Coast trip. "He wanted to be sure we really felt this amounted to something and the President really wanted him to go." Dulles' first draft report of the conversation revealed Nixon's angst about traveling for openly self-serving purposes. Crossed out and guarded by hand written brackets Dulles wrote, "He said there had been gossip that Nixon himself promoted these missions and they did not serve a vital government purpose." By pointing out the lack of utility he believed others attached to these trips, Nixon expressed his own dissatisfaction. He needed to dispel any hearsay that his job was anything less than vital.

Dulles gave the Vice President all assurances that he and the President believed the trip was important. Not placated, Nixon suggested that he also visit Ethiopia and Liberia. Dulles agreed, and by February 28 the itinerary included Gold Coast, Ethiopia, Liberia, Morocco, Ghana, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia and Italy. For Italy, Nixon convinced Dulles again to ask the President for a personal letter, this one to Pope Pius XII. ² As usual, despite his displeasure at being a messenger boy, Nixon played the role because it increased his domestic and international prominence.

Before departing, however, Dulles found an additional task for Nixon. On February 21, 1957, the Secretary explained to him that the visiting Vice Presidents of Bolivia and Peru wanted to meet with their US counterpart. Nixon at first deferred, claiming he had only seven days before his African tour to master pertinent background materials. Dulles replied that he could not give lack of time as an excuse, but could inform the two Latin Americans that receiving foreign dignitaries devolved on the Secretary of State and President, not the Vice President.
When presented in those terms, Nixon immediately changed his position and agreed to a meeting. Accepting his patron’s explanation meant permanently closing himself off from an avenue of international relations work. The excuse would have set a precedent that blocked Nixon from seeing any foreign official. The argument challenged Nixon to accept the assignment, or lose the privilege for the future.  

Nixon met with the Vice Presidents and still managed to prepare for his upcoming trip.

The African travels expanded Nixon’s international affairs resumé by a continent. He mentioned in a letter to British Governor of Uganda, Sir Frederich Crawford, "I [feel that I] have a much better grasp of current conditions in East Africa. I am certain that this first-hand knowledge will prove beneficial to me in the months and years ahead, and will enable me to understand more fully the future developments in this great continent [Nixon’s brackets]." Although an official thank you, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Nixon’s statement. He gained valuable experience on this trip. Each new country he visited, represented another notch in his foreign relations belt, and added to his public prestige.

While in Africa, Nixon acquired a taste for Middle Eastern relations. After returning from the trip, he wrote to Ambassador Donald Heath in Lebanon "my experiences and conversations during this trip put me in complete agreement with your views on the importance of the Arab refugee factor to the over-all problem of Arab-Israeli relationships." Nixon judged that no solution would present itself without a preceding resolution of the Arab refugee problem. Although the Vice President made little use of this information at the time, fifteen years later his reactions were tied to these early conclusions.

Unable to deny completely Nixon’s success abroad, Eisenhower took advantage of it.
Writing to the Sultan of Morocco, he noted that the Vice President's discussions "have given new impetus to the further strengthening of the close ties which we have both worked to forge." The American Ambassador had been instructed to open discussions on US military operations in Morocco and Ike invited the Moroccan leader to come to America. The initiative for talks would have originated with Dulles, rather than Eisenhower. Probably, Ike wrote the letter at Dulles' request, or at minimum in consultation with Dulles. The important factor for Nixon was that his visit provided the opportunity to expand American-Moroccan relations. The trip again served the purposes of Dulles, while expanding Nixon's role within the Administration.

Nixon's badgering appeared to bring him some of the responsibility he craved. The expanded itinerary gave him the opportunity to write a 69 page paper containing his observations and recommendations for US foreign policy toward Africa. In no way comparable to the personal report he compiled after the Herter Committee experiences, this document was official and reflected his expertise, not his curiosity.

To advertise his review of Africa throughout the Administration, he asked that the report be distributed among all "interested departments and agencies of the government." Both Dulles and Eisenhower approved this request, despite the document's classification as top secret. Clearly, neither man believed the account was too sensitive.

Nixon's paper made sound policy suggestions, but contained no earth-shattering insights. Nixon recommended that France be gently warned to leave Algeria before it faced serious anti-colonial opposition there. He suggested that the US also encourage North African countries to pay less heed to Egypt and its leader, Gamal Nasser. On Israeli-Arab
relations, he ambiguously advised that "we give new and careful attention to the Arab refugee problem with a view towards evolving a plan which at the appropriate time could form the basis for an equitable settlement." And he recommended increased American economic aid for Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan and Libya. In general, he called for the State Department to increase its attention and representation in Africa.

Interestingly, Nixon took his own report to task during the formal presentation on August 22. "He detected a tendency in the present report to underestimate the seriousness of the Communist threat in Africa." Augmenting the written document, he orally explained how the Red International might infiltrate Africa using the guises of Islam, racism and nationalism.

Nixon may have had two possible reasons to omit his Communist focused analysis from the report. First, it could have related to a lack of first-hand evidence of a threat. He discussed what had appeared the most important aspects during his in-country time. Prior to leaving the US, however, the State Department had stressed Russia's influence in Africa. Dulles' Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Robert C. Hill, wrote Nixon a memorandum about Communist infiltration in Northern Africa. Hill concluded, "I need hardly emphasize the fact that your leadership of the United States Delegation is considered by the Department of State as extremely significant in demonstrating the American interest in Africa" and implicitly against Soviet penetration. To emphasize the importance of Communist influence in Africa, Nixon attended a State Department briefing on the topic, just three days before he departed.

After the trip, however, the report reflected his experiences, rather than the briefing. As he presented it, he realized the threat emphasized by State had not been thoroughly
integrated into his report. Thus, he added it orally when he submitted the report.

Alternatively, Nixon may have excluded information on the U.S.S.R.'s potential intrusions under the direction of Dulles. Relaying his position verbally would put it at the top of every NSC member's thoughts, perhaps underscoring the threat more effectively. And, possibly Dulles wanted to keep those concerns out of the official record.

The paper did illustrate Nixon's understanding of the problems found in North Africa. It also coincided with Dulles' basic foreign policy tenets. Within the Administration, the paper went far in advertising Nixon's newly gained expertise on Northern African policy. If he could not hold the President's ear, at least he could share his knowledge with the advisors to whom Eisenhower did listen.

In August, Dulles and Nixon were talking about Nixon's next trip. The Vice President expressed an interest in visiting Europe, as long as it was scheduled in conjunction with events he could attend, such as building dedications and honorary degrees. Nixon also expressed his interest in traveling to Poland. As with previous proposed trips to Eastern Europe, Dulles doubted it would be possible.6

Whether or not they intended to plan a Fall expedition events again prohibited any travel for the Vice President. The October fourth launch of Sputnik shocked the Administration and the American people. The implications such an accomplishment raised about intercontinental missiles terrified most Americans. In addition, Ike's minor stroke on Monday, November 25, meant Nixon could not leave the country. As Vice President, he might be required to step up to the duties of President.

Irrespective of a second 1957 trip, Nixon had now established himself as a foreign
relations expert, outside the Executive branch, if not within it. In November, Nixon received a request from the editor of Foreign Affairs, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, to write an article. He declined through Allen Dulles, probably because it would not be appropriate for the Vice President to express his foreign affairs analysis in such a public forum. Armstrong's request, however, illustrated that Nixon's expertise was acknowledged by non-Administration international relations specialists.

That month, Morocco placed Nixon in the same grouping as Ike and Dulles. Moroccan officials wanted to give the President the Order of Mohammed. Ike agreed to accept the medal and subsequently turn it over to the Department of State. Telling Nixon about the situation, Dulles noted that the Moroccans also hoped to decorate himself and Nixon. Without thinking, the Vice President stated, "if the President accepted he would too." Probably recalling his own visit to Morocco, Nixon believed he had as much right to the honor as Ike. But, Dulles discouraged that action and "explained the President was accepting in behalf of the country."7 Nixon was out of luck - one country, one leader, one Order of Mohammed. The Vice President agreed to decline the honor. Nonetheless, by implication, the Moroccans' tribute reflected their respect for Nixon and his foreign relations expertise.

In 1958, Nixon again went abroad. On February 8, Dulles asked him to attend the inauguration of Arturo Frondizi, the first nationally elected President of Argentina in two decades. Dulles explained that America wanted to show support for the new regime, because Latin Americans believed the US had been too close to Frondizi's predecessor, dictator Juan Perón. Nixon complained to Dulles that he did not want to act as the Administration's goodwill ambassador anymore. Contradicting what he had said six months before, Nixon
now claimed that inaugurations diminished the prestige of his trips (in August 1957, Nixon requested that any trip to Europe be scheduled around events similar to inaugurations). Although he preferred not to travel just to attend them, he conceded to go to Latin America in the Spring for seven to ten days.

Nixon took the opportunity to again express his willingness to travel to Europe. He included one proviso, which reflected his unceasing desire to raise his stature. He would only take a European trip if allowed to visit Poland and Yugoslavia also.\textsuperscript{8} Nixon did not go to Europe in 1958.

He did go to Latin America, but Dulles did not insist he attend the inauguration. Instead, he had someone else recommend it. On March 6, Dulles officially asked Nixon to visit Venezuela, Uruguay, Argentina and Bolivia. The Secretary added a handwritten note stating, "assuming you do not go to B.A. [Buenos Aires] inaugural this may be proposed by Chris Herter. F" One week later, Undersecretary Herter sent a memorandum to Nixon recommending that he attend the May 1 inauguration.\textsuperscript{9} Thus, the directive came from Herter, instead of Dulles. It was an intriguing illustration of Dulles' efforts not to upset his friend, while maintaining control over his protégé.

By the end of March, Nixon was preparing for the trip in earnest. He instructed a staff member, Robert Cushman, to find out the status of Ike's letters to the Presidents of the Latin American countries he was scheduled to visit. Nixon recommended "the desk officer -- man in charge for each country -- should write these letters and they should be started immediately as it takes quite a while to get them approved at State and then by the President."\textsuperscript{10} Enlightened self-interest worked to motivate the Vice President to ensure these
letters were written. He greatly valued the authority carried by presidential notes - too much to leave their drafting to chance or carelessness.

Nixon's week to ten day trip stretched into twenty days. Ending with dramatic violence in Caracas, Venezuela, it was everything but a friendly visit. Ironically, the events proved Nixon's belief that he could accomplish more if allowed to go beyond the goodwill veneer attached to his travel.

The South American excursion emerged as a one of the most important trips for him. It gave Nixon more public exposure than any previous foreign excursion. It also made him a symbol of courage and democracy, two extremely important characteristics for a man hoping to be the 1960 Republican presidential candidate. The journey served as an excellent example of Nixon implementing the touring formula he developed in 1947 - meet people, talk with leaders, debate controversial individuals and take risks.

The first half of the South American expedition went smoothly. Nixon received agreeable welcomes in his host countries, although American coverage of the events was not particularly high. He encountered limited anti-American - Communist inspired, he believed - demonstrations in several regions. Recalling experiences in Italy eleven years before, he seized the opportunity at the national university in Montevideo, Uruguay, to engage several "Communists" in a heated debate about American foreign policy. Nixon proclaimed himself the victor, and reaffirmed his belief in confronting Communists face-to-face. The exchange made excellent media fodder.

In Peru, the protests took a more aggressive turn. When he arrived at his hotel students shouted "Fuera Nixon" and reports stated Nixon's visit to San Marcos University
would be met by a large demonstration. Always willing to take a risk when traveling, Nixon went to San Marcos anyway. It was probably a mistake, as the intelligence proved accurate. A mob awaited the Vice President.

To his credit, Nixon displayed courage and dignity. The students shouted anti-American slogans and threw objects at the Vice President. After a brief foray into the crowd, his party retreated and drove to a backup destination, Catholic University. There Nixon debated a group of unorganized anti-American students. In a situation where he retained much greater control, Nixon won the battle of words. Standing on the front table in a classroom, Nixon effectively fielded questions about American policy toward Latin America. The Vice President left this second school to cheers of "Viva Nixon!"

The supportive shouts were not to last. Returning to his hotel, Nixon found another mob. Instead of driving to the hotel door, he decided to walk through the mob. The hostile crowd shouted epithets, threw pebbles and spit on the American group. Nixon stood up to the abuse, carefully controlling his desire to respond, even when a student spit tobacco juice directly in his face.

For his trials, Nixon received praise from the media and his countrymen. It was a public relations coup. In American eyes, Nixon was unjustly attacked, both verbally and physically. His unwillingness to withdraw when faced with danger, or show fear in the midst of it, had made him an instant hero.

Besides the fantastic media attention that resulted from Nixon's adventure in Peru, the events earned him praise from the President. A soldier, Eisenhower had been impressed with Nixon's resolve. He sent a telegram exclaiming, "Your courage, patience and calmness in the
demonstration directed against you by radical agitators have brought you new respect and
admiration in our country."11 Nixon rarely received such accolades from Ike.

Nixon’s success in Peru left him in a quandary. Having endured Peruvian protests, he
could not back down if faced with additional demonstrations, in other countries. He had
shown himself brave and strong. Now he had to maintain that image.

The day Nixon left Lima, Dulles received a warning about further demonstrations in
Latin America. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, William
Snow, informed the Secretary that, "The incident in Lima may inspire similar ones in Quito,
Bogotá, or Caracas. Before the Vice President reached Lima, there had been small
demonstrations also inspired by Communists, in Montevideo and Buenos Aires." Whether or
not Dulles responded is unclear. Certainly, Nixon would not willingly abort a trip that had
brought him such attention, irrespective of the associated dangers.

Nixon’s desire for press coverage guided the trip itinerary from the beginning.
Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, R. Richard Rubottom, had recommended
against visiting Chile and Venezuela. Rubottom explained that the Chilean President had just
canceled a visit to the United States. Diplomatic etiquette thus prohibited a visit by the Vice
President. Rubottom had no comparable reason to avoid Venezuela, so Nixon could not be
deterred from going to Caracas. According to Rubottom, the Vice President pushed for the
stop because Venezuela had the largest American colony in Latin America (besides Mexico)
and numerous US investments. State Department staff experts pointed out that the
Venezuelan dictator, Marcos Pérez Jiménez, had been driven from power earlier that year and
subsequently found asylum in the United States. Resenting the US protection of Jiménez,
anti-American sentiment in Venezuela ran extremely high. In search of adventure and generally interested in an American audience, Nixon could not be dissuaded. His resistance to State Department advice also reflected his constant desire to make his own decisions, thereby establishing his independence in the Administration.

Since Nixon insisted on going to Venezuela, South American experts in State suggested Caracas be the first stop on the itinerary. They hoped to reduce the amount of time anti-American agitators would have to prepare for the visit. Nixon again refused. He believed the best send-off for his tour would come in Caracas, from its large American population. Their presence could also increase the media interest from home in a story. Rubottom recalled that Nixon "had in mind always what the newspapermen would be reporting. . ." He would not retreat, for fear of criticism in the press. Added to that, was the attractive chance to impress reporters further by taking risks and debating Communists.

Nixon stumbled into the adventure of his life in Caracas. He and his wife were greeted at the airport by a waterfall of saliva as they stood at attention for the Venezuelan national anthem. What followed was worse. The motorcade was stopped by a roadblock and a hostile mob specifically attacked Nixon's automobile. Mainly luck saved those in the Vice President's car from serious injury or death. Certainly, no other American Vice President has experienced anything similar to the Caracas attacks. Perhaps, that is because no one but Richard Nixon insisted on visiting such a dangerous environment.

Rubottom wondered whether Nixon's initial anti-American contacts in Montevideo resulted in the Caracas debacle. He implied that Nixon's successful debates in Uruguay fueled the reactions that followed. In effect, Nixon's quest for greater adventure became a
self-fulfilling prophesy. The more Nixon succeeded, the more dangerous the altercations became.¹²

Nixon got his big send-off, but it was not the positive one he had imagined. His party left Venezuela for Puerto Rico the day after it arrived. Still, the humiliation and danger which he survived increased his hero status. He debated Communists and he stood up to mobs. By displaying his courage, he rhetorically defeated them.

Following this second trip to Latin America, Nixon freely offered his opinions on policy concerns in South America. He had nearly lost his life to Communist inspired mobs (as he saw it). If that did not give him the aura of Latin American expert, nothing could.

Upon returning, Nixon explained that his visits to the university in Montevideo and San Marcos confirmed the value of the impromptu calls. The element of surprise, claimed Nixon - doing the unexpected thing - had immeasurably positive effects. He had taken to heart the lesson Syngman Rhee taught in 1953.

Nixon also noted that he had shown the United States would not retreat from Communist aggression, whether in the form of a mob or something more nefarious. He believed only a demonstration of fortitude would convince the enemy. Of course, Dulles entirely agreed. His underlying goal was to avoid misunderstandings with the Communists. Dulles "felt that the most important thing for the Russians and the Chinese was to understand American foreign policy."¹³ A main element of that policy was US resolve. Nixon’s forbearance in Latin America was just one method by which America illustrated its message.

The Vice President never doubted that a Communist insurgency had directed all the Latin American violence. On May 16, one day after returning to Washington, he addressed
the Cabinet. Nixon stressed that "Communist inspiration was evident from the similarity of placards, slogans and techniques in all the areas in question. Particular items of American policy bearing on individual countries could not be considered the major cause." Similar slogans and signs across international borders indicated Red intrigue. He had learned that as a Herter Committee member.

Nixon absolved the US from responsibility for the attacks, but not from all the problems in Latin America. While the demonstrations were Communist inspired, he concluded the Administration's policy had resulted in an underlying hostility to America. He stated "that the political complaint against the United States for harboring refugee dictators was more important than various economic complaints. . . ." Nixon suggested raising the standard of living in these Hispanic countries, thereby supporting the masses rather than the elite, would go far in winning their trust. He did not admit any direct connection between animosity in reaction to the US sheltering dictators, and the assaults made on his person.

Six days later, Nixon expanded his conclusions for the NSC. He still maintained that Communists orchestrated the attacks, but that Washington's relations with ex-dictators fomented distrust throughout Latin America. For the NSC, he offered additional analysis connecting these topics. The Vice President noted because anti-dictator fervor now "constitutes the most emotional issue in Latin American. . . . we should accordingly in Latin America attack Communism not as Marxist economic thought but as a dictatorship and, worse from the Latin American point of view, a foreign controlled dictatorship." His suggestion displayed an understanding of US-South American issues, bounded within his bipolar world perspective.
Nixon feared the Hispanic governments to the south were naive in their understanding of Communism and could not believe "they regard the Communists as nothing more than a duly-constituted political party." He advocated developing a pro-United States contingent of Latin American students. George Allen, head of the USIA supported the idea, but remarked "the real problem was what we were going to give them [the student groups] as a message to rally around and about which they could become enthusiastic." His comment illustrated the true problem America faced in Latin America - anti-Americanism. Communism was a cursory problem. Interestingly, Nixon had pointed out a similar contradiction in 1954 when Dulles proposed recruiting natives to fight a guerrilla war against the Vietminh, if US backed forces lost control of Vietnam. Nixon stated then that no Vietnamese would fight to help France maintain its claim on their country. The Vietnamese would sooner accept Communist rule than return to French subserviency. In the same way, the Latin-Americans had no reason to favor United States domination over domestically based Communist rule. After four years under Dulles' guarded tutelage, Nixon no longer acknowledged the relevance of this argument.

Nixon's report emphasized Communist elements in Latin America, but also supported the policy changes recommended by State Department officials which stressed other concerns. A June memo from R. Richard Rubottom to C. Douglas Dillon - reiterating recommendations made to Dulles in April - illustrated the policy direction State experts advised. Rubottom suggested increasing economic aid, approving loans, improving the ability of those countries to borrow funds and deleting the "widespread belief in Latin America that the United States prefers dictators." This counsel paralleled that provided by the Vice President in May.
Clearly, the Dillon/Rubottom proposal had merit. US assistance that benefited the populace, improved Latin America's image of her northern neighbor. Rubottom's memo revealed the artificiality of Nixon's singular reliance on Communism. He and others did not discount the Communist influence, but they stressed economic issues and socio-political resentment over Nixon's explanation.

Notwithstanding his Communist-centric analysis, Nixon held a more liberal assessment of the region, than might have been expected. During the June 19 NSC meeting, he advocated an increase in economic aid for countries friendly to America, but he also suggested the Administration go a step further. "Where funds are not available to support private enterprise in Latin America, the US would have to look at the situation as it is and not as we might wish it to be. Accordingly, we will have to be more flexible in regard to our views on aiding nationalized enterprises in several Latin American republics." Although a "revolutionary idea," Nixon claimed the aid was necessary to maintain good relations and prevent increased Russian influence. The Vice President warned "that we must be much less rigid than in the past in our definitions of what constituted 'democracy' or 'self-government' as these related to Latin America."16 The United States had to expand its relations with those countries, even if their governments tilted toward the socialist side.

Despite their difference in emphasis, Rubottom used the Vice President's basic agreement to enhance his own argument for a new foreign policy toward the southern continent. To his relief, events in Lima and Caracas had already made his case. The violence exercised against Nixon's party prompted a reassessment of US economic policy toward Latin America. The Administration approved an expansion of commodity agreements,
vastly increased the USIA budget for Latin America and endorsed the creation of a
development bank specifically associated with the region. And, the Administration actively
reduced its fraternization with Hispanic dictators to increase its appeal to the more democratic
regimes.

According to Rubottom, the Nixon trip had moved Latin America from the lowest
interest to the first or second priority. The violent events were "interpreted as a symptom that
US-Latin American relations were in some peril." It was the great irony of Nixon's 1958
trip that it resulted in a major shift in US policy in reaction to Nixon's physical presence and
activities, rather than because of his foreign relations expertise and advice. His method of
campaigning and debating (essentially what he did in Lima) fomented the riotous behavior that
the American delegation survived. Only that hostility - and it could have been enacted upon
any high ranking Administration official - inspired the modifications in foreign policy. Thus,
when Nixon finally managed to affect a major international decision, it was because he had
been attacked, not because he was an expert. In fact, the President's brother, Milton
Eisenhower, and Rubottom both advocated the policy changes Nixon presented. However,
until the Latin American resentment manifested itself in tangible form, Washington ignored
the signs of unrest.

Nixon, although battered, could not take direct credit for the change. No one would
accept the idea that Nixon nearly sacrificed himself in Caracas knowing it would result in a
shift in US attitude toward Latin America. He had sought adventures in hopes of attaining
media attention and this he achieved. Only as a bonus - because Rubottom invoked the Vice
President's name in support of the new policy - did Nixon receive some indirect credit for the