THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

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NOTE: This study of the first battle of Bull Run is the first of a series of four studies by student officers of the Army Staff College to appear in the Journal. The next two are concerned with the important mistakes in organization and otherwise revealed during the first years of the civil war, while the last of this series presents a careful comparison of the conduct of military affairs in 1861 and 1862. These studies were made in connection with the course in Military History as the foundation of discussion by the Staff Class. It is not practicable to present here the conclusions resulting from such discussions, nor is this necessary. The papers are of sufficient importance in themselves, and the reader will find therein, it is thought, an interesting and comprehensive presentation of facts that will assist him materially in drawing his own conclusions as to the best methods of avoiding in the future some of our errors of the past.—EDITOR.

I. THE MILITARY SITUATION BEFORE THE OPERATIONS.

Union.

Political considerations determine that war shall be declared. They govern the direction and scope of military operations. They finally decide when and under what circumstances terms of peace shall be agreed upon. The American civil war was no exception to these rules. There never was a moment from the first day of this conflict to the last that the movements and operations of the armies, the appointments of the officers to command them, and every detail connected with them, tactical, strategical, and administrative, did not show to a greater or lesser extent the tincture of some political motive.

Therefore, when the people of the state of Virginia, on May 23, 1861, ratified the ordinance of secession, they thereby furnished the President of the United States the first political reason for an aggressive movement against them. Military reasons had already, for some time, existed in great abundance, but they were apparently considered of little moment. For some time the Confederates had maintained a picket line on the heights of Alexandria overlooking Washington. But the President, no doubt, did not wish to give Virginia the excuse of resisting the "armed invader" and hence, up to this time, had carefully refrained from placing troops on her soil. Now, however, on the night of May 23-24, three columns of troops were thrown across the Potomac into Virginia and a strong line, from the Chain
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Bridge above Washington to Alexandria, below, was intrenched. On May 27, Brig. Gen. Irwin McDowell, U. S. Volunteers, was placed in command south of the Potomac.

Major McDowell, Corps of Engineers, of the class of 1838, had been appointed brigadier-general of Volunteers on May 14. Now forty-three years of age, he was a highly trained, active, capable, energetic, and thoroughly efficient officer at the height of his physical and mental powers. He was held in high esteem by General Scott, then commanding the Army, and by the President and the Secretary of War, under whose observation he had recently been serving.

Any offensive movement of McDowell's troops against the Confederates in that part of northern Virginia was sure to be influenced more or less by the disposition that might be made by the Confederate authorities of a small army, now at Harper's Ferry, under the command of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. Confronting Johnston was General Patterson with a Union Army of three months' men of about the same size. Patterson's special business in this quarter was to prevent Maryland from joining or aiding the rebellion, to reopen the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, closed by reason of Johnston's presence at Harper's Ferry, and to prevent an invasion by way of the Valley of the Shenandoah. Later, when McDowell's advance to the south began, it became of prime importance for him to hold Johnston in western Virginia.

Early in June, Johnston, convinced of the untenableness of Harper's Ferry, and perhaps a bit frightened by the reported advance of McClellan from the west on Winchester in his rear, fell back and occupied Winchester while Patterson occupied, first, Harper's Ferry and, later, Charleston. This rendered unnecessary a projected movement by McDowell's forces against the Confederates at Manassas Junction, the purpose of which was to create a diversion in favor of Patterson and assist him in taking Harper's Ferry.

The northern public, excited by the long period of inaction following the fall of Fort Sumter and perhaps also by the unfortunate result of several minor affairs between outposts and other small parties, little heeding the time required for the innumerable details of preparation that their lack of forethought in the past had rendered necessary, now imperatively demanded an advance. The cry, "On to Richmond," resounded on all sides and, in response to it, the authorities at Washington again began to consider a movement against the Confederates in direction of Centerville, this time with the idea of making it the main, and not a subordinate effort.
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Positions of Union and Confederate Forces, June 20, 1861.
Confederate.

Maj. Pierre G. T. Beauregard, Corps of Engineers, a classmate of McDowell's, was one of those officers of the old Army who, observing the war clouds that daily lowered more gloomily on the political horizon, resigned in '61 to follow the fortunes of the Confederacy. He was appointed a brigadier-general of the Confederate Army on March 1 of that year. Fate and the Confederate president placed him in the position of opponent to his associate of bygone years. If any difference existed in the abilities of the two officers, it must have been in favor of Beauregard, as his record at West Point was slightly better than McDowell's. Both seem to have possessed most of the qualities which, at that time, a government could reasonably expect its officers to have. Being of the Engineers, however, neither had ever spent much time with troops and a dense ignorance of the science of leading them in war, a universal fault at the beginning of the conflict, was to be expected.

As soon as Virginia's voice announced her accession to the Confederacy, her seven sister States, realizing her peculiarly exposed position, hurried forward a portion of their best troops to protect her. It was natural that the Confederate president, having in mind the possibility of an early advance from Washington, should wish to place in this important command his most experienced and able general. Hence General Beauregard, with the prestige of the recent capture of Fort Sumter behind him, was selected. Hitherto General Bonham with 5,000 troops had occupied the so-called Alexandria line with headquarters at Manassas Junction, where Beauregard, with the promise of all possible reinforcement, arrived June 2 and took command.

Beauregard's instructions, which he inherited from his predecessor, announced that the government's policy was strictly defensive; that no attack, or provocation for attack, was to be made, but that any advance by the enemy was to be firmly resisted; that Manassas Junction, because it controlled the lines of communication south and west, was to be held; that Alexandria was to be occupied as soon as the forces at command were deemed sufficiently strong, without, however, appearing to threaten Washington; and that the troops were to be organized and drilled as rapidly as possible and posted where most needed and where they could be most easily and quickly concentrated on threatened points.
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The Confederate troops in the whole of northern Virginia, east of the main chain of the Alleghanies, now formed a series of independent commands, extending from northwest to southeast and consisting of Johnston's army at Winchester, Beauregard's at Manassas Junction, a brigade at Aqua Creek under Holmes, and the forces under Huger and McGruder guarding Richmond from Butler's approach along the lower Chesapeake.

At the same time the troops under Beauregard's immediate command were disposed with one regiment of infantry at Mitchell's Ford, another at Union Mills Ford, still another at Centerville, and some detached companies of infantry and cavalry at Fairfax Courthouse. The remainder were in and around Manassas Junction.

On June 20, Beauregard having organized his command, now considerably reinforced, into six brigades, began a forward movement to strengthen his advanced posts. The brigades of Bonham, Ewell, and Cocke were placed so that they occupied a rough triangle with one regiment at Mitchell's Ford, one brigade at Centerville and a point half-way to Germantown, one brigade and a light battery at Germantown and Fairfax Courthouse, one regiment at the crossing of Braddock's Old Road and the Fairfax Station road and one battalion at Sangster's Crossroads. McLean's and Blackburn's fords were manned by Jones and Longstreet respectively, while Early was held in reserve a short distance in rear of Union Mills Ford. A small force of infantry guarded the Stone Bridge on Warrenton Turnpike, and the recently constructed works at Manassas Junction were garrisoned by seamen from the navy and some newly-enlisted militia. Beauregard busied himself with reconnoitering the country, constructing defensive works along the Bull Run, trying to accumulate supplies and ammunition, and complaining to the president about reinforcements and the unsuitableness of the Bull Run line for defense.

An excellent secret system of communication had already been established with friends in Washington.

II. PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES AND PLANS.

Union.

In obedience to public opinion, General Scott, on June 24, verbally directed McDowell to submit a plan of operations with an estimate of the strength and composition of the force necessary to carry it out. The report was promptly submitted and was
Positions of the Union and Confederate Armies on the Evening of July 20, 1861.
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approved on July 8. McDowell stated that he believed his mission should be to turn the enemy’s position and force him out of it by seizing or threatening his communications. He knew of the enemy’s defensive works along the Bull Run line at Manassas Junction and did not propose with his raw troops to attack them in front. He felt certain that he could make no movement so secretly but that an advance would be known to Beauregard in time for him to call up troops from all quarters. If, however, Patterson could hold Johnston and Butler, Huger and McGruder, it seemed probable that the available Confederate reinforcements would amount to no more than 10,000 men, making in all a force of 35,000 that would have to be met. The contest, McDowell estimated, would take place between Washington and Manassas Junction. Moreover, the result would be of immense importance, through the prestige it would give to the cause of the winner. He therefore asked for a force of 30,000 men of all arms with a reserve of 10,000 men.

The average service of the men of whom this army would have to be composed did not then amount to sixty days. It was on this account, their rawness, and their probable unsteadiness in line, that McDowell recommended that the troops be organized into as many permanent brigades as the number of regular colonels would allow so that they might have as fair a chance as the circumstances permitted. McDowell was ordered to carry his plan into immediate effect, but so many details of preparation had to be reckoned with that the necessary troops did not reach him until the 16th of July.

Confederate.

During the period before McDowell’s advance from Washington, inaction was practically forced on Beauregard by the defensive policy of his government, but it appears that he did not submit quietly to instructions that deprived him of all initiative against the enemy. He believed, first of all, that Manassas Junction, on account of its strategical importance and its proximity to Washington, where the main Federal war strength was being concentrated, would most likely attract the first efforts of the hostile main army. Just where the blow would be struck—whether from the direction of Alexandria or from the direction of Leesburg with the object of severing his communications with Johnston—he could of course not yet determine, but it was evident to him that the sole military advantage now possessed by the
Confederates was that of interior lines. He therefore made three ineffectual attempts to get his government to permit him to use this advantage and to assume the offensive before the enemy's preparations for his forward movement were complete.

These plans were based upon the idea of using the shorter lines of communication for a quick concentration of his own forces with those of Johnston and Holmes, thus giving the combined Confederate army superiority over any Federal force that could be brought to meet it. In the last one of these plans, submitted about the middle of July, the first concentration was to take place at Manassas Junction, Johnston furnishing detachments to hold the passes of the Blue Ridge against any essay by Patterson against the flank or rear. The combined army was then to advance, establish itself between the lines of the enemy near Washington with larger masses and overwhelm him. Johnston, reinforced by Beauregard to the necessary strength, was then to return to his former position and exterminate Patterson. Finally, Garnett, then opposing McClellan in West Virginia, was to be strengthened until he could successfully attack and destroy his opponent. Being firmly convinced that none of the Confederate detachments could independently resist the advance of the forces of the enemy in their respective fronts, Beauregard did not fail to suggest a plan that, in case the concentration were not ordered, should, he thought, be adopted, if a superior enemy forced a retrograde movement on him or Johnston. In effect this was that Johnston should fall back on Richmond, delaying the enemy wherever possible. He himself would also fall back on Richmond when compelled to do so and unite with Johnston, and their combined forces would then defeat the enemy in detail as he advanced toward Richmond on converging lines.

However excellent the strategy contained in these propositions, they accomplished little but the deep disappointment of General Beauregard at the failure of the Confederate president to adopt them. One of the main reasons for General Beauregard's continuous discontent with the existing military situation was the unsuitableness of the Bull Run line as a defensive position. The ground sloped away on all sides from the heights of Centerville and while Bull Run itself, with its steep banks, was quite a formidable obstacle, the practicable fords across it were so numerous and were spread over such a considerable extent of its length as to make it impossible for him to guard them all and yet guard each of them with a force large enough to repel a reasonably strong assailant. Moreover, the southern bank was completely
commanded from the northern side, rendering it doubtful if
trenches constructed close to the stream could be occupied under
fire; and further, there were long stretches of open country on the
southern side, making it difficult to move reserves under cover
from view and fire. In short, the objections were so numerous
that Beauregard took it upon himself, as a final expedient, to
cause the crossings of the Rappahannock to be fortified so that
he might, if forced back by superior numbers, still have some
hope of defending Richmond.

III. COMPOSITION.

Union Army.

Brigadier-General Irwin McDowell, Commanding.

Actually engaged .................. 18,572
Killed ................................ 460
Wounded ............................ 1,124
Captured or missing ............... 1,312

Total losses ......................... 2,896

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Confederate Army.

Actually engaged .................. 18,053 men.
Killed ................................ 387
Wounded ............................ 1,582
Captured or missing ............... 13

Total losses ......................... 1,982
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Army of the Potomac, Brig.-Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, Commanding.
(Not organized into Divisions.)

Brigades:
5th Brigade, Col. Cocke. 6th Brigade, Col. Ewell.
Reserve Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Holmes.
Unattached Infantry: 8th Louisiana and Hampton's Legion.
Cavalry: One regiment, one battalion, and ten independent companies.
Artillery: Twenty-seven guns.

Army of the Shenandoah, Gen. J. E. Johnston, Commanding.
(Not organized into Divisions.)

Brigades:
1st Brigade, Gen. Jackson. 2d Brigade, Col. Bartow.
Cavalry: One regiment. Artillery: Five batteries.

IV. SITUATIONS AND EVENTS PRECEDING THE BATTLE.

Union.

McDowell marched on the evening of the 16th. On the morning of the 18th his army had concentrated at Centerville. The enemy's outposts had fallen back without resistance to the southern bank of Bull Run. The march orders had carried the leading division, Tyler's, no farther than Centerville and it was necessary, inasmuch as McDowell had already practically decided not to attack the enemy in front, to determine by reconnaissance which flank could best be turned. On the morning of the 18th he accordingly ordered Tyler "to observe well the roads to Bull Run and to Warrenton, not to bring on an engagement but to keep up the impression that we are moving on Manassas."

McDowell then proceeded in person to the extreme left of his line with the view of determining whether the country in that direction was suitable for a quick turning movement around the enemy's right. It was not found suitable for that purpose and all idea of a movement against the hostile right flank was then abandoned.

Meanwhile, Tyler's orders led him into quite an engagement even though they expressly forbade it. He had moved forward toward Mitchell's and Blackburn's fords with a squadron of
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cavalry and two companies of infantry. Arriving at the crest a mile from Bull Run he began shelling the enemy's position, without, however, developing much. Richardson's brigade was called up and heavy lines of skirmishers were pushed forward even to the fringe of trees lining the northern bank of the stream. Here heavy Confederate artillery and infantry fire was met, which satisfied Tyler that the enemy was in force and at the same time enabled him to locate the latter's artillery positions. The Federal forces were then withdrawn toward Centerville, with the exception of Richardson's brigade, which remained to guard the roads leading from Manassas Junction via Mitchell's and Blackburn's fords toward Centerville.

The remainder of the army rested at Centerville on the 19th and 20th, mainly, it appears, for the purpose of receiving rations, while McDowell carefully examined the enemy's position and the country. As a result of this the order for battle was published on the 20th. The plan announced was to turn the enemy's left, force him from his defensive position and destroy the railroad communications with the Valley of Virginia, thus severing the enemy's two main forces. Miles's Fifth Division, with Richard- son's brigade of Tyler's division and a strong force of artillery, was to remain in reserve at Centerville, preparing defensive works there and threatening the fords. Tyler's First Division, which now had two brigades camped on the Warrenton turnpike in front of Centerville and a third a short distance in rear of that town, was to move at 2.30 a.m. on the 21st and vigorously threaten the Stone Bridge, opening a heavy fire at daybreak so as to attract the enemy's attention and prevent him from noticing the turning movement that was to be attempted. As soon as Tyler had cleared the way, Hunter's Second Division, followed by Heintzelman's Third Division, was to move about two miles down the turnpike and there turn to the right on a country road leading to Sudley Ford where the Run was to be crossed. They were then to move south against the enemy's flank and rear, forcing him to open the way for Tyler's troops who were to cross and attack, fresh and in full force. Runyon's Fourth Division was left to guard the road to Alexandria.

Confederate.

It has been shown that about June 20, Beauregard, having organized his force into six brigades, sent three of them forward to strengthen his advanced posts. Of these, Bonham's brigade
was at Centerville and beyond, Ewell’s was scattered around near Fairfax Courthouse, while Cocke’s remained guarding the upper fords.

In case the enemy advanced, Bonham was under orders to retire slowly on Centerville, thence on Mitchell’s Ford, drawing the enemy after him so as to compel him to face the only defensive works yet constructed. Ewell had orders to retire along the line of the railroad to Union Mills Ford where the position was naturally strong and there was good cover.

At about 8 p. m. on July 16, Beauregard received through his secret service a message from a lady in Washington that McDowell was to move that afternoon. Beauregard at once reported this to Richmond with another request that Johnston and Holmes be ordered to join him; and next day when the enemy made a strong demonstration against Bonham, this was also wired to Richmond with a still more urgent request for reinforcements. At the eleventh hour, when it appeared almost if not quite too late, the long-wished-for orders were given. On the 17th Beauregard received word from Richmond that Holmes had been ordered to join him, and further that more reinforcements would be dispatched from there at once. He was authorized to hold a North Carolina regiment en route to join Johnston. In addition he was directed to send Johnston word that the War Department had forwarded the latter an order via Staunton to proceed to Manassas Junction with all his effective force.

We may be sure that Beauregard lost no time in attending to this. An aide was sent to say to General Johnston that there was not a moment to lose and that all available transportation would await him at Piedmont. At the same time it was suggested that Johnston should leave the railroad at a convenient point and proceed via Aldie against the enemy’s flank and rear while Beauregard upon hearing the sound of the conflict would press him in front.

But the idea of running against a large force like McDowell’s with a force of only about 8,000 like his own, even though every tactical advantage were on his side, did not allure General Johnston into accepting the proposition. Beauregard made no change in his own dispositions except to notify his advanced commanders of the enemy’s approach and to direct them to be ready to comply with the order of June 20. On the morning of July 17, the enemy gained contact with the outposts of Bonham and without important incident he and Ewell proceeded to carry out their retrograde movement. On the morning of the 18th, the enemy was reported advancing on Mitchell’s and Blackburn’s fords.
The Confederate line was now some six miles long with Ewell's brigade, four 12-pounder howitzers, and three companies of Virginia cavalry at Union Mills Ford; D. R. Jones's brigade, two 6-pounders, and one company of cavalry at McLean's Ford; Longstreet's brigade and two 6-pounders at Blackburn's Ford; Bonham's brigade, Shields's and Kemper's batteries, and six companies of Radford's cavalry at Mitchell's Ford; Cocke's brigade, Latham's battery, and one company of cavalry at Ball's Island and Lewis's fords; and Evans's demi-brigade, under Cocke's command, with four 6-pounders and two companies of cavalry at the Stone Bridge and Farm Ford. Early's brigade stood in rear of, and as a support to, Ewell's.

Toward noon the enemy opened on Mitchell's Ford with artillery. Soon afterwards strong columns of Federal infantry were seen advancing, which resolved themselves in part later into heavy skirmish lines pushing through the woods, while the balance remained on the roads, seemingly with the intention of forcing Blackburn's Ford. Longstreet met the principal attack and repulsed it. Two regiments and some artillery from Early's brigade then arrived and the fire became quite heavy. Several separate advances were made by the enemy, each of which was repulsed, until finally, his initiative being apparently expended, the contest degenerated into an artillery duel, at the end of which the enemy abandoned his ground in full retreat. This affair was the result of Tyler's reconnaissance and was called by the Confederates "The Battle of Bull Run." They named the battle of July 21 "The Battle of Manassas."

The military situation, except for the arrival of the Army of the Shenandoah, remained unchanged from the 18th until the morning of the 21st. No offensive movement was made by either side. About noon on the 20th, General Johnston in person reached Manassas Junction. Most of his troops arrived the same afternoon. General Holmes had arrived the day before. General Johnston, although he denies it, appears to have left the command, to which he was entitled by reason of superior rank, mostly in Beauregard's hands.

The dispositions of the troops were somewhat modified to accommodate the newly arrived reinforcements. Holmes was placed in rear of Ewell; Early was shifted from Ewell's rear to Jones's support; Longstreet was supported by Bee's and Bartow's brigades, and Bonham by Jackson's brigade, all of Johnston's army. Ten companies of infantry, two of cavalry, and Rogers's battery were added to Cocke's command. Hampton's Legion,
600 infantry, arriving from Richmond the morning of the 20th, was placed near the Lewis house as a reserve. Two companies of Radford's cavalry were held in reserve in rear of Mitchell's Ford, while Stuart's cavalry, 300 men, of Johnston's army, filled the gap between Cocke and Bonham. In reserve in rear of Bee's right were five pieces of Walton's battery and Pendleton's battery was in rear of Bonham's left.

It is perhaps a bit remarkable that almost at the same moment that McDowell was planning his movement against Beauregard's left, the latter, inspired probably by the enemy's lack of aggressiveness as well as by the presence of his newly arrived reinforcements, was himself arranging to attack McDowell's left. On the night of the 20th orders were prepared for just such a move. They were forwarded early on the morning of the 21st to the commanders concerned and directed Ewell to move out at once from Union Mills Ford along the road toward Centerville, halting about half way and awaiting the arrival of D. R. Jones on his left, the latter coming from McLean's Ford; Jones in his turn was to await connection with Longstreet from Blackburn's Ford while Bonham from Mitchell's Ford was to join on to Longstreet's left. The formation of the line being completed, the whole force was to swing in, pivoting on Mitchell's Ford, with the object of striking McDowell's flank and rear. Fortunately Ewell did not receive his copy of the order and the movement was delayed. Before matters could be readjusted, events of such importance began to happen on the left as to preclude further attempts at carrying out the movement.

V. THE BATTLE.

Union.

Sunday morning, July 21, 1861, broke bright and clear. Tyler's Division was up betimes but was delayed awaiting the arrival of Keyes's brigade which had been camped back of Centerville. When the division did start it moved so slowly that the turning column following it did not cover the mile or two intervening between Centerville and the country road for two or three hours. The turning column, consisting of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions, reached Sudley Ford at 9 a.m. instead of about 7 a.m. as was expected. At about 9.45 a.m. Burnside's brigade, leading the column, was fired into from the direction of Buck Hill by Evans's command which was now barring the way. Line was promptly formed and an attack was made but was repulsed.
Porter, following Burnside, came to the latter's support but in the meantime Bee and Bartow had come to Evans's assistance and the reinforced line was able to do little. It was not until the leading regiment of Heintzelman's division was pushed into the fight that the Confederates could be dislodged. They then broke and in much confusion fled to the shelter of the Henry House plateau.

This Henry House plateau now became, quite by accident, the focus of the whole battle storm. Its possession was contented for most vigorously during the remainder of the conflict. It is a hill with a broad, flat top about 60 or 70 feet above the level of Bull Run and some 700 yards back of the Stone Bridge. Young's Branch makes a rough semicircle around its northern face which was covered with undergrowth and cut up with small ravines and water courses. On the edge toward the Confederates there were dense thickets of pine and oak scrub. The surface of the plateau was open and level, and contained the fields and houses of old Mrs. Henry and the free negro Robinson.

McDowell arrived on the field about the time the Confederate commands began their flight across Young's Branch. He at once despatched an order to Tyler to push the attack against the Stone Bridge. But Tyler's action had all day been timid and most ineffective and so continued, for, though he received the order, the Stone Bridge was not attacked, notwithstanding that its defenders now consisted of only four companies of infantry. Nevertheless McDowell did get some use of at least a small part of Tyler's division. Sherman, one of the brigade commanders, discovered the Farm Ford and, leading his brigade across, reported it to the commanding general in time to take part in chasing the Confederates across Young's Branch. Later Keyes's brigade, accompanied by Tyler himself, crossed at the same place but, instead of uniting with the other forces on the field, made a feeble attack of its own up the slope toward the Robinson House. This was soon repulsed and then the brigade moved off down the valley of Young's Branch taking no further part in the engagement. Schenck's brigade of Tyler's division never crossed Bull Run at all.

Soon after McDowell arrived on the field, Burnside reported that his brigade, having done most of the fighting, was out of ammunition and asked permission to withdraw and refit. In the excitement of the moment, it seems, the request was granted and another brigade was lost to the fight; for Burnside returned no more to battle.
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The Confederates had by this time established themselves in their new position at the curved edge of the woods on the eastern side of the plateau. For the assault McDowell had the brigades of Franklin, Willcox, Sherman, and Porter, which last was badly shaken and demoralized, Rickett's and Griffin's regular batteries, and Palmer's regular squadron of cavalry. Howard's brigade was in reserve and was not brought into the fight until later in the afternoon. The assault was promptly and vigorously carried out. McDowell threw himself into the thick of the fight and became for the time being simply the leader of the few men under his personal observation. Soon the northern edge of the plateau was carried and the batteries were pushed forward to a position east of the Henry House where they were formed in one line facing in the direction of Bull Run. From this point they were used with terrible effect. Shortly afterwards, however, a troop of hostile cavalry charged the escort, causing it to break and fall back and a few moments later the batteries received a full volley, at a distance of 60 or 70 yards, from a Confederate infantry regiment that on account of its uniform had been taken for a Union force. The batteries were completely wrecked, most of the horses and men being killed or wounded.

The battle ebbed and flowed as McDowell pushed in his brigades and Beauregard's reinforcements arrived. Finally the Confederates made a charge which swept the Federals clear of the hill and the second stage of the battle was over.

At length the Federal forces were reformed into some sort of order and Howard's brigade was approaching the field. McDowell, as soon as possible, renewed his efforts to dislodge the enemy. He succeeded in regaining possession of the Henry and Robinson houses and of the lost guns, but the latter were useless. There were no longer suitable men to man them nor horses to draw them. Moreover, the constantly arriving Confederate reinforcements extended the line so that it outflanked McDowell and soon thereafter the pressure of a second Confederate advance began to be strongly felt. At this turn of events, it seemed as if it were suddenly borne in upon the minds of these volunteers that they had fought a good fight and had lost. There were now no reserves on the field to stay their lagging spirits. Their letters from home, their sweetheart's pictures, their tents and rations were all beyond the Potomac and it appeared as if they came to the conclusion, by common impulse, that it was there that they also should be. Without especial confusion or excitement other than the frantic efforts of their officers to stop them,
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they trooped off the field mostly by the way they had come. McDowell and his staff, near the Matthew House, made herculean efforts to reform a line but without avail. With the exception of the regulars, all cohesion was lost and most of the organizations simply melted away. The regulars organized a rear guard but there was little necessity as the victor made no pursuit worth mentioning.

A few Confederate shells struck among the crowded refugees on the road to Centerville. About the same time an overturned wagon blocked the bridge across Cub Run on the Warrenton Pike. Then a panic began and soldiers, congressmen, pleasure carriages, ammunition wagons, and horsemen mingled in a wild race for Washington.

All next day the crowd poured across Long Bridge and the exhausted men, feeling themselves safe again, lay down anywhere and slept. The rain beat upon their upturned faces unheeded. Every physical, mental, and spiritual power was exhausted.

Confederate.

Soon after 5.30 on the morning of the 21st, it became evident to Evans at the Stone Bridge that the enemy was in motion. About the same time artillery fire was opened on him and a skirmish line was seen approaching. Evans deployed a part of his force to meet this and a desultory fire resulted. By 7 a. m. Beauregard, who, with General Johnston, had taken up a position in rear of Mitchell’s Ford to supervise his own offensive movement, the order for which had again just been sent to Ewell, had received word of the demonstration against Stone Bridge and had ordered Jackson, Bee, and Bartow to support the left. He concluded that the Federals were making their main attack against the Stone Bridge which, he thought, rather favored his own movement.

About 8.30 Evans became suspicious of the enemy’s feeble demonstration and of the lengthening line of dust visible to his left, which latter assured him that some kind of a turning movement was in progress. Leaving four of his infantry companies to guard the bridge, and taking eleven companies and the two howitzers, he moved first to a position about 400 yards south of the Carter Mansion, later to one near Buck Hill where he formed line with a howitzer on each side, his left on the Sudley and Newmarket road. About 9.45 the enemy’s advanced troops arrived and attacked him in this position. He held his own ground for about an hour when his men began to show serious signs of weakening and reinforcement became urgently necessary.
Meanwhile General Bee, with his own and Bartow's brigade, hearing the sound of the conflict, borrowed Imboden's battery from Jackson and marched over to the Henry House, in front of which he formed line, a brigade on each side of the battery. Evans applied to him there for assistance and was advised to fall back on the better position on Henry House hill which he, having in mind the protection of the turnpike, refused to do. Bee finally yielded and moved forward to Evans' support, placing one regiment in the latter's line, two on his right and Bartow's two regiments on the right of these, the last extended forward nearly at right angles along the edge of the wood, where the right was only a short distance from the enemy's line. The battery was left back on the hill.

The Confederates now managed to hold their ground until Sherman, advancing by Farm Ford, rendered their position untenable. Under cover of the fire from the retiring howitzers and the battery on the hill, Bee began to fall back, but in spite of the leader's best efforts the retreat soon became a rout. The fugitives fled across Young's Branch, around the base of the Henry House hill, and could not be stopped until they reached the cover of a ravine leading up to a point on the crest near which Jackson had already placed the right of his line.

The attention of Generals Johnston and Beauregard soon was attracted to the heavy firing on the left. They thereupon decided to call off their own advance and make the fight in that quarter. Ewell, Jones, and Longstreet were directed to make a strong demonstration in their fronts while Holmes's and Early's brigades with two regiments of Bonham's and all the other reserves on the right were ordered to the left. They then set out full speed for the fight, arriving there in time to assist in reforming Bee's, Bartow's, and Evans's commands, a task of great difficulty, and placing them on Jackson's right, thus prolonging the line toward the Robinson House. Order was restored none too soon, for the enemy was already crossing Young's Branch and moving up the slope, although somewhat delayed by the fire of Hampton's Legion from in front of Robinson's house.

Beauregard now requested General Johnston to return to the Lewis House and direct the reinforcements on the field as they should arrive. As soon as Johnston had gone, Beauregard readjusted his lines. Regiments were ordered up from Cocke's command as well as from other points and were placed for the greater part with the view of extending the line to the left to prevent a flanking movement by the enemy. With 6,500 men and 13 pieces
of artillery, Beauregard now awaited the hostile advance. It was not long in coming. Preceded by a storm of shot and shell the enemy swarmed up the western and southern edge of the plateau, quickly seizing the Robinson and Henry houses. The pressure of the Federals on his troops soon became so great that Beauregard saw that only a sudden offensive movement could save him from being pushed off the hill. Consequently a charge was ordered which was successful in clearing the surface of the plateau of the enemy for the time being. But, covered to some extent by the small ravines and thickets of the western slope of the hill and out of the way of the heavy fire of the Confederates, the Federals were again reformed and pushed forward, this time making use of the embankment of the sunken Sudley Road. The conflict for possession of the hill now became most severe. In addition to the heavy fighting at close range, the scorching July sun beat down upon the combatants, adding vastly to the hardships of the troops.

Fearing lest some local infraction of his line would, on account of the proximity of the Union troops, cause his whole force to give way, thus losing him the hill and at the same time his hope of winning the victory, Beauregard determined upon another supreme effort to push back the enemy and gain time for the arrival of his sorely needed reinforcements. The signal was given and the movement was made with such “sweeping and dash” that the enemy was again and for the last time pushed off the plateau on which he had endeavored so strenuously to establish himself. The “key to victory” remained in the hands of the Confederates.

Additional troops had continued to arrive all during the battle and several regiments coming up just as the charge on the hill was completed were sent to the west of the Sudley Road against the Federal troops not reached by the wave that swept their comrades off the higher ground. At 3 p.m. another important reinforcement arrived—Smith’s brigade of Johnston’s army. This force was sent also to extend the line to the left. Early’s brigade from over on the right arrived soon afterwards and was directed forward with the intention of rolling up the enemy’s right.

Under the combined pressure of all these troops the enemy did not long maintain himself.

When the Federals finally gave way, Beauregard, seeing that the day was won, ordered all his available troops in pursuit and himself proceeded to the Lewis House to turn over the command to General Johnston. Returning thence to the pursuit, he was
overtaken by a message from one of General Johnston’s staff officers to the effect that a large Federal force was reported to have crossed Bull Run at one of the lower fords and to be marching on Camp Pickens, the Confederate depot of supplies near Manassas Junction. This report turned out to be false and the supposed Federals proved later to be some of D. R. Jones’s troops returning from a demonstration across Bull Run. Nevertheless it caused General Beauregard some anxiety for a time and to it, as well as to the exhaustion of the troops, he imputes his failure to pursue vigorously the defeated enemy. Some of the pursuing troops, those closest at hand, were called off and pushed against this supposed new danger. Ewell and Holmes, just arriving and too late to take part in the main battle, were turned back toward Manassas Junction. It was not until these troops had gone some distance to the rear that the mistake was discovered; and it was then too late to take up the pursuit, at least with these particular organizations, so Beauregard ordered them into bivouac and himself repaired to Manassas Junction to meet President Davis who had arrived in time to see the last of the Federals disappearing from the battlefield.

Some pursuit was made by the Confederate cavalry, whose numbers were too weak to accomplish any material results. Detachments of infantry, accompanied by artillery, also followed the fugitive enemy but without cohesion or union of effort, so that as night began to fall the idea of inflicting damage on the flying Federals gradually disappeared from the minds of the Confederate leaders, and the retreating mass was allowed to proceed on its way with only such danger as the straining imaginations of its individual units could conjure up.

VI. THE STRATEGY.

Union.

Before McDowell started on this campaign, he was given to understand by General Scott that Johnston could not join Beauregard without having “Patterson on his heels;” and there is no doubt that the opportune junction of Johnston’s command with Beauregard’s was a matter of vital importance in deciding the issue in favor of the Confederates. General Scott was compelled to order McDowell’s advance by the demands of public opinion. But at the same time he gave great weight to the general feeling that if Patterson were withdrawn from the Harper’s Ferry position to cooperate with McDowell there would arise the immediate
danger of Johnston's crossing the Potomac and moving on Washington. Consequently that cooperation between McDowell and Patterson which the circumstances so urgently demanded was never ordered. General Scott, anxious to make a direct advance against Beauregard in one quarter, for which he must give up a great many of the troops necessary for the defense of the city, and just as anxious to hold the enemy as far away from Washington as possible, in the other quarter, not only did not order cooperation between Patterson and McDowell but placed upon Patterson an offensive-defensive mission, difficult if not impossible to execute. It is thought by some that Patterson's mission could not have been carried out without continuous fighting and this, it is quite evident from the shifty character of Scott's telegrams to Patterson, the former was unwilling to take the responsibility of ordering. The loss of Washington was the bugbear that followed those charged with the conduct of the war throughout the rebellion. It is not therefore so remarkable that it influenced the first battle to such a considerable extent. Neither, in view of later events, is it remarkable that the Federals should have been satisfied to allow two entirely independent commanders intimately to influence the same set of military operations. That policy was adhered to until it was literally beaten out of their heads. And it took a deal of beating to accomplish the result.

After McDowell's advance Patterson was, by reason of the Confederate railroad communications between the Valley and Manassas Junction, on the extreme flank of the exterior line. In this position it was impossible for him to render McDowell assistance except in keeping Johnston west of the Blue Ridge—in which he failed miserably.

The strategical offensive was of course adopted as a result of the political offensive forced on the Government by the people. There were reasons why the aggressive should not have been undertaken at this time. Leaving out the regular artillery, the only trained soldiers available at this time were those of Sykes's battalion of infantry, Reynolds's battalion of marines, and Palmer's battalion of cavalry. These formed only an infinitesimal part of the total force required. As for the balance of the army, it consisted of three months' militia whose term of service had almost expired and newly enlisted volunteers. These same men afterwards won great battles for the country, but it was not in them to do it then. Clad in such uniforms as their respective fancies had caused them to adopt during their "home guard" days, under the command of officers wholly ignorant of the care
and leading of troops, armed with weapons to the use of which they had never been trained, incapable of the physical hardships that must be endured in the field, the wonder is that they were not disorganized by the mere forward movement to Centerville. Success can reasonably be expected with such troops only if the enemy is vastly inferior, but in this case, no matter how bad his condition might have been considered, it certainly was not worse. Fortunately, the objective of the movement was comparatively so close at hand that the army was not consumed by the hardships of the march. Fortunately, also, the campaign was of such short duration that matters connected with reinforcement and the maintenance of lines of communication in hostile country did not have to be considered.

This campaign classes itself as a strategical frontal attack. In other words, McDowell, knowing the position of the enemy, advanced into the theater of operations from Washington to Centerville, which latter place was in front of the center of the hostile lines. His idea was to place his army in such a situation that he could most easily turn the enemy’s position and force him out of it by seizing or threatening his lines of communication. It can scarcely be doubted that the strategical frontal attack was under the circumstances the best method of procedure. It placed the Federal army near its objective in the quickest possible manner and with the shortest line of communications and retreat. With the raw troops available it is to be doubted if a strategical attack of Beauregard’s left wing via Leesburg and Aldie, with the object of seizing the Manassas Gap Railroad and later the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, was at all practicable. The lines of communication with Washington would have been in great danger, and in any case the marching powers of the new soldiers could not have withstood the strain. A strategical attack of the enemy’s right wing along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad was impracticable also for lack of good lines of operation, and further on account of the rough country and the depth of the streams to be crossed. Besides, this would have favored rather than hindered the arrival of Johnston from the Shenandoah region.

“Rapidity of movement and surprise are the life and soul of the strategical offensive.” On the other hand, in the strategical frontal attack, all chance of effecting a surprise by the direction of the attack is excluded and hence it can only be attained by the rapidity of the advance. Success must be sought by energy of action, by which is meant that tactics must follow strategy with all possible speed.
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

With McDowell's advance up to the time he reached Centerville no fault can be found. It was the long delay from the 18th to the 21st that proved his undoing, not so much because of the active measures which this unfortunate waste of time gave his immediate opponent the opportunity to take as because it gave Johnston just enough time to reach Manassas Junction from the Shenandoah Valley. And it was Johnston's troops that supported Evans's rapidly dissolving command and Johnston's troops that bore the brunt of the first attack on Henry House Hill and Johnston's troops that arrived just in time to sweep McDowell's right from the field.

With Johnston still in the Valley of Virginia, McDowell could hardly have failed to win. With Johnston already in the field there still remains very little excuse for the Federal defeat.

Confederate.

The position near Manassas Junction had originally been taken up at the instance of Col. Thomas Jordan of the Virginia forces who, in a carefully written memoir on the subject, had shown the importance of at once occupying the Junction in order to prevent its seizure and the consequent severance of the communication by rail with the lower Valley of Virginia.

The Confederate forces in the northern part of Virginia formed, as already noted, a series of independent commands extending from the Valley of Virginia to the lower Chesapeake. They were as badly dispersed as were the Federal forces, for wherever there was a Federal force there was also a Confederate detachment to oppose it; and, moreover, it must be admitted that there was some reason for their dispositions. They did not like the idea of turning over the approaches to Richmond along the Chesapeake to Butler by withdrawing Huger and McGruder; it would have been decidedly to their disadvantage to have moved Johnston's command from Harper's Ferry, thus abandoning to the enemy the subsistence supplies then existing in such abundance in the Valley of Virginia; and it was equally important to them to cover the approaches to Richmond from Washington, where the main forces of the enemy were concentrating. In spite of this, much may be said in favor of the abandonment of all these minor matters in order to have had a large concentrated force that would have been capable of dealing the hostile main army at Washington a knockout blow.

If the Confederates had adopted offensive instead of defensive
strategy Richmond might readily have been abandoned to Butler without military injury to the Confederate cause. The government had only recently moved there anyhow. Huger and McGruder would then have been available as reinforcements to Beauregard's army. Holmes might just as well have been at Manassas as at Aquia Creek. Johnston might equally as well have evacuated Harper's Ferry in the beginning. Patterson would not have advanced far into the enemy's country with the force he then had. With such an army, quickly and secretly concentrated at Centerville, and a competent and aggressive general at its head, it seems not unreasonable, in view of later events, to suppose that Washington would have fallen into the hands of the Confederates and the unorganized, thoroughly green militia, available for its defense, quickly put to flight.

It is not necessary to speculate on what further victories the Confederates might there have achieved. With Washington in their hands at the very beginning, the course of the war would have been entirely different, with perhaps a very different ending. One of the most important of the immediate results of such a state of affairs would have been the recognition of the Confederate States of America as an independent political body by perhaps all foreign governments, and the sympathy and covert assistance of some of the most prominent of them throughout the war.

Their main mistake under the circumstances, however, was undoubtedly made by not assigning some competent general officer to the command of all these independent detachments and investing him with full power to act as he deemed best under the circumstances. Such action as this was the more necessary in view of the fact that the Confederates possessed the important military advantage of interior lines, of which the best use could be made only by having one chief commander in the one theater of operations.

The Confederate policy was avowedly defensive. This was to a certain extent forced on President Davis by the existing inadequacy of his military means and the incompleteness of his general arrangements for carrying on the war. It extended, however, even to a desire to avoid attracting any hostile force whatever. Such a policy was wrong and the error of its adoption was fraught with the gravest consequences. Granting President Davis even the military resources that he did have (and that he thought them nearly sufficient is evidenced by the fact that in the beginning he ordered only 10,000 stands of arms from Europe), it was
important for him to gain every possible military advantage at the very first. Moreover, at this juncture it was his business to establish by every means at his command the affirmative of the important political proposition, "We have the right to secede and set up an independent government of our own," rather than the negative of the proposition, "You have no right to coerce us into remaining in the Union." Once the Confederate government was firmly established and duly recognized by the foreign powers, he had only to defend it, which was as far as the South desired to go.

Having adopted the strategical defensive, the poorest possible use was made of it in waiting in almost absolute inactivity for the enemy's arrival. Since the final tactical decision in favor of the Confederates was a lucky chance that even Beauregard himself did not expect, how much better it would have been if the advanced Confederate force had been vigorously used against the enemy to delay him and wear him out and to assure time for Johnston to arrive; or if the army had retired into the interior, temporarily giving up the railroads, using its natural attractive power upon the enemy to draw him after it, so as to gain time for those factors that constantly tend to weaken the offensive to operate; or, finally, if part of the force had been used to draw the enemy on while the balance was used against his flank.

None of these was done, however, and by the morning of the 18th, in view of Johnston's expected arrival, very little could be done except to continue to hold the Bull Run line.

VII. TACTICS.

Union.

The principal reason for McDowell's tactical defeat was perhaps his long delay at Centerville which, permitting Johnston to place his army on the field, turned the tide of battle against the Federals. There was little excuse for this delay. McDowell had started from his position opposite Washington on the afternoon of 16th. On the morning of the 18th the army was concentrated at Centerville. The distance between the two places was about 20 miles. The troops therefore should have found themselves sufficiently rested to begin the attack on the morning of the 19th at the very latest. The men found no especial difficulty in marching and fighting all day long on the 21st and then walking all the way back to Washington without rest. Another excuse for the
delay is the late arrival of the wagons with rations for the command but this does not account for the loss of two whole days. Besides, soldiers can fight nearly as well without rations as they can lie around camp without them.

The truth of the matter probably is that McDowell arrived at Centerville without any tactical plans whatever and it took him the better part of three whole days to decide what he was going to do. Some fault may be found with his conclusions and the way they were carried out. Von der Goltz says that the turning movement must not be looked upon as meritorious in itself. Absolute necessity must justify its employment. There is danger that the gap between the turning column and the rest of the force will be taken advantage of by the enemy to make a counter attack unless, as in this case, he is behind an obstacle across which he must advance to make such attack, or unless his troops are unfavorably situated, as Beauregard's were, for inserting a column between the divided portions of the enemy. But the chief disadvantages are exactly those that were here encountered by McDowell, namely, undue dispersion of the troops and consequent loss of control, lack of unity of effort, and the ever-present possibility of unforeseen contingencies operating to delay the turning column.

In the special case in hand, the turning movement resulted in cutting off the turning column almost as completely as if it had been the only Federal force on the field. It further caused the line of battle to face almost to the original rear and gave those troops of Johnston's army that arrived on the afternoon of the 21st an excellent opportunity to leave the railroad where it crosses Warrenton Turnpike and to proceed by the pike directly against the Union rear. It is true that Tyler's feeble and dilatory action was responsible for the failure to establish communication via the Stone Bridge which was guarded during nearly all the action by only four companies of infantry. But McDowell had only himself to blame for this. The reconnaissance made by Tyler on the 18th, while it possibly did not exactly comply with his orders, was well executed and the information gained thereby was of value. Yet it was treated with levity by McDowell, who gave no manner of credit to Tyler, and finally resulted in a lifelong enmity between the two men. This explains the difference between the Tyler of the 18th and the Tyler of the 21st. As the matter stood on the 21st, Tyler should never have been entrusted with the advance on the Stone Bridge. Some officer more in personal accord with the commanding general should have been given this important duty.
McDowell had five divisions with which to conduct the battle. Since he had already determined that an envelopment of the Confederate right was impracticable, he should have sent one of these divisions to make a strong secondary attack along the entire front so as to hold the enemy's troops and their reserves. The ground would rather have favored this. One other division should have been held in reserve. With the combined weight of his other three divisions he should then have bored through the defenses of the Stone Bridge by sheer force of numbers if nothing else. He would have found Poplar Ford not held at all and Farm Ford so weakly held that only a moment's effort would have been required to take it. Turning to the left, he should have taken the whole Confederate line in flank while it was still occupied with its own advance. Moreover, if some such attack had been made on the morning of the 19th or even on the 20th, Jackson, Bee, and Bartow, who bore the weight of the fighting in the earlier part of the battle, would still have been somewhere back in the Shenandoah Valley.

McDowell's errors in the conduct of the battle were due to lack of experience, but they had an important effect on the result. His own influence on the course of the fight amounted to practically nothing by reason of the fact that he chose to assume control of the few men whom he could personally supervise rather than perform his proper functions. The fact that he gave Burnside permission to withdraw in the heat of action is perhaps explained by the excitement he was under at the moment, but why he permitted Burnside to remain out of the fight for good and all is not explained. He knew practically nothing of what any of Tyler's brigades was doing except Sherman's, and he only knew of Sherman's because the latter had enterprise enough to push across Farm Ford and report to him. During the time that elapsed between the departure from Washington and the encounter with Evans much valuable information might have been obtained by the proper use of even that little cavalry force available. But it took years of practical experience in war to teach either Federal or Confederate what cavalry was for. After the enemy was encountered the handling of the infantry was just as bad. The leading regiment of Hunter's division was deployed against Evans and promptly driven back. Then the whole force was permitted to go in by dribbles in any way it chose. Finally the whole morning was frittered away by eighteen regiments of infantry in trying to push five regiments out of the way. It appears that they only succeeded when Sherman appeared on the enemy's
right flank. Instead of reforming for the attack on Henry House hill, the attack resolved itself into a chase of the rebel fugitives across Young's Branch whereby the Federals naturally encountered Jackson. Howard's brigade was apparently the only formed reserve held out. It was not brought into action until some time in the afternoon. Instead of using it at the proper time to assist the firing line in taking Henry House hill, the key point of the position, it was employed to extend the line to the right. The worst mistake of the day was in the use of the artillery. The fine regular batteries of Ricketts and Griffin had in the beginning opened fire from the heights in front of Young's Branch. Here they were doing excellent work undisturbed by the enemy's artillery fire which could not reach so far. Later they received the order to move to the front and were placed, as already described, in a most hazardous position almost against the enemy's front with their flank turned toward him. Small wonder that they were ruined before the fight had hardly begun. It is scarcely to be doubted that if these two batteries had not been lost the battle could have been won in spite of everything.

Confederate.

The element of chance favored the Confederates in this battle in almost every conceivable way. At every turn just that combination of circumstances necessary to insure their success seemed to come about. Their victory can certainly not be ascribed to the abilities of their commanding general.

In the first place the Bull Run line did indeed furnish a very poor defensive position. From Farm Ford on the left to Union Mills Ford on the right the distance in an air line was about six miles. Behind this long line Beauregard had strung his troops, placing most of his strength behind Mitchell's Ford because that lay on the direct road to Centerville from Manassas Junction. The disposition was weak at many points and could scarcely be called strong at any. Beauregard seemed to think that in order to carry out his principal mission of protecting the lines of communication west and south it was necessary to spread his force over as much area as possible.

After he allowed McDowell to get as far as Centerville it was difficult for him to tell exactly where the blow would fall. The country was full of good roads leading from Centerville to the right and left flanks and through the center of the position. That town should never have been allowed to fall into the enemy's
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

hands. The ground sloped down from the place on all sides and it was otherwise suitable for defense. There was little probability that the enemy would choose any other route to advance by than one which led through Centerville. There was just as little probability that he would go around an enemy in position there with the idea of striking at Manassas Junction and thus accomplishing his object without attack. With a force of about 21,000 men, such as Beauregard had, concentrated and well in hand, placed in a suitable position behind earthworks at Centerville, there is every reason to believe that Beauregard could have accomplished his mission with far less risk than he did. It would have made little difference whether Johnston arrived or not. Neither would his line of retreat have been endangered. The Run could have been crossed at so many places that it would have mattered but very little whether he had it at his back or not. On the 21st Longstreet’s command crossed it no less than six times showing that the passage in his neighborhood was not at all difficult.

It was indeed a fortunate circumstance that Ewell failed to receive the order to advance on the morning of the 21st. With four brigades on the northern side of the Run confronted by the Divisions of Miles and Runyon and three Federal divisions bearing on his left, Beauregard’s army would have been in a serious plight.

Beauregard made many of the mistakes that have already been mentioned in connection with McDowell’s conduct of the battle. During the fight there was practically no one in command. Beauregard busied himself in helping the regimental commanders reform their broken ranks and in exhibiting his personal courage as a shining example to those around him. Johnston allowed himself to be used as a sort of a staff officer to his more strong-minded subordinate. Radford’s cavalry appears to have been broken up and assigned along with other cavalry organizations to the several commands at the fords, not with the view of assisting them in the service of security and information but with the idea of forming a reserve for those commands. Stuart’s cavalry connected Cocke’s right with Bonham’s left. There was no ford in this part of the position and the dense woods which lined the bank of the stream cut off all view from his front. But in spite of all this, where there should normally have resulted a complete surprise of the enemy by the Federal turning column, it came about that Colonel Evans was in command at the Stone Bridge and that Providence had given him eyes to see and a brain capable of reasoning on what he saw, so that in this instance the improper
use of cavalry did not bear the usual fruits. Beauregard's use of the infantry and artillery was perhaps the result of force of circumstances, the poor dispositions and the unexpected situation of the battlefield. He could scarcely have used them otherwise. The arrival of the brigades of Early and Smith in quick succession illustrates the military axiom that he who possesses the last formed reserve wins the fight.
OUR PRESENT DRILL REGULATIONS.

BY CAPT. GEORGE F. BALZELL, 5TH INFANTRY.

A drill regulations for infantry—or for any other arm—should be a manual that will form the foundation for the proper training of that arm. It should contain only matter that is suitably designed to that end; and such matter should be so presented that it will comprise only details and principles that are correct, and the true embodiment of what experience has brought to light and military teaching upholds. Such a book should be so true to principle that every soldier, from its teaching, should be able properly to perform what war requires of him and should, on the other hand, find no opportunity for casting aside any lessons taught in peace. By this it is not intended that the regulations should be an exhaustive treatise on the multifarious phases of the soldier's work. This would not be desirable. But there should be presented solutions to the many problems involved—the end that is to be looked for in the rounding out of our infantry.

Our drill book, like all others, contains requirements for training that may be classed under two different heads: first, that which is necessary to be learned with every attention to detail; and, second, that which forms the basis for developing the soldier in the practical application of principles and methods that lead into the sphere of active service. Under the first may be put all close-order drill, and under the second all other matters that tend to fit organizations for their work in campaign.

1. CLOSE-ORDER DRILL.

From an examination of the drill book it will be seen that of the one hundred and eighty-six pages devoted to the subject of infantry training, one hundred and thirty-four pages are assigned exclusively to the question of close-order drill and ceremonies.

No one doubts the necessity for thorough training in close order, for upon it rests the important matter of properly inculcating certain phases of discipline: the ready response to the will of the commander. But is there realized—from the amount of space devoted to the subject—a proper appreciation of the relative importance of such form of instruction in comparison