Williams: Why were the Mary Washington people eager to start a state A.A.U.P.?

Moss: I do not know for certain. The first we heard of the idea was a proposal that the faculties of state institutions should join together to influence state educational policy and appropriations. I do not believe that A.A.U.P. was mentioned at that time.

When this was discussed in the William and Mary faculty council I opposed it partly because I did not think the interests of William and Mary and those of a similar institution were close enough, and so we might find ourselves locked into a joint program not appropriate to our interests. There was a tendency to classify institutions, especially in regard to the level of state support -- the University of Virginia and V.P.I., being most favored, William and Mary next, sometimes being classed with V.M.I., then the former state teacher college among which was Mary Washington. It would have been a gain for Mary Washington to be identified with us, and this identification would have been a loss to William and Mary.

I also believed that joint faculty action in Virginia should be in the interests of higher education -- public and private. In this way we would be working for professional goals in general and not merely for gains in salary and appropriations. This would also eliminate the issue of places on the

(**- Question and answer no. 5 of additional questions to the original interview.)
rating scale since the organization would not be confined to state institutions.

The picture was changed when the national A.A.U.P. began to develop state organizations. This seemed to me more appropriate since the University of Virginia, V.P.I., and the University of Richmond were willing to go along.**

Williams: I know you were saying that the Mary Washington people may have been instrumental in starting this state chapter.

Moss: Yes, I know that they certainly had a leading role. I think that the conflict business with Chandler had strengthened the determination of faculties in Virginia generally to take a more aggressive position. I think that it had an impact -- what we did here had an impact over the state as a whole. There was another factor: that a State Council on Higher Education had been set up, so that the state was thinking more of the educational policy of the state as a whole rather than just of individual institutions. There was also a tendency for the state to exercise more control over higher education through the administrative devices. And one of the things we were running into was that the business officer at a particular institution would say, "Well, we will have to do this because the people in Richmond say so." And we began to compare notes, and the different business officers didn't always have the same version of what it was that Richmond demanded. So by swapping information we were able to put something of a check on this.

** See page 79
of the academic by the administrative. For example, at one institution they insisted that the sick leave arrangements that were provided in the administrative setup of the state should apply to the college faculty. We didn't do that ordinarily. One faculty member would take up the other faculty member's work and carry it on, and there wouldn't be any question of sick leave. This was not a part of the system, and the man who had read this into it misunderstood it. So this state's A.A.U.P. business, you know, could check into that and help the local chapter get it revised. (I may say incidentally that the State Personnel Act specifically excluded college faculty from administrative regulations of this kind.) For these various reasons we got interested in state organization, and with the help of the national organization and advice from other state organizations we developed one here in Virginia. Now the local chapter was very helpful in supporting this in the beginning; I don't think that they've been so active since. Now do you want to stop here or is there something you want to follow-up on this?

Williams: I want to ask you has this state organization supplemented, aided the A.A.U.P?

Moss: Oh yes. It has really been very important. The most important thing is that a state organization has been a signal to college administrations that there is something more here than your local chapter. There is something here more than just the national, which will intervene in a major crisis. It has also lobbied before the legislature, particularly on the matter of retirements,
so that the retirement system has been improved all along. The A.A.U.P. has argued for the Teacher's Insurance and Annuity arrangements. I wouldn't want to argue that they have done a tremendous job at lobbying, but they merely made their presence felt. On one issue of academic freedom, the speaker ban issue, I think they were very effective, so that in response to A.A.U.P. many state legislators said, "Well, we can't have this kind of thing in Virginia." It has raised the levels of the A.A. U.P. so that administrations knew they were dealing with something besides a local chapter.

February 26, 1975

Williams: As I just said, Dr. Moss, you had told me that in 1950 you went to England as a Fulbright professor, and then you returned in 1951. Did you find the very different college that Nelson Marshall had told you you would find?

Moss: Well, it wasn't Nelson Marshall that told me I would find a different college; it was Pomfret. I knew that something was going to happen because of the athletic business. Nelson Marshall brought this before a meeting of the chairmen of divisions (what was then a faculty council) and asked advice about pursuing it. He told us at that time that it had to do with the altering of grades, but he didn't go into very much about it. And
our attitude was (I think this was through the whole group) that this had to be pursued. There was no avoiding it. I think he was hesitant about pursuing it because he was dean and only newly dean, maybe for a year. This was in the baliwick of the athletic department and the baliwick of the registrar, and the president really ought to have been the person to step in and do something about this. Nelson Marshall was conceiving of his job as rather a large one in initiating this. Now I think he was right and told him he was right. This concerned the academic standards of the college, and as dean it was his responsibility. (By the way, he was then dean of the college. He was not dean of the arts and sciences, but dean of the college.) So I knew he was going to pursue that. I didn't know it would result in any great change in the administration. Then I was walking with Pomfret one day just before I left, and he told me at that time that it would be a different college when I returned, a different kind of college. And I should have taken this as more of a signal than I did. I assumed, why yes, the year was going to make a difference, though I didn't think it would do that. So I went off to England. And then I returned at the end of July 1951, and had known nothing of what had been going on, I attended a faculty meeting where some of the latest stages of the faculty participation developed, and also I became involved with the group that was drafting the "Manifesto." Now I had not had anything to do with the original drafting of
the "Manifesto" or the decision to do it. I think that Charlie McCurdy and Jimmy Fowler had much to do with that -- Mel Jones, too. So I participated in some of the discussions, and I did raise a question or so, particularly about the statement that the faculty accepted some responsibility for what had been done. And I said, "No, I had nothing to do with this. In fact, my whole attitude at the college has been one of condemning this kind of athletic corruption. Why should I sign a manifesto which says that we humbly apologize for having neglected to do what we should?" Well, Jimmy Fowler was a little impatient with this and said, "Are you going to sign it or are you not going to sign it?" I said, "I'm going to sign it, but I want it to be as good as it can be before we sign it. If this is what the rest of you insist on leaving in, okay, I'll sign." So there was no division, but I thought I should make the point that this was not something I wholeheartedly agreed with. But I certainly agreed with making the "Manifesto. Of course, it had a tremendous effect; there's no doubt about that. So that was the initial background. I suppose because of participation in that and participation in faculty discussions when the question came about the -- well, for one thing, I went to see Pomfret hoping to persuade him not to resign. He had already gone to California. I don't think it would have done any good. But at any rate, I was getting involved, you might say. I think this was perhaps why I was chosen to be on this committee to talk to the board, to look for a new president. There was a rather
difficult situation. You have already heard that Bemiss had been asked by Shewmake to round up some faculty members, bring them to Richmond (this included Bill Guy, Jim Miller, and a few others). At any rate the faculty felt very angry that the business manager, who was non-academic, had been asked just to pick up some faculty members in a car and bring them up to confer with him. We thought that it was our right to be consulted and that we would choose our own representatives. Also it was clear that something funny was going on that didn't seem to make sense. We were not satisfied with the results of what was happening. We didn't know what they were, but we were uncertain. Therefore we chose a committee to confer with the board. Now I have several lists that I found in my memorandum at that time. I don't know which was exactly the list of members. I know that Douglas Adair and Phalen and Taylor and I were on it and apparently Lambert was, too. I can see that the faculty might have chosen him. So it was a longer list. Then we knew or perhaps we had been told that all the members could not appear, that the board would hear only three of us, or maybe we thought that three was best to send, and so there was the choice made. It was an even division in which Phalen was one candidate and I was the other for chairman. I cast my vote for Phalen, so that Phalen was the one who was elected. I did not know, though I certainly should have, some of this background. I sensed that there was something -- why should Phalen be chosen?
I felt that this was a factional business. If I had voted for myself I would have been chosen. I didn't want to have a dissatisfied faction. I felt that I could give support to Phalen and that maybe Phalen couldn't give support to me. That was the main reason. (I think ordinarily I would be inclined to vote for the other fellow. This is sort of a rule of courtesy.) Now the thing that I should have known which was the background for this (I've been told this since); that Phalen was Pomfret's candidate for dean at the time that Sharvy Umbeck was chosen, and I expect that he was Miller's candidate and Fowler's candidate. This had never occurred to me because Phalen never impressed me as a man who had the stature of dean. He was a nice fellow, but he was lacking in aggression, and I thought probably was sound on the issues that I was interested in, but I couldn't see him as a man commanding enthusiastic support through the faculty.

Williams: You said he was Sharvy Umbeck's and Dean Fowler's ...

Moss: I think the contest was between Sharvy Umbeck, who was liked by some members of the board, and Phalen, who was the nominee of Pomfret and who I think was liked by Fowler and Miller because, lacking much aggression, he was inclined to fit in what they wanted to do.

Williams: But this was not generally known among the faculty at the time?

Moss: No, and I didn't know it. But I have been told since that this was Pomfret's downfall because when the board refused to accept
his nominee for dean, this meant that his days were numbered. Now frankly, I don't see why he should have accepted Phalen. Some people said that Pomfret was lazy. I guessed this: that he was inclined to dismiss things too casually. He wouldn't wrestle with the problem, and he wouldn't have any anxiety about it and try to fight it through. I felt that the naming of Marsh for the Marshall-Wythe acting deanship might have been an accident. In other words, Taylor brought Marsh's name and Pomfret didn't think very much about it. "Yes, okay," and didn't realize that he was stepping into any kind of problem. I think this is probably the same in the case of Phalen. Some people said that he didn't wrestle with the budget enough, that if he would insist on understanding it before he let Charlie Duke take it to the legislature it might have been a little different. I think this was possible; this was true. I don't think that it goes so far as to question earnestness about his motives, No, not that. But I do think he probably was too casual about things that were critically important.

Williams: Would you say that he was willing to delegate authority to others?

Moss: He let situations take care of themselves. He had, I think, a Quaker background, and I think he had a general attitude that things weren't worth fighting about. If you had to really draw blood it was doubtful whether it was worth fighting about it. And of course, his retirement, his resignation was of this sort. He didn't question anybody. He didn't challenge anybody. He didn't say "No, I won't resign," or anything like that. He got
himself another job, picked up his bags, and left. And while I have heard that he has made comments about what happened, certainly he hasn't attempted to write or otherwise try to justify his position or anything like that. He didn't like a fight. So here was this background that I wasn't fully aware of.

Now I think -- in fact I know -- that the whole committee met and discussed the question of the presidency. I do not recall that the whole committee met just before we went in to the board. I do remember sitting down and talking about it. Maybe I'd better point out another thing, too. This is partly as a result of things that I've heard later. It was evident that something was wrong about this presidential choice. Then I got a tremendous shock. In a faculty meeting (I believe this was not the faculty meeting just before the president's choice, I believe it was a later one in which we were trying to find out what happened), Shewmake sent to the faculty, or made public, a letter which Miller had written to him which concluded that Miller had always greatly admired Shewmake. We thought Shewmake was a contemptible pup, and how Miller could say this, we couldn't understand. I thought Jim Miller had just sold his soul. Looking back on it now and putting things together, I think that what happened was that Miller imagined that it would be some time before the board could possibly find a president, that this had been a sudden event. We were taken by surprise; we were unprepared with a candidate. When
they named him acting president, then it would probably be a year or so, and they would decide that they couldn't do any better, and they would choose Mr. Miller as president. Now I think that his wife, who was rather ambitious and a vigorous, determined person, I think that she was much of the motive force behind this, I believe. I was told there was a social occasion of the Faculty Women's Club, and lo and behold, things were different from ever before. Mrs. Miller had charge of it. She dressed up the maids in uniforms and all of this. This was a new era. Well, now an acting president doesn't exactly establish a new era. And also they moved into the President's House, or at any rate they were using the President's House for entertainment and had already embarked on a social program. It was quite clear that he was going to fill the role fully and spectacularly. I think this meant that he was anticipating that he would be chosen. This was not a game that was played directly and squarely; it was something that was being managed. I think that we sensed something of that sort.

Now to return (because this was really important to say this before): the board didn't like what was happening. They thought Miller was going too far. I say this; no one told me this, but it seemed to me this was the attitude.

(Reading this over Oct. 9, 1976, it seems rather hard on Miller and really represents my perception and speculation at the time rather than a report of the facts that I knew first-hand. But in that perspective what I have said has a place in any account of the events.

In the absence of real comprehension of the situation rumors were flying about, such as that Nelson
Marshall was ambitious for the presidency. The rumors were often circulated by people who were angry and suspicious. The disturbance arising from athletic corruption, the accusation of McCormy, and the resignation of Fonfret was aggravated by the faculty manifesto on athletics, which received widespread and favorable publicity. I think it frightened the board and many other persons. It was the introduction of a powerful factor which board members and their partisans had never contemplated and which they were unable to deal with.

After that manifesto any faculty-based action assumed threatening dimensions. Miller may have done only what, as he saw it, the situation demanded. But every action in every quarter was given a symbolic value beyond its real significance.

When we went in to see the board Shewmake introduced us as being the same group with which he had been in touch up to that point. Now that was a lie. (With Phalen present on the committee as chairman, he may be said to have had some ground.)

Williams: Why do you think he said that?

Moss: Well, he obviously was a little upset and nervous. I think he knew what they were going to do and his was a ticklish situation. I think in something of a feeling of irritation he was trying to eliminate the question of there being faculty dissent about anything or the faculty taking an independent line. I think he was touchy about that. And he probably said more than he intended to say. I think he wanted to casually dismiss it by saying, "Well, gentlemen, members of the board, these are members of the faculty who, in line with what we have been doing and consulting the faculty, have come in to consult with the board." He might have said that. I think he meant to say that. But with poor judgement he called us the same group. There-

*** Insert by the Author at a later date - see above
fore the animosities that might have been aimed at the earlier steps of the faculty were aimed at us.

Williams: This was you, Taylor, and Phalen?

Moss: Yes. Now, I was tempted to immediately say, "Oh, but Mr. Rector, we are a different group. We were chosen by the faculty because they didn't like what had gone on before." I did not do this for two reasons: one was because Phalen was chairman of the committee and responsibility for initiative was primarily his. In view of what we now know he wouldn't have said anything about it because he was with this faction. Then the second reason was that I didn't think it best to inaugurate our discussion with the board by talking about an issue which might be a subordinate issue, you see. Well, I don't recall the whole of the discussion. I don't think we were with the board for very long. It was obvious that they wanted us in and out. But I do remember two things in which I was concerned: one was that they said, "Well, we are interested in these qualifications. Of course, they're the qualifications that any good president would have. But do you think we can find a man like that? Are there people?" And I immediately said, "Well, there's Grayson Kirk at Columbia whom I think would be just right." And Shewmake or somebody else on the board (I think it was Shewmake) said, "Well, don't you suppose that Columbia has some need for Mr. Kirk?" Granted that they probably did; of
course he became president of Columbia. Another name that may have been mentioned, though I'm not sure — certainly faculty people thought he was the best candidate — was Calkins. But we also understood that he wouldn't accept it. He had just accepted something new, anyhow. Then the other thing was that I was impelled, but I did not do it — I restrained myself — to say that there were two kinds of persons we did not want. One was anybody who had a close connection with the former Chandler administration, who would be a throwback to that. And the other was that we didn't want any retired military man who was looking around for a college presidency, because at that time not only Eisenhower but Clark and two or three others were getting college presidencies. That was the way out of the army at the end of the war, you see. Well, of course what we got was exactly that. If I said it, I think that it might have caused some question right away. And some board members would have been very much disturbed about it. I'm sure that John Garland Pollard would have. And he refrained from voting on the Chandler elec-
tion. I think that he would have been more concerned and that some of the others would have. I doubt if it would have defeated Chandler because I think he had it made in the board.

Williams: Why did you feel that these two types should be excluded?

Moss: Well, as to the military man, there's no question. The whole academic profession was disgusted with this kind of trend, and it was evident in the case of several of them that they were
not the proper people. On the matter of going back to the Chandler regime, my thought was that in the first place there weren't any good people identified with that Chandler regime, such as Combs. In the second place it would have been a signal that we were returning to an era which I think had its day and which was not too good in retrospect and that it would immediately intensify this cleavage over the issues that we've talked about before.

Williams: Can you see these issues that we've talked about before having direct bearing on the Pomfret resignation and the selection of A. D. Chandler? Do you think this was a throwback?

Moss: Yes, I do; in the minds of some, at least. For example, Shewmake was a man who had always felt himself very closely identified with the college. He had not only been a student, but he had been a faculty member. He was an alumnus. He had had much to do with initiating what became the Marshall-Wythe School. He had written poetry about the college, sentimental poetry. And the college meant a lot to him, and the Chandler regime meant a lot. Now Chandler was a man who had great defenders. He was in trouble the last years of his life.

Williams: J. A. C.

Moss: Yes, and he had been criticized for many things, but there were men all around who rushed to his defense and said, "Well, he is the finest man we could possibly have. He's done more for the college than anybody else." And these people were just as
blind in their support as the critics were with their criticisms. To revive the Chandler regime was to intensify this conflict. Now I think that members of the board felt there was a golden age of William and Mary; it was the age of Chandler when we grew from a college of three hundred students to a college of eighteen hundred or something like that, you see. "Look at how we've expanded, what we've done. He rescued the college from oblivion, what we need now is someone who'll do it again." And then, too, I think another factor was the apparent crisis. From the standpoint of the faculty there was no crisis within the college. We were functioning satisfactorily, students in classes, everything going along quite smoothly. But to hear board members talk you would have thought that the whole college was in confusion over the crisis and that it needed the hand of a strong man. And what is better than a military man? Of course, that was one reason why we didn't think that such a man was needed. And then, there were some damn fool alumni, for example, here in town who supported the athletic program who were saying, "What those faculty members need is somebody to come in there and give them the treatment they deserve," which of course intensified feelings. So that was the kind of setting it was.

You've never asked me very much about Rube McCray, but Rube McCray was a man who had some friends among the alumni who had been loyal to him even in the time when it was clear that there had been dishonesty in the athletic office. It's strange the
way these fellows rally behind men who were not personally scoundrels. I was fond of Rube McCray in my personal relationships with him, and particularly Hester McCray, his wife, was very much liked in the community. But sometimes very nice men get involved in something of this sort. I think he became involved in it because the winning team was demanded, and under the postwar conditions in which the college found itself, the only way they could have such a team was by getting in men who were not qualified for the academic program. And it was just his push to the wall that did this. I think J. A. C. Chandler, for example, was no scoundrel; he never made any money himself. I'm not as generous about Charlie Duke. I think that his habits were on the lower plane and that he didn't know the difference between -- well, I hesitate to say his private property and the college's private property, but I think he was in the habit of thinking that the college car was at his disposal to take the children to school and that if there was a nice azalea bush somewhere that he thought he might like and could do just as well at his house (which was the college's house anyhow) then... . I think this was a lower level of morality, but I don't think he was -- he didn't make a fortune out of his association with the college. On the other hand, they had a man who was the head of buildings and grounds who I think carried this a lot further. Williams: When the faculty committee appeared before the board, at that time and previous to that had you been led to believe that you
would have some influence on the choice of a new president of William and Mary?

Moss: We believed that we would. Now we were uneasy about this. We hadn't had the kind of convincing evidence that we really wanted. And after the meeting with the board we went out and sat under the trees there in the Wren Yard, and we talked about it and felt that there was something that was wrong. But just what it was we didn't know. Now I may say about all of this there is a report written by a committee -- I think I was chairman of the committee -- which announced to the faculty what we thought had happened. It's our account at that time. I haven't read that report again. I'm not sure whether I would revise it in any way. But I think it was a pretty good, straight report. Now I may say that that report was read in Chandler's presence in the faculty meeting, and this was a rather dramatic kind of thing. He stood and took it. I'm sure it must have been a very uncomfortable time for him. By the way, the president never said it -- and I can understand he wouldn't-- he never said anything to disagree with that report or to give us any kind of reassurance of what had taken place in the board, nor did any member of the board.

Williams: They just ignored ...

Moss: Yess, I can see how they would. It might have helped some if there was something they could have said. But what could they say?

Williams: Chandler's presidency was then a fait accompli.
Moss: Yes. Now it was a fait accompli, and the first reaction of course, was one of considerable indignation, and threats of resignation, which I felt were perhaps intended at the moment. But you know when faculty members go back home for supper after a faculty meeting and tell their wives what went on at the meeting, why the wife always says, "Well, now, John, you stay out of this. Just remember we've got a couple of children here. We have a mortgage on this house. It's all right for you to say what you think, but don't do anything that's foolish." So even though some brave words were spoken about resignation, I think that it lacked just that degree -- if there were to be resignations which would result in excluding Chandler from the presidency they had to be overwhelming. If 80% of the faculty had resigned Chandler wouldn't have stayed. But once they had let that pass and there were no immediate resignations, that particular play in the game was out.

Williams: This was never a really serious possibility?

Moss: I don't think it was.

Williams: Considered?

Moss: Yes. It was feeling. Well, at that meeting we found our way out by a formula in which we had a resolution which said that our objection was to the manner of selection of Chandler and not the man. Well, this was a little bit of rhetoric. I think that people did have the feeling, "Well, it might be interesting. What is this man like? We don't know him yet. Let's see
what he's like." And I think it was true: it was the way that things had been done that made them feel most deeply.

I think it was the first morning he was in his office I went in to see him. It was a very agreeable conversation. The principal thing which I said was that no president of the college had ever championed before the legislature and the state the idea of the kind of liberal arts college that we felt we had. I didn't refer to Bryan and Pomfret, but I was essentially saying that they had filled the office of president and had agreed with these policies, but they had never gone out and sold them. You see, they had left things to Charlie Duke. Charlie Duke wasn't going to sell anything of this sort. He wasn't going to sell anything that was hard to sell. He wasn't going to ask anything from the legislature for which he would have to give anything in return. Well, so I told him, I said, "The college has never had its position really championed."
Well, he didn't say yes he would or that he wouldn't, but he did assure me that he had an appreciation for the liberal arts point of view. And I think that perhaps he did at that moment. And I think there was even some hope that this man whose background included nothing of the liberal arts -- Naval Academy, military service, a father who had not been exactly a liberal arts president -- I think there was some possibility that such a man would feel that he had to move further than anybody else to become a good liberal arts college president, that he had to step out a little bit to reassure people about the liberal
arts and to champion it. Well, it didn't work out that way. I think that conceivably if he had found a little more acceptance in the faculty, he might have possibly felt this. But he was so soon on the defensive. I think it was his own insecurity, primarily, but the faculty didn't give him security in a hurry. Later on they wouldn't give it to him at all. This is a possibility, and yet it was a less than even chance. I think that maybe one of the mistakes was that he in his insecurity turned to the reading of his father's correspondence and his father's record at the college, was looking for cues as to what he should do. He turned to his father's appointees on the faculty, and I think that was the end of the game as far as his decisions were concerned.

Williams: In this whole business of the "Faculty Manifesto" the faculty consultation on the election of the president, and the faculty protest to the manner in which the president was selected, the faculty was accused by the Board of Visitors of overstepping its role. How would you have answered that and how would you answer that now?

Moss: Well, essentially I did answer it, and the answer is the same today: this was the role of the faculty. It did not overstep its role. The Board of Visitors was made up of men who did not understand this. They didn't know. They had had almost no contact with the faculty. Many of them were unwilling to because for one thing, they were uncomfortable with the faculty. There
was a cleavage in Virginia between some of these political people and people like those on a faculty. The faculty people are more cosmopolitan; they are better educated. The politicians tend to be local and provincial, and the kind of education they had was fifty years earlier. Well, I won't go into all of that. I did in one talk I gave on this, and it was published. But this cleavage -- and they didn't understand. Moreover, the faculty during the period of Bryan and Pomfret had flourished as an effective participant in the affairs of the college. It had done very well, as I think I told you in our first interview. Really even in the early Chandler regime there had been faculty participation. All of this had been a development that had flourished. The faculty members who were taking the lead in things were a responsible, capable group. They were relatively young in a sense, and yet they were men of experience and seniority in the college. Also the movement toward a more active participation of the faculty in college government was developing all over the country. It was a natural development at the time. There is a whole long story here. But I think that William and Mary was somewhat in the vanguard, but the faculty was not exceeding its authority. Now of course, where the Board of Visitors was touchy on the matter of authority was that they had been playing football -- this had been their game. Something had gone wrong, and the faculty had raised hell about it, so that in terms of the immediate situation,
yes the faculty was stepping in and dealing with something the
board thought was their province to deal with. I think, too,
that there were some ways in which the faculty didn't really
exceed its bounds because all it ever did was to take advisory
action. But it had provided a political base for a change in
direction in the college, such as the two presidents, Bryan
and Pomfret, represented. Bryan and Pomfret had faculty sup-
port. I don't know whether they ever said this to the board,
but they were in a position to say to the board, "Well gentle-
men, this is what you want to do, but I can assure you that the
faculty just won't take it." Well now, to tell the board that
is to say the faculty is having its say. So I can see why
they said it, but I wouldn't for one minute agree that they
were right (that the faculty had exceeded its proper role). I
think I'd say, "Show me. Where was this? What did they do?"
All the board could do is say, "They passed resolutions or
they insisted on having some say about athletic policy." The
rules of the Southern Conference required that there be facul-
ty control of athletic policy. Now the reality isn't that. The
reality is in most places -- at least it was at that time --
that some favorably inclined faculty members were selected by
the president to serve as silent members of a committee on ath-
letics. But at a place like William and Mary the athletics did
intrude on the academic program, and that's the ground on which
the faculty acted.
Williams: The board, though, did accuse the faculty of this. That's why I asked. Do you think that the athletic situation was the only grounds they could have used to accuse the faculty of overstepping their authority, or had this been a growing cleavage between the board and faculty?

Moss: I think they felt very definitely that the choice of the president was the prerogative of the board. I once heard Mr. Bryan say, though I don't know if he meant it very seriously, that the only business that the board had was to choose a president, and then go home and let the president run the college. But at any rate, the choice of the president was their privilege, as they saw it. There is another privilege on which they were relatively sticky, and that is honorary degrees. Now the faculty's position was that honorary degrees were ordinarily a disgrace to a college, especially when they were given to local politicians, and the faculty tended to challenge these degrees. The board persisted in its view. It is the rector who at commencement awards the honorary degrees. Then the faculty became very much interested in the financial affairs of the college because in the long run, this whole athletic program depended on finances. For example, during one year I was told that the funds that had been set aside for a library were withdrawn from the library and were used to purchase coal. Now I grant that an administration in a crisis might possibly have to make a decision like this. But nothing was said to the faculty about this. The faculty didn't have any chance to say, "Well, maybe there is
an alternative. Maybe we'll each take the 5% reduction of next month's salary in order to maintain the funds for the library."

No, it was just, "There are some funds. We'll take them and use them this way." The question of scholarships, the question of faculty salaries -- all of this really required the faculty to at least understand what was happening financially. Now here is a way in which Jimmy Fowler played a particular part -- I say Jimmy Fowler. He is the person who was hard-driving about this, capable, and didn't leave things to run loose. He and some others insisted, "Yes, we should know what is in this budget."

Williams:

Moss: You're talking about when he was dean of the faculty?

Moss: No, no, this was as a faculty member. I am speaking of him as -- this is typical of him. Later on he was much more specific about this. He and some others felt they knew as much about the budget, should know as much about it, as Charlie Duke. Incidentally, we didn't feel that any of the top echelon administrators were so good that we could leave the college to their kind attentions. This may have been a little presumptuous on our part, but they weren't so conspicuously good that we were obviously out of order.

Williams: In other words, you felt that the faculty role concerned anything having to do with the college?

Moss: Yes, I would say that we had the responsibility of at least passing resolutions on anything that had to do with the college. Now of course, when the faculty was thoroughly united
these resolutions had a considerable force. And also faculty members were vocal, effective -- more so than the individual board members or administrators. For example, at the time of the Rome issue, students were writing letters to the papers -- great numbers of them. Every day there were a couple of letters coming in. And the editor of the News Leader said he couldn't understand it: these must be damn well-educated students at William and Mary to be able to write letters like that. Well, I don't know, but I have a suspicion that many of these letters got reviewed by members of the faculty, at least if the grammar was correct or something like that. Maybe this was a good education for the students. But at any rate when it came to any political activity that was verbal and which required analysis and so on, faculty members were much more capable at this than their opponents -- the board members. So the members of the board and Chandler had reason to really be concerned about the scope of this power that the faculty could exercise. This would disturb people who -- for one thing board members are part-time, and they put in all this time thinking about these questions, questions which are of primary importance to the faculty are of secondary importance to the individual members of the board.

Williams: So did Chandler try to -- shall I say -- do anything about this faculty power?

Moss: Yes. The first thing that he did was to rely very heavily on
people who were his own appointees or his father's appointees. And this appeared in the first instance to be a recognition of some people who had been treated rather badly in the Pomfret-Miller regime. For example, Glenwood Clark was made the head of the department of English. Well, there were other men who I think might have been more effective department heads, but Glenwood Clark had been here in his father's day and knew what it was to answer a Chandler, you see. There were several appointments like that. Then there were some truly foul appointments. One of them, a man named King, was made head of the department of business administration, and none of us had very much respect for him. He was given the highest salary of any faculty member in the college. This we found out, and it was a shock.

Williams: Why?

Moss: Because the president could rely on him, you see. Now another man, who was named Farrar, was dean of men, and this is one of the most scandalous things in the history of the college in this period. I don't know where Farrar came from, but he was recruited by Chandler or in the Chandler administration. (I could never understand how "CF" Lambert could have tolerated Farrar's appointment, but he did.) And Farrar was a man who boasted that he had collected on his tape recorder all kinds of conversations in his office, that he had all kinds of information about different people: students, faculty members, and so on. Sometimes he would tell this, always suggesting that
there was more and juicier and that essentially nobody really dared to fool him because he had the goods on everybody. You get the kind of man? I made the mistake of listening to him. I think I should have just told him the first time he came near me, "Hey mister, I don't want anything to do with you. Get out!" But he had a good deal of information, and he was ready to spill this. I accepted it as information. I didn't credit it very highly. Then I finally caught on to what was going on. He asked to see me at a place down Route 60 here. He had some kind of excuse about -- it being better to have a meeting down there, and I told him I would meet him down there. So I did. I was a little suspicious. Then he wanted to meet me in his car. He said, "I'd rather not meet you at the office, but meet you at the car." So I did. It was in the evening. We drove out to the Matoaka Lake parking lot. And here another car was there which turned its lights on us. It was to the point of rudeness, you might say, but something was going on. And I think that what he was trying to do was to show to some student leader or somebody else that I was in the car with him and that he and I were buddies and so on. Well, of course this finished him as far as I was concerned. But later on when I talked to Judge Hooker up at the State Corporation Commission, he asked me about Farrar. He said, "What about this fellow, Farrar? What's he got to do with all this going on down at the college?" And I said, "Well, he's a pretty bad character." But
I said, "I haven't seen him betray us yet," which suggested that I expected him to. But I was sorry for having had anything to do with him. I couldn't understand how he stayed here as long as he had. Mr. Bryan would have fired him within three months. Mr. Pomfret would have gotten him out inside of three months, I'm sure. Now what Chandler was doing in this, I don't know.

Williams: Did he know about his covert operations?

Moss: I expect he knew something about them. I think that maybe his main reason for keeping him was that he felt he could manage the student situation, that student unrest was very serious, but it took a scoundrel like this to manage it. I think that may have been the reason. I have heard that the fellow went on down to Texas and had set himself up in some sort of business that was a fraud and finally went to the penitentiary. Where did we get him from? But Chandler was willing to go along with that and go along with this Al King. Of course, I suppose you could say that if he had -- if some of the faculty members had been willing to work with him this wouldn't have happened. He would have relied on them.... And he did rely on some faculty members who were not greatly esteemed by other faculty. He relied on Tony Sancetta, for example. Tony Sancetta was a nice guy in many ways, still was inclined to work with the president as he had worked with any president. And one of the things that he did for Chandler was to get Chandler some Italian military
order and so on. That kind of thing was going on.

Williams: Back a few minutes ago when you were talking about the finances, and you had spoken of a man in buildings and grounds. Right after the college had gone through this athletic business, had gone through this selection of a president controversy, then it was hit again with the lodge controversy, which I assume you were referring to here. What was the problem here?

Moss: It's a general practice among people who are stewards or people in that kind of job to pick off a little for themselves. It's so general that they don't often think of it as being wrong. It gets wrong when it becomes a system and is on a large scale. I think that he was in the habit of taking property that wasn't his, that belonged to the college, appropriating it, and then using it somewhere. I was told of a number of these instances before the fraternity lodge business. But there seemed to be some discrepancy between the number of bricks actually used in the lodges and the number of bricks that were bought. Two houses were being built at the other end of town using exactly the same bricks and in about the same quantity as the missing bricks.

Williams: By the same man?

Moss: By the same man. Well, I don't know what was ever proved. The legislature got interested in this, so that Whitehead, who was being asked to investigate the college (he was chairman of the Committee on Education) waved these clippings in Chandler's face and said, "How do you explain this?" Well, this man
in charge of buildings and grounds left. I don't know what became of him. I think he had some motels up the highway or something, but he left. On the fraternity lodges, I don't suppose the college made any recovery of anything. Probably it was better just to let the man go, but it was embarassing to the administration. Now this was Charlie Duke's baliwick. I should say that at that time (I'm not sure just exactly when, but during all of this) there was one day when Charlie Duke met me in the hall and he shook his finger at me and said, "There's never one thing I will stand for and that is having anybody around this college charge me with having done anything that was dishonest and corrupt." I thought he was a little too excited for the situation. I just mentioned that I was startled at the extravagancy of his remarks about it, and I think it was while this was going on. But it was under his supervision you see. He was the man who had to answer for the conduct of his subordinates. He should have known what was going on; he should have known what was happening to these bricks. I would not have asked him to go out there and count them as one of the newspaper men evidently did, but I think he should have been going over the -- it was a failure in the auditing, that's all.

Williams:

We had talked very briefly last time and have touched on it here today about faculty relations in the '50s under Chandler. It was charged by the students in '55 that this was the "U.S.S. William and Mary," that Chandler was turning William and Mary
into a battleground. Was this true?

Moss: Yes. Those are vague phrases. There's no doubt William and Mary was a battleground at that time. I would say that there was a tendency for some people to think that the student grievances and faculty grievances were all the same. Well, this is not true. For example, I knew very little of what was going on with the students. Chandler was something of a puritan, or he was keenly sensitive to the puritanical attitude in the state -- I think maybe both. For example, there had been drinking in the Chandler family; this may have affected his own feelings about it. But he didn't want any liquor served at the college on any college occasion. When I offered him a glass of sherry at my house one day he was hesitant, sort of looked at his wife, and then went ahead and accepted it. He was touchy on this. He was touchy on problems of sex among students, for example. Now mind you that this is also the period when the veterans are back, men who had been standing on their own feet and haven't been listening to too many instructions about behavior. They weren't going to take it. Now there was a great deal of beer drinking, and Chandler insisted on applying strictly a state regulation which elsewhere was overlooked. But he was incensed that when he went around the campus that he found beer cans thrown around and found the fraternity lodges were in disorder. He was hearing stories about how girls had been misbehaving with boys in the college. Maybe there were -- in fact I'm sure there were --
some instances of this. But other administrations had said, "this is what happens with students of this age in college. You know there is a certain percentage of this going on." But Chandler was scrupulous about this. It must not be. So this inevitably drove the students into a spirit of rebellion. And then when he attempted to deal with this he created distrust because he wasn't sensitive to it intuitively. He didn't know how to deal with people of this type in an academic institution. He might have known how to deal with them on shipboard, but you see, he wasn't on shipboard. Of course, one of the dramatic things with the students was when Hodding Carter talked at the Marshall-Wythe Symposium, and he opened his talk by addressing the students, "Shipmates." They roared. (That, by the way, is another thing to talk about, too, but not at this point.) The students had their own set of grievances, and he decidedly mishandled it, as he did also the faculty grievances. He just didn't know how to do it, and he didn't have any good advice. He couldn't get advice on this kind of thing from a man like Farrar, or if Farrar gave him advice the students would regard this as being wrong, anyhow.

Williams: Did the faculty pretty much stay out of this 1955 protest?

You said they weren't ...

Moss: Well, the faculty, of course, was associated with it in some ways. The students talked to us about it. I won't say that we advised them as to particular things that they were to do, but
we gave them a sympathetic ear. They would say, "Look at this man, Chandler what he's done about this". And we'd say, "Yes, we understand because this is what he does about our things." But at the same time the faculty had been very sensitive about not letting students get entangled in faculty affairs. And when there was any suggestion that there be a kind of alliance--I don't know that any was ever really made -- any intimation that there should be an association here, the faculty's attitude was automatically, "No, we're not having students step into our affairs." I think that there were some times when individual faculty members may have gone a little too far in encouraging students, in talking with them, but not so far as some of the faculty members did during the more recent student unrest, when some faculty members were identified with the students. But give the students credit for having been able to manage their own affairs. They didn't need any faculty advice. I do suspect that some of those letters during the Rome business may have been carefully gone over, but I don't believe that anybody ever said to the students, "Now, you go, and you write the letter, and you write this, and maybe this is a good thing for you to say." I don't think there was anything like that. I do recall that at one time in 1955 Jim Miller made some kind of a general appeal, I think chiefly to alumni or to friends, that now was the time to bring all the pressure you could bear. Have you run across that? I think he did that in
'55 at the time that he resigned.

Williams: And this was at the same time that some of the Richmond newspapers were calling on Chandler to resign, and I think there was a proposal in the General Assembly to investigate William and Mary.

Moss: Oh yes. Things had really reached a boiling point in '55. I went over some of my notes, you might say my calendar, during '51, '52, and '53, and I was amazed at how many critical things had taken place in close succession in those early years. And then there was something of a hiatus until the thing broke more in '55. I don't remember the sequence of events. I'm not chronologically organized on this, but it seems to me there was a period between with a good deal of intense conflict in '52 and the later thing in '55.

Williams: And the conflicts in '52 would have concerned what?

Moss: Well, I had my personal conflicts with him in '52. It started out-- I can't be too sure just what the sequence was, but I believe the first -- well, this was in November. Yes, I remember, it was in November. The president made a speech before the American Legion in which he said that it was the business of the college to find out what the American foreign policy was and then to teach and advocate this. This was, as a matter of fact, only the tail end of his address, but this is what the newspapers picked out, and so here was the glaring headline (it wasn't on the front page, but it was picked out) that the presi-
dent says that the business of the college is to support the foreign policy of the United States. Well, I'm very touchy on matters of academic freedom. I have been involved in questions of this sort. This was while the McCarthy thing and other things of that sort were going on, so I went in to see the president, and he reassured me that he hadn't meant that. I wrote a letter to the News Leader in which I said that this was a wrong point of view. The department of government at the college teaching foreign policy did its own work to find out what foreign policy ought to be and taught what it was convinced was right and did not follow from what the Department of State said. The editor picked this up right away, and he said, "Say it again, Admiral." He said, "Just suppose that during the period of the Truman Administration when the News Leader didn't like the foreign policy, that the college had been supporting that foreign policy?" Well, this was embarrassing to the president, and he told me so. He felt badly about it. Then a series of things of that kind happened. For example, his intentions about academic freedom may have been all right, but he didn't know how to interpret it in the situation. Another appeared when I suddenly received a memorandum from him saying, "Accompanying this is a book by Mr. Flynn." It was a book on American foreign policy in China called While We Slept, and this book was an attack on the China policy of the Truman administration. It was
McCarthyite in its orientation, though not quite as bad as McCarthy. He said, "Please tell me which of these are used in the courses as texts, which are supplementary reading, and which are in the library." Well, I wrote back and I said, "As to the books in the library, ask Mr. Harkins; he's the librarian. None of these books, it so happens, is used as a text, and none of these is used as supplementary reading in any course we have this semester." And then I added, "It is a serious question about a memorandum such as this because of the invasion of academic freedom." Well, he called in Marsh and Miller and said, "What does this fellow Moss mean? What is the matter with it? What is going on here? Why should he object to this? I just wrote a note on what he's doing. Can't I know what a member of the faculty is doing in his classes? Why can't I know about this?" Well, part of my sensitivity about it was due to my belief that he had been given this by someone who, you might say, was making mischief or perhaps was merely talking to the Admiral in conversation and said, "Well, I think you should know what's going on in your college. Maybe they're doing this, may be they're not". There were other situations of that same kind. He sent me something else on China policy. I wrote him a memorandum back on it because he was quite mistaken in the position that he had taken. Let me say that during the war, I was with O.S.S. in China and the Far East, so that
this made a little more difference to me than somebody else. I was very much concerned about the McCarthy business because people whom I really admired were being driven out of the State Department, and I knew what some of the inside was. I was more touchy on it than somebody else might have been. But he really didn't know what kind of a problem it was. And one of the members of the board was Robertson, who was assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs, I believe under Eisenhower. At any rate, I think that Robertson may have had some connection with that. And then there was a case where I made a talk down in Norfolk to the Rotary Clubs -- maybe this was earlier. I made two talks in Norfolk which attracted -- they didn't attract any newspaper attention -- but they did attract attention from some persons who might have been alumni of the college or friends of his. I know of some military people at one of these talks (where it was a public meeting) over the question of the use of the atomic bomb and things of this sort. I argued that the methods of psychological warfare which I knew because of my O.S.S. experience would be damaging to the United States as well as damaging to an enemy that when you got involved in this kind of thing you created a series of problems. And I know that there were people from the Armed Services Staff College and so on in Norfolk who were there and who were aware of the fact that I was at William and Mary and had made these statements. None of the statements were ones that you could really quarrel
with. But I think that this came on back up to Chandler. He talked to me about it. That may have been at some other talk, but I remember his telling me that this was unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the college. And on another occasion he talked to me. I found on my calendar that the president had said that it might be time for me to consider the nature of my career and how my present way of doing things fitted in with my interests and my career. I don't think he made it much stronger than that.

I remember one night -- I think it was New Year's Eve -- that we were both at a party at Mrs. Blow's down at Yorktown. It seemed to me the whole evening that Chandler was just sort of looking at me, watching me all the time. I couldn't understand his intense curiosity. It was as though I was some kind of animal that needed close inspection. I couldn't understand that. Well, he was a strange character, as I'm sure you've found out, though not without a sense of humor. One day I went in -- and I had put on a suit that I liked very much but which was going to pieces. I suddenly discovered just before I went in that the seat of the pants had worn out. Well, I went in, and we talked and so on. As I went out the door I sort of glanced back at him, and I saw him grinning and I thought, "Ah, he's smiling about the hole in the seat of my pants." Well, I think he had a kind of a sense of humor of that sort. He could feel the intensely bitter -- they called him "the pickled beet"
in the navy. He could be pretty sour.

Williams: At the time of these student protests you said there was a call for the opponents to rise (maybe that's put too strongly). Was there a chance that Chandler could have lost his job in '55? Do you think there was a realistic possibility of that?

Moss: Oh, I didn't. And one day he told me: -- he said, "Let me give you to understand very plainly: I'm not going to leave this job until I have left William and Mary in a better condition than it was when I came here." He said, "I'm going to stay here and finish my job." And I was convinced that he meant that. I didn't have any doubts about that. I also felt that relying on political pressure to get him out, that is in any dramatic way, was a great mistake. He wasn't going to get out himself, unlike Pomfret. He wouldn't pack his bags and go. He'd fight.

Williams: It would have split the college, would it not?

Moss: Oh, I don't think so.

Williams: It would have caused a very unpleasant situation.

Moss: In the total community and including alumni, yes. But the State organization in Virginia doesn't do things like that. It rarely does anything as dramatically as that. They'd want to know where they were coming out. What do we have to replace Chandler? What happens? Now what did happen was, I think, that after that 1955 business Chandler was doomed. He might stay out his time, but he was off-balance. His hands were tied about many things,
and so on. He had lost confidence so generally that he couldn't be a very effective president. Then a series of steps was taken. What did happen was that I believe the -- well in the first place Governor Stanley told members of the board -- I've been told this -- that either things were going to be straightened out down there or there was going to be a new board. And the board did make an effort. The board set up a committee, of which Simpkins was the chairman, to look into the whole business. And when I saw the announcement of this in the paper, I wrote to Simpkins and told him that in view of the terms of reference of his committee that I thought it appropriate that I should talk with him. And so I did go up and talk with him in his office. I didn't give him concrete things that would justify the removal of the president. I wasn't able to say anything like that, but I gave him a picture from what I thought was a faculty point of view about what was going on at the college. I think he must have seen clearly that it was not the same thing as the student business; it was something different. This committee than gathered material. Among other things, Dean Marsh wrote a report on what had been taking place. It was his picture, and he put in everything including the kitchen sink that would support the Chandler administration. It was a loyal support of the president. To those of us who read it, it was so obviously overdoing it that it almost collapsed of its own weight. But at any rate, I think that was rather important for the board. They made their report. Their report, which came out
about the first of July, was to the effect that -- I don't remember most of the substance, but at any rate it wound up with the statement that those faculty members who didn't feel that they could remain comfortably at William and Mary ought to go. Well, in view of the fact that I had been in conflict with the president all along and had gone to Simpkins, I felt that this was addressed directly to me. I couldn't take that! It was gratuitous advice, you see. It certainly didn't fit any of my thinking as to what I should do. And so I wrote the reply. I didn't realize the degree of difference ... I was anxious about what difference it would make. Well, I felt that I had been publicly addressed in the newspaper, and I had to give a public reply. Well, I took it up to Richmond and gave it to Virginius Dabney, and we had a little conversation about it. I told him I realized that once it went in there was no telling what would happen to it, but that I did hope that it would not be interpreted as being primarily my unwillingness to resign, that the important thing was the conditions at the college were bad. And when the letter appeared, he wrote an editorial, and it was to the effect that the focus should be on the situation at the college and not on what particular faculty members were going to do and not do. I knew it was possibly a momentous thing for me, and I was troubled by it. I went to have lunch with Fitzroy right afterward so I could have the company of an understanding friend. I came on back down to Williamsburg. I might say another thing; another letter had preceded mine. A man named Deerstyne, who was with
the Restoration but who was part-time at the college, had written a letter. His was rather strong. And I remember that, knowing that I was going to write, but not having drafted a letter, I called him on the phone, and I said, "I just want you to know that just hold tight for a little bit. You're not going to be standing alone on this." I may say also that before I took that letter up I went over to see Jim Miller. I said, "Now Jim, you're a logician, and you know the situation. I want you to look at this letter and see if it sounds right." He said indeed it did, and it was fine. Then I took it to my lawyer, and I said, "I want you to look at this and see if it is reasonably prudent." He said he couldn't find a thing wrong with it. I'm told that Chandler also got some advice following this. I was told that he went down to see Kidder Mead, who had charge of Restoration public relations, and sort of begged him for some kind of advice as to how he should handle some of these things. I don't know whether he did or not -- it's a possibility. I know that some people who had been working with him were very, very angry. I remember that I overheard a conversation between two employees in the alumni office, "Why in the hell doesn't that goddamn blowhard keep his mouth shut," or something like that. But as far as faculty members were concerned, I think that all I ever had much to do with thought that it was the right thing.
Williams: Do you think that there were others who felt as you did but did not take as strong a stand as you did by writing to the Times-Dispatch?

Moss: Yes, oh yes. I didn't -- I think there were people who were associated with Chandler who were inclined to say, "Why couldn't we have had some peace? Why every time a thing would get settled, why does it have to get upset again?" I'm sure they said that. But I had no people who came to me and said, "Well, you certainly did the wrong thing." No, not at all. I did find this, though: there were some people -- I remember that we had some college occasion. Maybe it wasn't right after that; maybe it had been earlier, but it's the kind of thing that took place. It was at a homecoming which was probably in 1952. But because of the position that I had taken I observed that there were some people who didn't want to be seen with me or with Nelson Marshall -- I guess it was in '51 -- didn't want to be seen with us on this public occasion. Well, I think there were some people who had that kind of response that since I had taken this strong position they were not going to be identified with me. I also think that there were some people that felt loyalty to the president was imperative. Pelzer Wagner thought this. And I remember that I was sitting at the table with him and also with Lloyd Williams, whose newspaper stories on the bricks had created such trouble. Lloyd Williams and I were speaking very frankly about the president and being critical of him, and
Wagener was quite disgusted. It was that kind of thing. I think that the faculty as a whole accepted the position that I took. Perhaps this is a personal note, but how did it affect relations between you and the president? How did he react to it?

I suppose this is the time to make a general statement regarding the -- I don't remember his immediate reaction. We probably didn't see each other immediately. He certainly didn't call me in, as far as I recall. I think there may have been, say, ten days before we saw each other. I'd make this observation: that while Chandler and I were often in conflict, and sometimes it was on a personal basis, I don't think that he -- I never found from him a punitive action that seemed to step beyond the proprieties. In other words, he seemed to be governed by some kind of navy rule: you may disagree with a man, there are certain kinds of punishments you can deal out, but there are some things that you don't do. I was not denied a salary increase. I was not denied anything that I asked for which was clearly in the interest of the college. I never had the feeling that when I was doing something for the college that I would find him ranged against me, unless it was really a matter of principle that he could stand on squarely. You follow what I mean? And he had that kind of integrity. And also I think that he more of a sense of humor than people credited him with. It was hard to credit him with a sense of humor, but sometimes there would be a trace of a smile. Sometimes he would recognize the dramatic or the amusing in a situation -- just a trace of a smile. I think he had that.
On the other hand, he accused me of disloyalty; I think from his navy standpoint this was disloyalty. It wasn't from my standpoint. But here we had as president of the college a man whose conduct simply -- it didn't seem to be as polite as you should expect from a college president. What was the matter with the man? I remember having lunch with him one day with Lord Milner there. Of course, with Englishmen you use the term "lord" -- you'd speak of "Lord Milner" -- but to have this man sit at the head of the table with his fork in one fist and his knife in the other and say, "Look here, lord," and stick his knife in Lord Milner's face, "Look here, lord." Well, I almost fell through the floor. Foreign visitors, in particular, would come here because this was the ancient College of William and Mary, which in their minds had some great dignity, and then to encounter this man who had no dignity at all.... They couldn't take it. What was it? So they would come to me: "How do you explain this?" I remember one man, I said, "Well, he's a son of a former president, and he just didn't realize that the law of primogeniture was repealed in Virginia back in Jeffersonian days." And there was one case in particular when we had some kind of conference on international relations, and a man who was president of George Washington was discussing some of our local affairs, and I was quite plain in saying what I thought about the president, that he didn't fit the job and so on. None of it was disagreeable or anything
like that. It was just that he wasn't the kind of man we needed at William and Mary. He went back and reported back to the president. I didn't know that this man had been in the navy with him. They were buddies, and so he went back. The president called me in, and he said he did regard this as disloyalty. I told him, "I'm sorry, and if I thought it would hurt you, if you would have felt offended I wouldn't have done it." I said, "We do have to be honest with people. I couldn't talk to my colleagues, people from another institution, and try to defend something that I thought was quite wrong." I couldn't possibly apologize -- I mean I couldn't justify the kind of performance that he was putting on.

Williams: You had said in your letter to the Times-Dispatch that the president, and you included the board, were damaging the reputation of the college, which fits in here. Looking back on it do you still feel this way?

Moss: Yes, oh yes. I think that they hurt us a great deal. Of course, they would have replied, "All of this commotion hurts the college. If you fellows would just shut up, why nobody would find anything to criticize the college for." But that wasn't true. They were bringing discredit on the college. (I forgot I had said that in my letter.) We were embarrassed to have the president represent us. Mind you, he is representing this ancient college which we, as faculty members, feel is a source of our own dignity. We are glad to be associated with William and Mary because it has dignity, and we want dignity. And then to have
this spokesman.... I remember that when the queen was here that we had a dinner in the Wren Building, a great big state dinner, or lunch it was, and the president was making some reference to his being abroad, and he said, "When I was in 'Edinburgh!'". Well, it's "Edinboro." Well, who was sitting opposite me but one of the professors of the University of Edinburgh, and you could see him sort of shrink.

Williams: How about the Duke of Edinburgh -- what did he do?

Moss: Well, he must have called him the "Duke of Edinburg"."I suppose he must have; he was here. How do you fit into that? I suppose what we could have done was to sort of laugh about it. I suppose that's really what I should have done, to have laughed about it and said, "You know, in your country, too, you have things that don't go quite the way you wanted them to. But underneath he's not such a bad guy." He had no personal dignity. And yet the epaulets on his shoulders -- you might say that stripped of his epaulets he didn't have a sense of security or dignity.

Williams: Given the situation, though, did you find it true that the Chandler administration was trying to "present the outside world with a rosy picture of what was going on at the college?" Particularly I'm thinking of the realm of publications.

Moss: Yes. They were doing that. They were trying to make it look very good. But you know, even on this they didn't have very good advice because the things they published tended to look
weak. They didn't have the vocabulary that fitted the public image of William and Mary. For example, they would talk in quantitative terms instead of qualitative terms. They didn't do a shrewd job on this. The board didn't either.

**Williams:** It was said (I think at the time of this 1955 uproar) that two sides were just talking about different things, which you were just saying. One side was talking about material accomplishments, about bricks and mortar, and that the other side was talking about spiritual losses. Is this an accurate statement?

**Moss:** I think that as a general statement that's accurate, yes. Faculty members were not unconcerned about material things such as salaries. And I'm sure that the board and the president had cherished the kind of reputation that the college had had in its colonial era. So generally this was true. Might I say, too, that one of Chandler's accomplishments was to do some fighting for salaries. I think he had the feeling that if faculty members were well paid that they might be happier people. That's true up to a point. But Pomfret and Charlie Duke and Bryan had never done this. I think that Chandler was really concerned about it. But the big break came with Paschall. And it was not altogether Paschall's fault, but he played his role. The state as a whole was doing better. Well, the president and the faculty, just as in this matter of academic freedom, never quite understood each other. The day I went in the first time (I think it was that day or certainly soon after) I told the president, "You know, we can't in a few minute's conversa-
tion come to a common understanding about these things. But if you and I were to go off on a little vacation together for a week or something, just in each other's company, and talk about a whole lot of things, with the college perhaps central, I believe that we would come to some common thinking about it."

I think he too quickly assumed that what I was suggesting was that we should actually go off on a vacation together ("I think I had mentioned the Bahamas or something). Of course, this was just a figurative thing. But I think that an example of failure to think along this same line was his perhaps jumping to the conclusion that I was proposing this seriously as a particular step, though in principle I think that this is true. If we had had a chance to work together on the same problem, come to know each other so as to get over some of these differences and then find out what we could do together that was substantial, then we could have done it. Maybe that's wishful thinking. As I look back on all these things I have a feeling that the college need not have gone through as much as it did. Men are just not that wise.

Williams: Wise in retrospect?

Moss: Yes.

Williams: Before we go on and talk about the later years of Chandler and setting up the Colleges of William and Mary and getting into this, maybe we'd better quit for the day because we've been going on for some time now.