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A Characterization of Optimal Strategies in a Reciprocal Product Dumping Environment

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Author: Callaway, Bryan
Advisor: Basu, Arnab
Committee Members: Cheng, Tun-jen; Feldman, David
Issued Date: 2009-05-20
Subjects: Game Theory
Product Dumping
Trade Theory
Industrial Organization
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10288/1266
Description: This thesis considers the possibility and implications of product dumping under a variety of different environments. The first cases we consider follow directly from the Brander-Krugman Reciprocal Dumping model first introduced to the literature in 1982. Following our analysis of these, we next analyze the Brander-Krugman model in the context of a sequential game. However, the most important finding from this analysis, in particular, is the paradox of a government's attempt at an information-coordinating trigger strategy. This finding has broad applications to current product-dumping policy since it serves to greatly enhance the welfare of the countries and industries involved.
Degree: Bachelors of Arts in Economics

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