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All Heads Gently Nodding: How Naturalism Dissolves the Problem of Other Minds

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Author: Curry, Devin Sanchez
Advisor: Davies, Paul
Committee Members: Goldman, Alan; Haug, Matthew C.; Ball, Chris (Christopher Thomas)
Issued Date: 5/4/2011
Subjects: Naturalism
Problem of Other Minds
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10288/13653
Description: The epistemological problem of other minds "� the hallowed philosophical quandary of justifying belief in the existence of other minds like one's own "� is a problem about how humans come to know minds. Historically, most philosophers have broached the problem of other minds entirely from their armchairs, without incorporating knowledge from relevant scientific theories. This thesis lays out what the science shows about how humans understand their own minds and other minds, and discusses what the evidence does to vindicate or deny leading philosophical accounts of attributions of mindedness. This evidence, drawn from work in psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and philosophy, strongly suggests that the problem of other minds is misguided and confused from the get-go and that there is no greater problem with belief in other minds than belief in one's own.
Degree: Bachelors of Arts in Philosophy

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